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Abstract
On a basic desert conception of moral responsibility, any agent who freely, 
knowingly, and inexcusably acts immorally deserves a negative response just because 
s/he so acted. The predominant view is that blame is the negative response at issue. I 
argue that, even if we know that an agent has freely, knowingly, and inexcusably acted 
immorally, there is no reliable evidence that this fact alone renders the agent deserving 
of blame or other form of censure. We ought, then, to be skeptical about the desert of 
blame, and in turn forego blaming or censuring on that basis. I argue that this does not 
entail that agents are never morally responsible for immoral acts. Some agents may still 
deserve to feel guilt for their immoral acts, and it is this guiltworthiness that explains 
their moral responsibility. Moreover, I argue that skepticism about the desert of blame 
does not impugn the rationality of our blaming emotions. These views stand in stark 
contrast to extant views concerning blame and moral responsibility, and offer solutions 
to heretofore unresolved issues in ethics. 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Introduction
On a basic desert conception of moral responsibility (henceforth simply 'moral 
responsibility'), any agent who freely, knowingly, and inexcusably acts immorally 
deserves a negative response just because s/he so acted. Historically, the dominant 
focus in explorations of this concept has been on its agential features; the kind of free 
will and moral sensitivity required to be morally responsible, whether or not anyone has 
these capacities, and how we ought to treat people if they lack them. Since Peter 
Strawson's influential paper Freedom and Resentment , work on moral responsibility 1
has broadened to also include a focus on the relation between moral responsibility and 
the interpersonal nature and norms of our blaming practices. 
I suspect that it is largely due to this Strawsonian emphasis that moral 
responsibility has come to be seen as essentially connected to these blaming practices. 
The predominant view is that an agent is morally responsible for an immoral action just 
in case s/he deserves to be blamed for it , and that it's irrational to blame those who 2
aren't morally responsible for their immoral actions.  Furthermore, due to the continued 3
focus on agential concerns, the question of whether or not a person is morally 
responsible is still seen as solely a question of whether or not s/he has the requisite 
agential capacities to be blameworthy. I think each of these views is mistaken. Once we 
 Strawson 1982.1
 Feinberg 1970, 55-94; Gibbard 1990, 42; Wallace 1994, 76-77; Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 5-8; 2
Strawson, G. 2002, 452; Bennett 2002; Clarke 2005, 21; Fischer 2006, 63; Darwall 2006 and 2009; 
Shoemaker 2007 and 2011; Waller 2011, 2-5; McKenna 2012, 150; Boxer 2013; Scanlon 2013, 101- 102; 
Pereboom 2014, 2.
 Honderich 1988, 583-585; Smilansky 2002, 501; Scheffler 2003; Strawson, G. 2008; Pereboom 2014, 3
128-129.
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shift the focus away from the interpersonal and agential features of moral responsibility 
towards its oft-neglected intrapersonal and normative features, we discover that moral 
responsibility is only contingently related to our blaming practices, and in the end only 
sometimes justifies them. Or so I argue in this collection of papers. Here's a sketch of 
the project.
I first set the stage for much of the work that follows by defending a justifying 
conception of the desert that constitutes moral responsibility. On a justifying conception, 
when an agent 'deserves' a negative response, there is a defeasible non-instrumental 
justification for responding to the agent in that way. There are rivals to this conception. 
By 'deserves a response', some - most notably George Sher, Michael Zimmerman, and 
Ishtayique Haji - mean only that the beliefs partly constitutive of that response (e.g. the 
beliefs constitutive of the negative reactive attitudes) are justified and true. Alternatively, 
by 'deserves a response', some - for example Nathan Hanna and (on one reading) Tim 
Scanlon - mean only that it is less bad that the agent receive that response than it would 
have been, had s/he not deserved it. I argue that the justifying conception explains 
paradigm moral responsibility practices, distinguishes moral responsibility from 
responsibility for imprudent actions, and explains why some individuals seem 'more' 
deserving of a negative response than others. I argue that, since these features are 
crucial to our core conception of moral responsibility, rival views are at best revisionist.
With this defense in hand, I turn to the question of whether or not blame can be 
deserved in the sense at issue in attributions of moral responsibility. Many claim that 
those who are responsible for wrongdoing deserve to be blamed, and that an agent's 
blameworthiness at least sometimes permits blaming or otherwise censuring them. I 
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argue in "The Case for Retributive Caution", that blameworthiness does not offer this 
permission. I avoid the typical agential concerns and just assume throughout that 
people sometimes act immorally without excuse and with the requisite free will and 
moral sensitivity. I argue that, even if we assume that agents freely, knowingly, and 
inexcusably act immorally, there is currently no plausible theory explaining how these 
facts alone offer a non-instrumental justification to blame or otherwise censure such 
agents. Moreover, our blameworthiness intuitions are too likely to be biased by an 
unconscious process I call 'anger affirmation' to be reliable. I argue that the unreliability 
of intuition, together with the absence of a plausible theory of blameworthiness, 
undermines adequate epistemic justification for the belief that anyone is blameworthy 
for acting immorally. Our concept of blameworthiness, however firmly entrenched, is 
unlikely to apply. I argue that we ought, then, to practice retributive caution by refraining 
from blaming or otherwise censuring agents on the basis of their alleged 
blameworthiness.
At first glance, it might seem that this skepticism about blameworthiness commits 
one to skepticism about moral responsibility for immoral acts. This is because the 
predominant blame-focused view of moral responsibility is that an agent is morally 
responsible for an immoral act just in case s/he is blameworthy for it. However, I argue 
that beliefs about deserving to feel moral guilt for immoral acts are on surer epistemic 
footing, and that we may sometimes have sufficient epistemic justification for such 
beliefs. I then argue in "Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness" for a guilt-focused view 
of moral responsibility. The desert of blame, I argue, does not explain moral 
responsibility for immoral acts, as the current literature suggests. Rather, an agent is 
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morally responsible for an immoral act just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for 
it. I argue that this conclusion explains puzzling features about moral responsibility that 
rival views cannot. Most notably, it explains why those who commit suberogations, 
those inured to the intended effects of blame, and those who do not fully understand 
what Darwall calls 'second-personal' reasons are blameless but nevertheless seem 
morally responsible for their immoral acts. So, skepticism about blameworthiness does 
not entail skepticism about moral responsibility.
Many philosophers argue that skepticism about blameworthiness at the very 
least impugns the rationality of the reactive anger partly constitutive of blame, and 
therefore generates a strong reason for skeptics such as myself to either relinquish 
doubt or eschew anger. Appealing to the conclusion Gary Watson draws in his influential 
discussion about the sadistic murderer Robert Harris, these philosophers argue that it is 
nearly impossible for any sane adult to target an agent with the anger that is constitutive 
of blame without also believing that the targeted agent deserves it. I call this view 
retributivism about anger. In my final paper, "Skepticism and the Rationality of Anger", I 
debunk the Harris explanation, and argue for a view I call the justifying view of anger. 
Roughly, this is the view that an agent can target an individual with anger if she believes 
she is sufficiently justified in doing so, and values acting on that justification more than 
she disvalues harming the individual. I then argue that there are non-desert based 
justifications that satisfy this condition. I cite as paradigms two kinds of cases: cases of 
moral education in which we value the reform of the immoral agent and moral 
community more than we disvalue the temporary harm anger causes, and cases of 
moral protest in which we react angrily to an immoral but nevertheless undeserving 
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actor in order to overcome or take a stand against the immoral system of which they are 
a part. Given our values, lacking the belief that such individuals deserve to be targeted 
by anger might decrease the severity of our anger, but it surely cannot extinguish it. So 
although skepticism about blameworthiness undermines a common justification for the 
reactive anger constitutive of blame, it does not impugn the rationality of blaming agents 
in reaction to their immoral acts.
In short, my view is that we ought to be skeptical about blameworthiness, but that 
this does not have the drastic implications for moral responsibility that the current 
literature suggests, since moral responsibility for an immoral act is neither explained by 
blameworthiness, nor presupposed by blame. 
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Defending a justifying conception of desert
It is generally agreed that desert is a triadic relation between a deserving subject, 
an object that the subject deserves, and a basis for the subject's deservingness of the 
object.  Aside from that feature, it is unlikely that there can be any non-trivial analysis 4
that applies to all desert claims.  I leave it an open question whether or not there can 5
be. Instead, and as indicated in the introduction, I limit myself in this work to the kind of 
desert that an agent generates solely by virtue of acting in a certain way with the 
requisite agential capacities. In the ethics and political philosophy literature this sort of 
desert is known as 'raw' , or 'pre-institutional'  desert. In the philosophy of agency 6 7
literature, it is known as 'basic'  desert. Though I enjoy the visceral character of the first 8
descriptor, I will in the remainder of this work employ the last.
There are two sorts of desert that are potentially 'basic' in this way.  Distributive 9
desert is desert of a portion of resources, benefits, or burdens that are, perhaps 
necessarily so, distributed by institutions. We might say, for example, that Jennifer 
deserves more of the total pay available to workers for staying overtime, while Jane, her 
workmate, deserves less because she slept on the job. There is also the desert of 
 This was made explicit in Rescher 1966, 62; Feinberg 1970; and Kleinig 1971, and has been assumed 4
in much of the literature since then. One notable exception is Vilhauer 2009.
 Sher 1987, xii.5
 Kleinig 1971.6
 Scanlon 1988; Rawls 1991; Scheffler 1992; McLeod 1999; Moriarty 2002.7
 Pereboom 2001, xx; 2007, 170. Pereboom's 'basic' title is adopted by McKenna 2012, 121, and Shabo 8
2012b, 159. Untitled characterizations of this sort of desert are prevalent in the free will literature. See, for 
example, G. Strawson 2002, 452-455; Waller 2011, 2-5; Clark 2005, 21. 
 For a concise overview see Sher 1987, 6-8.9
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negative responses such as blame, guilt, or punishment generated solely by those 
actions that are immoral, and done freely, knowingly, and inexcusably.  It is only this 10
latter sort of desert that concerns me in this work.
What is it to 'deserve' some negative response for an immoral action? I join the 
near consensus that desert constitutes a defeasible normative justification in the form of 
the 'good' or the 'right'. More specifically, I endorse
The justifying conception of desert (JD): When an agent A deserves a negative 
response R for an immoral action, there is some non-instrumental good in seeing 
to it that A receive R , or there is a defeasible non-instrumental reason to see to 11
it that A receive R.12
There are two rival conceptions to JD. In what follows, I defend JD against arguments in 
favor of each rival conception.
2. Against the Epistemic Sense of 'Deserves'
Michael Zimmerman claims that there is an epistemic use of the term 'deserves' 
such that, by 'A deserves a negative response R', some mean only that there is a 
reason for agents to hold the doxastic attitudes involved in that response, where the 
 'Moral' desert is sometimes used to specify this kind of basic desert. See, for example, Rawls 1991, 10
2003; Scheffler 2000; Shafer-Landau 2000; Miller 1999, 134, 148.
 Ross 1930, 134-138; Sher 1987, 194-198; Hurka 2001, 8-12; Moriarty 2003, 520; Bennett 2002, 147; 11
Kagan 2003, 93; McKenna 2012, 172; Pereboom 2014, 137.
 Mundle 1954, 217; Feinberg 1970, 60; Murphy 1971 and 1973; Kleinig 1973, 62-3; Zimmerman 1988, 12
162; Moore 1993, 15; Schmitdz 2002, 774. 
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reason is generated solely by the truth of, or evidence for, those doxastic attitudes.  13
Philosophers sometimes employ this use of the term in theories of 'appraisability' or 
'attributability', which concern the justification for holding certain sorts of immoral 
appraisals of agents, or attributing agents with certain immoral characteristics.  George 14
Sher appeals to this sense of desert, claiming that 
We must take 'X deserves blame' to mean no more than that blame directed at X 
is justified or appropriate , [where] the norms that render it appropriate to have 15
the desire-belief combinations that I have said add up to blame stand revealed as 
those that require that we believe propositions that are true and that we accept 
moral principles that are justified.16
Call this the epistemic conception of desert, or ED. ED is too weak to accommodate two 
core intuitions about desert. The first core intuition concerns a constraint on the relation 
between affect and deserved response. Some responses affect the deserving agent in 
some way. That is, they ensure the deserving agent a particular physical or mental 
state, behavioral response, or level of well-being that would not have occurred 
otherwise. For example, an agent might be affected by expressions of blame in that she 
 Zimmerman 1988, 152.13
 For these uses of 'desert', see Zimmerman 1988, 152; Haji 1998, Sher 2006, 93-114, and Boxer 2013, 14
38. For attributability more generally, see Watson 1996; Arpaly 2006, 9-39; Shoemaker 2011; Nelkin 2011, 
34-35.
 Sher 2006, 86.15
 Sher 2006, 130.16
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is caused to feel bad, to scoff, to believe herself blameworthy, to decide to be indifferent, 
to apologize, to be worse off, or simply caused to hear an agent blaming her. 
By 'blame', Sher is merely appealing to a set of doxastic attitudes. This attributive 
sense of blame  does not necessarily dispose the blamer to act. This is because the 17
attitudes that constitute such blame are all private, unemotional, and need never result 
in any outward change in the blamer. So such a response does not affect the targeted 
agent. As Sher points out, "even when someone receives his full measure of deserved 
blame, his receiving it need not affect his life at all."  This does not comport well with 18
conclusions about other kinds of cases. As Sher himself points out, "in many other 
contexts a person’s getting what he deserves necessarily does have some impact on 
his life."19
Suppose Jenny doesn't practice as hard for her competition as her competitors. 
As a result, she comes in last. Intuitively, Jenny deserves her loss. Suppose Sadam's 
wanton drinking is hurting his health. He solemnly promises himself he'll quit. But he 
doesn't. So he feels guilty. Intuitively, Sadam deserves to feel guilty. In each of these 
cases, the object of desert affects the deserving agent, and needn't affect anyone else. 
Each deserving agent's desert is theirs and theirs alone. This is evidence, as both John 
Kleinig and Joel Feinberg note in their work on the issue, that an agent's receipt of her 
desert must affect her.  "Deserved treatment", says Kleinig, "is not something toward 20
 See my "Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness" for further details.17
 Sher 2006, 86.18
 Sher 2006, 86.19
 Feinberg 1970, 61; Kleinig 1971, 72.20
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which we remain indifferent."  Sher recognizes that such a constraint is at play in other 21
sorts of cases, conceding that
At first glance, the norms may not seem to explain [deserved blame], since what 
they demand is...only that other people (or the wrongdoers and bad people 
themselves in another capacity) have certain beliefs and desires whose 
propositional objects refer essentially to them. Because the norms are addressed 
to potential blamers rather than to potential blamees, their demands may seem 
ill-suited to support a reconstruction of what the latter agents deserve.22
Sher argues that the violation of the constraint that desert is affective is acceptable in 
cases of desert for immoral actions because it is a consequence of accepting (i) that 
blame is the object of desert for immoral actions,  and (ii) that blame is merely some 23
combination of dispassionate doxastic attitudes.  I argue in "Moral Responsibility as 24
Guiltworthiness" against (i). But even if we grant it, (ii) is not firmly established. And 
there are strong intuitions against it. Consider a paradigm example of a wrongdoing. 
Nathan Hanna has us imagine that "a general orders the kidnapping, brutal torture, and 
execution of innocent dissidents."  Suppose she does this freely, and knowing full well 25
 Kleinig 1971, 72.21
 Sher 2006, 130.22
 Sher 2006, 70, 80-81.23
 Sher 2006, 86.24
 Hanna 2012, 46.25
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that it is inexcusably wrong. Now consider a case in which the General is targeted with 
the sort of aretaic blame to which Sher appeals.
The General's suspicious lieutenant Alfredo discovers her wrongdoing. Alfredo 
concludes that she is blameworthy, becomes angry at her, and desires that she 
not have committed the wrongdoing. In a sense, Alfredo 'blames' the General. 
Although this blame constitutes a change in Alfredo's attitudes, it does not at all 
alter his behavior. Alfredo never communicates his emotions or attitudes to the 
General. 
Alfredo 'blames' the General in the aretaic sense. Alfredo is certainly epistemically 
justified in holding those attitudes involved with his blame. So on an epistemic 
conception of desert, the General gets all that she 'deserves'. But she clearly does not 
get all that she deserves. The object of the General's desert must affect her in some 
way. Desert is affective. So ED is false.
 Sher's claim that (i) blame is the object of desert for morally bad actions or 
characteristics has some initial plausibility because we often allege that immoral agents 
deserve blame. However, we have in mind not just the collection of attitudes that are 
sometimes called 'blame', but rather the passionate expression of those attitudes. As I 
detail in the next two works in this dissertation, 'overt' blame may include many, perhaps 
all, of the features of attributive blame. But it also includes an overt expression of anger. 
(i) is only plausible when it refers to overt blame. But (ii) refers to blame that is not overt 
in this way. So Sher's two-step argument in support of ED is unsound. To deserve a 
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negative response is to deserve something affective, and not merely the non-affective 
attitudes involved in that response. That is why most philosophers, including Sher in an 
earlier work , offer conceptions of desert that provide a normative rather than an 26
epistemic justification. Alfredo, for example, is not merely justified in appraising the 
General negatively. All else being equal, the General's desert also justifies Alfredo in 
affecting the General harmfully by way of overt blame or even punishment. ED cannot 
offer such a justification. JD can.
Some may protest that this dispute is merely verbal. There is, they might say, an 
epistemic sense of 'deserves', and a normative sense of 'deserves'.  The former 27
justifies negative responses that are not affective. The latter justifies negative responses 
that are. I'm happy to concede the point. However, I think that the epistemic sense of 
'deserves' is, then, nothing more than a term of art that can do no useful theoretic work. 
After all, 'desert' is a misleading title for a justification for merely believing propositions 
that are true and accepting moral principles that are justified. We do not typically say 
that agents like the General 'deserve' others to correctly appraise her. Indeed, almost all 
of those working on blame do not speak of desert when referencing such a justification, 
but instead of 'warrant', 'aptness', 'fittingness', or, more directly, of 'epistemic 
justification'. Linguistic practices are sometimes misguided. But surely the fact that an 
epistemic sense of deserves is not what people mean to pick out when they use the 
term is, in the absence of a compelling argument to the contrary, sufficient evidence that 
the epistemic sense of 'deserves' is not at play.
 Sher 1989, xi.26
 Zimmerman 1988.27
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3. Against Weakened Normative Conceptions of Desert
In opposition to ED, I think we should endorse JD. As explained above, the 
negative responses that immoral agents intuitively deserve - blame, guilt, punishment, 
and the like - are all affective. They are also typically harmful. That troubles some 
philosophers. Tim Scanlon has consistently held that "it is never a good thing, morally 
speaking, for anyone to suffer, no matter what they have done."  His remarks indicate 28
the same stance on reasons.  He rejects JD on that basis. However, the conclusion 29
that those who freely, knowingly, and inexcusably act immorally do not deserve a 
harmful response is extremely counterintuitive. So those like Scanlon who reject JD 
typically don't wish to renounce desert altogether. Rather, they aim for a weaker sense 
of desert that can be supplemented by further justifications. Scanlon has recently 
endorsed such a view, claiming that an agent's desert of blame can weaken our reasons 
to offer the agent good will, friendliness, sympathy, and help.  Nathan Hanna , 30 31
developing remarks by Fred Feldman , has also offered such a view. On Hanna's view, 32
The discounting conception of desert (DD): When A deserves a negative 
response R for doing wrong, her receiving R is not as bad as it would be if she 
didn’t deserve it, or there is less reason to prevent her from receiving R. But her 
 Scanlon 2013, 104. Also see Scanlon 1998, 274.28
 Scanlon 2013, 107-108.29
 Scanlon 2013, 105-106.30
 Hanna 2012.31
 Feldman 1995.32
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receiving R is still intrinsically bad. And there are no reasons to see to it that she 
receives R.
In what follows, I argue that DD (and, a fortiori, ED) is too weak to accommodate core 
intuitions about desert that JD can, and that there are no good arguments favoring DD 
over JD. So JD is preferable to DD. 
Reconsider the case of the General. Suppose that, in response, Alfredo harms 
the General by way of an expression of overt blame or minor punishment. Given moral 
prohibitions against harming people for no good reason, Alfredo needs a viable 
justification for his harmful response. All else being equal, the fact that the General 
deserved a harmful response to her wrongdoing seems to constitute such a justification. 
But the mere fact that it is less bad to respond harmfully to the General, and there is 
less reason to prevent her from being harmed, cannot alone offer a viable justification 
for harming her. So the DD interpretation of desert cannot accommodate our intuitions 
here. JD can.
Alternatively, suppose that those authorities in the General's community who 
have the relevant moral standing to punish wrongdoers learn of the General's 
wrongdoing. Suppose further that these authorities purposely neglect to in any way 
respond to the General for her wrongdoing. Intuitively, the General's desert of a harmful 
response all by itself renders their failure morally deficient. But the mere fact that it is 
less bad to respond harmfully to the General, and there is less reason to prevent her 
from being harmed, cannot explain this. JD can. Such intuitions are persistent and 
commonplace enough that rejecting them in favor of DD would seem to require a 
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substantial revision to our moral thought.  So the onus is on the advocates of DD to 33
offer compelling arguments in favor of their view. 
One argument against JD is that it is morally indefensible, given the strength of 
general moral prohibitions against harming others.  However, the claim that there are 34
moral prohibitions against harming others "no matter what they've done" is precisely 
what's in question. Many people's intuitions counsel against that conclusion. To reject 
those intuitions on the basis of the alleged obligation doesn't bode well for the DD 
advocate. After all, any moral theory that prohibits harming others will almost certainly 
obligate us to prevent the harming of others. Intuitions in favor of DD are contrary to this 
latter obligation. So on this strategy, DD intuitions would also have to be rejected.
Another kind of argument against JD concerns its questionable epistemic 
origins.  I defend such an argument in "The Case for Retributive Caution". But in this 35
case employing such an argument would yield another pyrrhic victory for DD advocates. 
The intuition that an agent's wrongdoing provides an objective reason, or makes it non-
instrumentally good, to respond to her harmfully almost certainly shares its epistemic 
origins with the intuition that an agent's wrongdoing weakens reasons against 
responding to her harmfully, or makes it less bad to respond to her harmfully. So if the 
epistemic origins of JD judgments are suspicious, so too are those of DD judgments.
 R.J. Wallace concedes that weakened conceptions of desert like DD may be revisionist for precisely 33
this reason (1994, 228).
 Wallace 1994, 226-227; Scanlon 2008, 189.34
 Murphy 2007.35
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A much better strategy for the DD advocate is to try to show that our intuitions 
about desert themselves support DD rather than JD. Nathan Hanna offers two such 
arguments. The first involves a case of severely imprudent behavior. Suppose that
Johnny, a carefree undergrad, goes to a frat party. He’s eager to impress his bros 
and after a couple drinks he hits upon a daring scheme. He clambers to the roof 
of the frat house with a sheet, bellows out his favorite beer’s name while striking 
a macho pose, hurls himself off the roof, and tries to parachute onto the lawn, 
aiming for a convenient spot near the keg (living dangerously is thirsty business). 
Unsurprisingly, he breaks his ankle.36
Hanna contends that
Dj: Johnny deserved to break his ankle.
But Hanna claims that it's also intuitive that "It’s intrinsically bad that Johnny broke his 
ankle. And there was no reason - not even a weak one - to bring this about for its own 
sake."   Hence, JD is false in this case. But even those who have this intuition will likely 37
agree that Johnny's ankle-breaking is less bad than it would have been, had Johnny 
suffered it through no fault of his own, a conclusion that supports DD.
 Hanna 2012, 43.36
 Hanna 2012, 43.37
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Dj is intuitive. And Hanna's analysis is compelling. I take it to show that JD cannot 
be the relation at stake in cases like Johnny's. But there are different kinds of desert. 
And the sort that is at stake in cases like Johnny's is conceptually distinct from the sort 
of 'moral' and 'basic' desert that is at stake in cases like the General's. So the Johnny 
example does not impugn JD as best capturing our intuitions about a kind of desert that 
many take to be at the core of our judgments concerning moral responsibility, as well as 
justified punishment and blame. 
Consider first my claim that there are different kinds of desert. It is commonplace 
to hear that a person deserves a prize, deserves to win the lottery, deserves her lot in 
life, deserves better weather, deserves punishment, or deserves to be better informed. 
The first pages of a Google news search just now (try it yourself!) reveals the claims 
"Plato deserves better than a stint at the Googleplex", and "everyone deserves a place 
at the library." As indicated above, these desert claims are too diverse to be given a 
unifying analysis that is non-trivial.  The way in which a person might deserve better 38
weather, for instance, seems different in kind from the way in which a person may 
deserve punishment, and these in turn seem different in kind from the way in which 
everyone might deserve his or her place at the library.
Consider next my claim that the sort of desert at issue in cases like Johnny's is 
distinct from the sort of desert at issue in cases of immoral actions like the General's. 
There are three considerations supporting this conclusion. First, if Johnny deserves his 
ankle-breaking, he deserves it because it is a predictable consequence of his action.  39
 Sher 1987, xii.38
 Sher 1987, 41.39
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But the General's desert of something harmful has nothing to do with whether it is a 
predictable consequence of her immoral action. 
Secondly, the sort of desert at issue in the General case clearly constitutes her 
moral responsibility. This makes sense in the General case, considering that the 
General deserves by virtue of immoral actions. But there is nothing necessarily morally 
significant about Johnny's imprudence. His imprudence doesn't constitute anything 
wrong or morally bad. And this is why, although he may be responsible for his imprudent 
action, it seems incorrect to say that he is morally responsible for it. 
Lastly, the sort of desert in the General case is a sort of desert that is not in virtue 
of consequentialist considerations. But it seems to me that desert of the harm that 
results from imprudence requires that the harm help the imprudent in some way. For 
example, Johnny seems to 'deserve' to break his ankle for pulling such a dangerous 
stunt because he's likely to 'learn his lesson' from such harm, or at the very least set an 
example for others. If the event does nothing to dissuade Johnny or others from further 
dangerous stunts, then what happens to Johnny seems not deserved but tragic. These 
considerations support the conclusion that DD applies to a sort of non-moral desert that 
is conceptually distinct from the sort of 'moral' and 'basic' desert at issue in the General 
case. 
Anticipating such a response, Hanna offers a second argument against JD 
involving the General case. Recall that the General orders the kidnapping, brutal torture, 
and execution of innocent dissidents. Suppose that, in retaliation for the General's 
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actions, rebels kidnap her, brutally torture her, and execute her.  Hanna claims that, 40
when this happens,
G: The General gets what she deserves. 
Consider those who accept G. Together with JD, G entails that there is some non-
instrumental good, or there is a defeasible objective reason to see to it, that the General 
is kidnapped, tortured, and executed. Call the acceptance of both G and JD the 'strong 
view'. Hanna contends that the strong view cannot be right. "That such treatment can 
never be intrinsically good and that we can never have a reason - not even a weak one 
- to inflict it for its own sake is compelling. Some things just seem off limits in this 
sense."  But it still seems that the General's desert, "weakened the reasons not to treat 41
her that way - so that what the rebels did to her wasn’t as wrong as what she did to any 
of her victims - and [her desert] weakened the reasons to do things like help her and 
sympathize with her."  Hence we should accept DD to explain G.42
However, those endorsing the strong view can consistently claim that some 
harmful responses to wrongdoing are 'off limits'. Intuitively, some humans will have the 
moral standing to inflict some less harmful response on the General; perhaps overt 
blame or imprisonment. But it is plausible that the epistemic limitations, emotional 
integrity, and moral imperfections of human persons preclude any actual human person 
from having the moral standing to kidnap, torture, and execute another. Perhaps only a 
 Hanna 2012, 46.40
 Hanna 2012, 46-47.41
 Hanna 2012, 47.42
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God could have such moral standing. So the strong view that there is some non-
instrumental good, or there is a defeasible objective reason to kidnap, torture, and 
execute the General is consistent with the claim that, since no one has the relevant 
moral standing to mete out such treatment, such treatment is always 'off limits'.
One response to this sort of position is that a defeasible justification that is 
always defeated is no justification at all. So some treatment can't be both deserved but 
universally 'off limits' in the way sketched above. But notice that a defeated desert-
based justification to kidnap, torture, and execute the General may still offer sufficient 
justification to mete out some less harmful response on her. Indeed, I think it is intuitive 
that, if the General deserves to be kidnapped, tortured, and executed, then, all else 
being equal, those with the relevant moral standing are justified in meting out some less 
harmful response upon her. They can blame, punish, or guilt the General, all the while 
claiming that they are justified in doing so because she deserved much worse. DD 
cannot offer such a justification. JD can.
Of course, many will be prone to reject G in the first place on the basis of the 'off 
limits' intuition that there is a limit on the harmfulness of the responses that can be 
deserved. Most of us are prone to reject G in favor of 
L: The General deserves something less harmful than the 'off limits' response of 
kidnapping, torture, and execution.43
Hanna claims that JD can't accommodate our intuitions about L. 
 Hanna 2012, 47.43
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Consider any proposed limit on [the harmfulness of deserved responses] and 
people who reach it. Take two such people who are [harmed] equally and in 
excess of it, say the General and someone even worse: the Generalissimo. It 
seems like what happens to the Generalissimo isn’t as intrinsically bad. And it 
seems like there’s less reason to do things like help him and sympathize with 
him. If [JD is true] and if there’s a limit on [the harmfulness of deserved 
responses], then we can’t appeal to desert to explain important differences 
between such cases. [But] desert is an obvious place to look for an 
explanation.44
Hanna is surely correct that targeting the Generalissimo with a harmful response is less 
bad than targeting the General with that same response. He's also correct that there is 
less reason to help and sympathize with the Generalissimo. Hanna's argument rests, 
then, on his further claim that, if there’s a limit on the harmfulness of deserved 
responses, then JD cannot explain why the harm that befalls the Generalissimo is less 
bad than the harm that befalls the General, or why there is less reason to help and 
sympathize with him. But that's false; the justifying conception of desert can explain this 
fact. 
Suppose that the General and the Generalissimo each deserve the most harmful 
response that can be deserved. Suppose now that we can only respond to one of them. 
Who do we have most reason to respond to? Who is it better to respond to? Clearly, it is 
 Hanna 2012, 47. 44
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the Generalissimo. This is because, assuming both the General and generalissimo 
deserve the same harmful response, the Generalissimo, being guilty of a greater 
transgression, is more deserving of it than the General.  Even if there is a limit on the 45
harmfulness of the response that a person can deserve, there may be no limit on how 
much a person can deserve it. More specifically, JD does not preclude the possibility 
that
JDg: There is some non-instrumental good to degree i, or there is a defeasible 
objective reason of strength n, to see to it that the General receives the most 
harmful response that can be deserved.
JDo: There is some non-instrumental good to a degree greater than i, or there is 
a defeasible objective reason of a strength greater than n, to see to it that the 
Generalissimo receives the most harmful response that can be deserved.
JDg and JDo together offer an excellent explanation of why any harmful response that 
befalls the Generalissimo is not as bad as the same harmful response that befalls the 
General, and why there is less reason to help him. The Generalissimo is simply more 
deserving of that response, a notion that JD can accommodate. So L doesn't generate 
the problem for JD that Hanna alleges. So his argument does not show that our 
intuitions about desert support DD rather than JD. On the contrary, DD requires a 
 See Kagan 2003, 93.45
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substantial revision to our intuitions about desert. Advocates of DD have not shown that 
we should make such a revision. 
This conclusion does not, nor is it meant to, show that anyone ever deserves 
anything for their immoral actions. Perhaps no one ever does.  But insomuch as 46
anyone deserves anything for an immoral action, the justificatory conception of desert is 
preferable to the discounting and epistemic conceptions of desert. Our conception of 
desert doesn't merely discount or provide doxastic warrant. It normatively justifies.  
 Pereboom 2014.46
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The Case for Retributive Caution
There are senses of free will and moral knowledge that are so stringent in their 
requirements as to be elusive in a world like ours. But let's assume for the moment that 
some of us, sometimes, freely and knowingly do wrong without a good excuse. Call 
those who do responsible for their wrongdoing. It's often alleged that such individuals 
are blameworthy in a basic-desert sense. A wrongdoer is blameworthy in this sense 
(henceforth simply 'blameworthy') just in case the wrongdoer's responsibility alone 
offers a defeasible non-instrumental justification  to censure them in some way; overtly 47
blame them, shun them, punish them, etc.  No further facts need obtain for 48
blameworthiness, for example those offered by consequentialist or contractualist 
theories.  Simply, those responsible for wrongdoing deserve to be censured just 49
because they are responsible for wrongdoing.
The concept is prevalent. Ross believed it self-evident that the morally vicious 
deserve to suffer pain.  The free will debate largely concerns whether or not causation 50
 Some explicitly ground the justification in the good (Ross 1930, 134-138; Sher 1987, 194-198; Miller 47
1999, 136; Hurka 2001, 8-12; Bennett 2002, 147; Moriarty 2003, 520; Kagan 2003, 93; McKenna 2012, 
172; Pereboom 2014; Rosen 2015). Others explicitly ground it in the right (Mundle 1954, 217; Murphy 
1971 and 1973; Kleinig 1973, 62-3; Zimmerman 1988, 162; Moore 1993; 15; McLeod 1999, 193; 
Schmitdz 2002, 774). 
 Ross 1930, 134-138; Mundle 1954, 217; Feinberg 1970, 55-94; Murphy 1971 and 1973; Kleinig 1973, 48
62-3; Sher 1987, 194-198; Gibbard 1990, 42; Wallace 1994, 76-77; Zimmerman 1988, 162; Fischer and 
Ravizza 1998, 5-8; Miller 1999, 136; Hurka 2001, 8-12; Strawson, G. 2002, 452; Bennett 2002; Moore 
1993; 15; McLeod 1999, 193; Schmitdz 2002, 774; Moriarty 2003, 520; Kagan 2003, 93; Clarke 2005, 21; 
Fischer 2006, 63; Darwall 2006 and 2009; Shoemaker 2007 and 2011; Waller 2011, 2-5; McKenna 2012, 
150; Boxer 2013; Pereboom 2014, 2; Rosen 2015.
 On this point see especially Feinberg 1970; McKenna 2012; Pereboom 2014. 49
 Ross 1930, 136-137.50
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allows the sort of free will requisite for blameworthiness. Even Scanlon, a former skeptic 
about desert, has recently conceded that responsible wrongdoers deserve to be 
blamed.  Justice Stewart cites blameworthiness in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme 51
Court decision that re-animated the death penalty in America, as the primary justification 
for capital punishment, claiming that the need "to impose upon criminal offenders the 
punishment they 'deserve'" is a viable justification distinct from deterrence. Research in 
social psychology confirms that Stewart's sentiment about the death penalty is 
widespread , and that the folk tend to more generally endorse blameworthiness as a 52
justification for punishment instead of instrumental justifications.  Tellingly, that 53
research also shows that those few who explicitly deny blameworthiness in favor of 
instrumental justifications for punishment are nevertheless far more sensitive to non-
instrumental considerations, and still punish wrongdoers even when it is made obvious 
that doing so is suboptimal.
Clearly, blameworthiness is frequently both thought and treated as if it's among 
the moral considerations permitting us to censure those responsible for wrongdoing.  I 54
think that's an unfortunate mistake. In section 1, I argue that an agent's 
blameworthiness permits one to censure that agent only if one has adequate epistemic 
justification to believe that the agent is blameworthy. This requires one to have 
adequate epistemic justification to believe that
 Scanlon 2013. 51
 Ellsworth and Gross 1994.52
 Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson 2002; Carlsmith 2006; Carlsmith and Darley 2008.53
 See especially Feinberg 1970, 55-94; Gibbard 1990, 42; Wallace 1994, 76-77; Fischer and Ravizza 54
1998, 5-8; Bennett 2002; Clarke 2005, 21; Fischer 2006, 63; Darwall 2006 and 2009; Shoemaker 2007 
and 2011; McKenna 2012, 150; Boxer 2013; Rosen 2015.
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(B)lameworthiness: a wrongdoer's responsibility alone offers a defeasible non-
instrumental justification to censure them.
One commonly cited source of justification for this belief is intuition. In section 2, I argue 
that intuitions in favor of B are too likely to be brought about by an unreliable process I 
call 'anger affirmation' to provide adequate epistemic justification. One could have 
adequate epistemic justification for B if there were a plausible theory that supports it. 
But I argue in section 3 that there is no such theory. The absence of reliable intuition or 
a plausible theory undermines any other potential sources of justification, for example 
expert testimony or peer agreement. It follows that, until we have stronger epistemic 
justification for B, an agent's alleged blameworthiness does not permit censuring that 
agent. I argue in section 4 that we ought, then, to practice retributive caution by 
refraining from censuring agents on the basis of blameworthiness. I conclude in section 
5 by considering some objections, and explaining why judgments about the desert of 
guilt are on surer epistemic footing than judgments about the desert of censure.
1. An epistemic restriction on the permissibility of harm
I begin with some brief remarks about the sorts of responses that are intuitively 
deserved by the blameworthy. As an expedient, and in full recognition of the complexity 
of the issue, I'll say that an agent is harmed when s/he is made to be in pain, in a state 
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that s/he dislikes, deprived of pleasure, or deprived of a state that s/he likes.  Those 55
who are averse to the terminology are welcome to substitute the term 'hurt' for 'harm'.  56
We sometimes harm others accidentally, unavoidably, or in response to a moral 
dilemma. Though such inflictions of harm lack a good moral justification, their moral 
status is unclear. That's not the case for those harms that one can easily avoid inflicting 
but one knowingly inflicts anyway. Consider the harm of certain blaming responses.
There are two core senses of blame. One is purely attributive. To attributively 
blame an agent for an immoral act is to believe that the agent has acted immorally, and 
to wish for the right moral reasons that the agent had acted differently.  Henceforth, I 57
will refer to this attributive sense of blame as moral disapproval. The sort of blame that 
concerns me in this paper has an emotive component. To blame an agent in this sense 
for an immoral act is to feel some form of anger (such as resentment or indignation) 
towards that agent in virtue of one's moral disapproval of that agent.  Henceforth, I will 58
refer to this sense of blame as simply blame. 
 Mill 1863; Griffin 1986; Crisp 2006. It is also plausible that an agent can be harmed objectively in that s/55
he is deprived of something that is intrinsically good independently of any feelings or mental states 
(Moore 1903). One might also think that well-being is constituted only by the combination of subjective 
and objective features (Kagan 2009; Parfit 1984, 500-501). I focus on the subjective harms of displeasure 
and dissatisfaction because those are the harms that primarily concern us when censuring (Kleinig 1971; 
Feinberg 1970).
 Thanks to Kate Manne for this helpful suggestion.56
 Watson 1996; Arpaly 2006, 9-39; Sher 2006, 93-114; Smith 2007, 476; Scanlon 2008, 122-214; 57
McKenna 2012, 21-29. 
 Feinberg 1965; Strawson 1982; Gibbard 1992; Wallace 1994, 76-77; Watson 1996, 238; Bennett 2002 58
and 2008; Smith 2007, 477; McKenna 2012, 21-29; Boxer 2013.
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Blame is typically overt in that it is expressed in a way that affects the target in 
some way.  Overt blame is almost always harmful. Granted, one might be able to 59
overtly blame in a non-harmful manner (perhaps through clenched teeth). However, it is 
generally agreed that the emotive component of blame is constituted by dispositions to 
ostracize , elicit guilt , and elicit repentance,  each of which is likely to be harmful 60 61 62
when acted upon, all else being equal. It's difficult to overtly blame without acting on 
these dispositions. So most every instance of overt blame constitutes or counts as an 
attempt to affect the target in ways that one knows are likely to harm that agent. In order 
to avoid the ambiguities plaguing the debate about blame and blameworthiness, I use 
the term 'censure' to apply to this more limited class of blaming responses. Specifically, 
a censure is 
Censure: An instance of overt blame that one knows is likely to harm the target.
Punishment is a paradigm censure.  Most instances of other common blaming 63
responses to perceived wrongdoing - public ridicule, shunning, shaming, and the like  - 64
 By 'affect', I have only minimal criteria in mind. An agent is affected by an expression of blame when 59
that expression produces in the targeted agent a particular physical or mental state, behavioral response, 
or level of well-being that would not have occurred otherwise. That a response affect an agent is a 
requisite for that response to be deserved. On this point see Feinberg 1970, 61; Kleinig 1971, 72.
 Feinberg 1984, 37; Bennett 2002, 149-152; McKenna 2012, 136.60
 Gibbard 1990; Bennett 2002, 152-153; Darwall 2006; Smith 2007, 477; Shoemaker 2007, 91; McKenna 61
2012, 139-140; Boxer 2013, 125.
 Bennett 2002, 151; McKenna 2012, 138-141; Boxer 2013, 125.62
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also fall under the 'censure' category, even if such responses are not always intended to 
harm their target.65
Given the harmful nature of censures, any moral theory that has a prayer of 
being true holds that a reason to censure an agent permits one to censure that agent 
only if it is a good reason for one to censure. A criterion commonly determining this 
status is a minimal epistemic standard we apply quite generally to belief-formation. 
Consider a case in which you come to believe that you have a reason to censure 
someone. An adequate epistemic justification for this belief is, as Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong puts it, a justification strong enough that we "ought to believe it as opposed 
to denying it or suspending belief."  Now suppose you formed your belief only because 66
of petty hatred, biased assumptions, or obviously unreliable testimony. Such a belief is 
not adequately justified. You ought, then, to suspend it, if not outright deny it. Prima 
facie, your supposed reason to censure is not a 'good' reason for you to censure.67
I'm agnostic as to whether or not this prima facie consideration wins the day all-
things-considered for every kind of alleged justification to censure. My argument here is 
only meant to support the claim that this minimal epistemic standard applies to 
blameworthiness. Since this claim is the first premise of my argument for retributive 
caution, I'll call it (i), though those desiring a more descriptive title are welcome to call it 
'the caution principle for blame', or simply 'the caution principle':
 McKenna 2012, 28-29; Scanlon 2013, 103.65
 Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, 341.66
 As Derk Pereboom remarks, "where there is a substantial likelihood that one’s justification for harming 67
someone is illegitimate, then harming that person on the basis of that justification could well be morally 
wrong" (2001, 161).
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(i) An agent's alleged blameworthiness permits one to censure that agent only if 
one has adequate epistemic justification to believe s/he's blameworthy.
Note that only permissibility is at stake in the antecedent of (i). The defeasible normative 
justification presumed to be offered by blameworthiness is not. The distinction is crucial 
to keep in mind. I follow Gideon Rosen in recognizing the possibility that a wrongdoer 
can be blameworthy even if no one has epistemic justification to believe them 
blameworthy.  Indeed, it may be that there is always some value in a responsible 68
wrongdoer suffering a censure. We tend to see some good in even the most misguided 
censures befalling those responsible for wrongdoing in the way that we see some 
cosmic justice in their suffering an accidental bump on the head. Similarly, there might 
be some epistemically inaccessible reason to censure every responsible wrongdoer. 
Perhaps there is even a sense in which the censuring of a blameworthy agent 'ought' to 
occur in the way that the weather 'ought' to be nice.  But that does not permit those 69
who lack the aforementioned epistemic justification to inflict censures on the 
blameworthy. There are two reasons why.
The primary reason has to do with risk. Censuring is almost always harmful 
overall. So censuring an agent in response to their alleged blameworthiness when one 
lacks adequate epistemic justification for the belief that s/he's blameworthy is to take a 
substantial risk that one is causing overall harm to that agent for no reason. There might 
be some moral good in taking this risk in a case in which the overall harm is small and 
 Rosen 2015, 69.68
 Pereboom 2014, 139-140.69
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the alleged reason for censure is a consequentialist one, for example mildly censuring 
an agent in order to prevent the small possibility of catastrophic harm. But taking a 
substantial risk that one is harming an agent in response to a non-instrumental reason 
that does not obtain is just as wrong as knowingly harming for no reason at all. We're 
not permitted to gamble when so much of moral worth is at stake.
Granted, there are rare cases in which a censure poses no risk of overall harm. 
We might know in advance that a censure will likely harm an agent ceteris paribus but 
not mutatis mutandis. Consider Martin Shkreli, the 'pharmabro' who raised the price of 
life-saving medication solely for profit. It seems that the harms inflicted on Shkreli by the 
vehement censures he receives are counterbalanced by his enjoyment of the attention. 
Suppose that's right. (i) applies even in such cases. Two interrelated considerations 
explain why. 
First, we routinely say that those who unjustifiably consider some individual bad, 
evil, or worse - deserving of censure - are being unfair to that individual. We consider 
such attributions unfair even when they are whispered outside of the earshot of their 
target, or even after the target is dead.  These epistemically unjustified attributions of 70
negative moral worth are unfair to agents in the same way that epistemically unjustified 
attributions of ugliness are unfair to works of art. The person who says "though I've only 
glanced at it, 'The Lovers' is ugly" is being unfair to that work of art. They are not 
harming it. Nor are they harming Rene Magritte. Simply, fair attributions of value require 
the benefit of the doubt. 
 In conversation, Nick Sturgeon points out that this may be unfair simply because it objectively harms 70
the individual. If so, this is another way in which censuring on the basis of an epistemically unjustified 
blameworthiness judgment risks overall harm impermissibly. However, I take it that the explanation I offer 
above shows an additional way in which these attributions are unfair.
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Second, as Peter Strawson points out, each moral agent has a level of concern 
for moral considerations. This level of concern constitutes each agent's 'quality of will'.  71
Individuals who make blameworthiness attributions without adequate epistemic 
justification don't care enough about whether or not a moral reason to censure obtains; 
they're willing to believe it does in the absence of confirming evidence, perhaps even in 
the teeth of contrary evidence. To both manifest this particular deficiency in one's quality 
of will and to deny an agent the aforementioned benefit of the doubt forbids one to 
censure on the basis of blameworthiness. That is so even when that censure causes no 
overall harm, and even if, unbeknownst to us, the agent actually is blameworthy. The 
impermissibility of epistemically negligent censures cannot be trumped by 
considerations unknown.
We need, then, to take stock of our degree of epistemic justification for believing 
agents blameworthy. Recall that, when a wrongdoer is blameworthy, the wrongdoer's 
responsibility for wrongdoing (her freely, knowingly, and inexcusably doing wrong) all by 
itself offers a defeasible non-instrumental justification to censure them. Debates about 
blameworthiness nearly always focus on whether or not agents can be responsible, with 
a sizable minority arguing we should be skeptical that agents have the requisite free 
will  and epistemic sensitivity.  As mentioned at the outset, I'll assume that the non-72 73
 Strawson 1982. Also see Arpaly 2006; McKenna 2012, 59.71
 Honderich 1988; G. Strawson 1994; 2011; Pereboom 2014.72
 Rosen 2004; Levy 2009.73
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skeptics are correct that we know some wrongdoers have the freedom  and epistemic 74
sensitivity  requisite for their responsibility. I wish to focus instead on sources of 75
epistemic justification for credence in the proposition that
B: a wrongdoer's responsibility alone offers a defeasible non-instrumental 
justification to censure them.
Over the next two sections, I argue that no one has adequate epistemic justification for 
belief in B (or any of its analogues). There are a few potential sources of epistemic 
justification for B. One is intuition. The other is a plausible moral theory that supports it. 
The former source of justification is inadequate. The latter does not exist. The absence 
of these adequate justifications undermines any other potential sources of justification, 
for example reliable testimony or peer agreement. I argue for each conclusion in turn.
2. The inadequacy of intuition.
For a proposition P to be 'intuitive' is for P to seem intellectually credible 
independently of an introspectively discernible inference.  Many, myself included, find 76
B intuitive. Consider the following case.
 As Seth Shabo (2012b) points out, although all compatibilist defenders of free will argue that some 74
agents have the free will required for blameworthiness, some of them clearly do not mean 
blameworthiness in the basic desert sense, while others are simply unclear. For compatibilists who clearly 
mean to defend the free will required for blameworthiness in the basic desert sense, see Fischer 2006, 6; 
McKenna 2012, 164-172. For libertarian defenses see Ginet 1990; Kane 1996; O'Connor 2000. 
 FitzPatrick 2008.75
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Gene: After the nation briefly falls into anarchy, the beloved revolutionary General 
Gene brutally tortures and executes an innocent young boy solely for his own 
sadistic pleasure. Gene knows it's inexcusably wrong. But he freely does it 
anyway.
We are epistemically justified in morally disapproving of Gene. And we are naturally 
angry at him in virtue of this moral disapproval. In a word, we blame Gene for what he 
has done. That is not enough, though, to give Gene what he deserves. In response to 
these gruesome wrongdoings, many of us intuit that Gene's responsibility alone offers a 
defeasible non-instrumental justification to express our blame in a way that harms him, 
that is, to censure him.  To isolate the intuition, assume that there's no consequentialist 77
reason to censure Gene. He's too cautious to ever commit such risky wrongdoings 
again. And because only a few people will ever believe he is responsible for the 
wrongdoing, censuring him will be generally perceived as unjustified, deterring no one 
from crime, depriving the nation of one of its emerging political saviors, and thereby 
resulting in more bad than good. 
Also, Gene's government is dissolved. There are no laws. There are no penal 
institutions. He is a revolutionary. He has agreed to nothing. Perhaps Gene would agree 
to such laws if he were in conditions conducive to rational decision-making, such as 
Rawls's original position.  Or perhaps, as Scanlon contends, those motivated to find 78
 Feinberg 1970, 55-94; Gibbard 1990, 42; Wallace 1994, 76-77; Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 5-8; 77
Strawson, G. 2002, 452; Bennett 2002; Clarke 2005, 21; Fischer 2006, 63; Darwall 2006 and 2009; 
Shoemaker 2007 and 2011; Waller 2011, 2-5; McKenna 2012, 150; Boxer 2013; Pereboom 2014, 2; 
Rosen 2015.
 Rawls 1991, 102-171; 2001, 80-134.78
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principles for the general regulation of the behavior of others, similarly motivated, could 
not reasonably object to principles that allow such treatment.  But as Scanlon has 79
recently conceded, our intuition is entirely independent of these contractualist 
proposals.  Moreover, as Derk Pereboom points out (in conversation), those proposals 80
fall prey to the following dilemma. An agent in ideal contractualist conditions will agree 
to censure wrongdoers on the basis of B either because s/he considers doing so to yield 
the best consequences, or because of the intuition that B. If it's the former, then the 
justification for believing B is pragmatic rather than epistemic (an issue I address in 
section 4). If it's the latter, then contractualist proposals beg the question. Still, it seems 
to many that Gene's responsibility alone offers a defeasible non-instrumental 
justification to censure him, despite the absence of consequentialist or contractualist 
reasons to do so. He deserves a censure just because he freely, knowingly, and 
inexcusably did wrong.
Very few contemporary philosophers explicitly claim that this intuition all by itself 
provides adequate epistemic justification for B.  However, many seem to make that 81
assumption. Most of those in the free will debate, for example, clearly think that the 
results of the debate will settle the question of whether or not agents are actually ever 
blameworthy. But their evidence for B often consists solely of thought experiments that 
elicit intuitions in its favor. Even some of those who express doubt about B are reluctant 
to deny the justificatory force of intuitions for it. For example, in an otherwise exhaustive 
series of criticisms of blameworthiness, David Boonin merely notes his own doubt about 
 Scanlon 1998.79
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the justificatory force of intuition before conceding that an intuition that B might be 
strong enough evidence for believing that proposition.82
There are those who attempt to push back against B by appealing to intuitions 
contrary to it.  But that fire-with-fire method operates under the assumption that the B 83
intuition has epistemic force in the first place. I think the assumption is unwarranted. 
There is no fire. There is only smoke. While intuitions are useful for distinguishing and 
clarifying our concepts , they don't always provide evidence that those concepts 84
actually apply. Consider the application of a contentious clinical concept. A young 
woman anxiously complains to her doctor of chronic numbness in her hands. On first 
examination, the doctor finds no physical condition that can explain the numbness. He 
intuits that the problem is purely psychological. That intuition provides excellent 
evidence that the doctor has and is applying the concept of a 'somatoform disorder', the 
contemporary title for 'hysteria'. His further intuitions about the more specific 
psychological determinants of the condition, its relation to gender, its necessary and 
sufficient conditions, and so on, help to clarify the concept that he's employing. That 
hysteria intuitions are (unfortunately) prevalent in our culture is strong evidence of a 
shared concept.
However, neither the intuition that a person is hysterical, nor the more general 
intuition that there is such a malady, provides any evidence for the corresponding 
beliefs. The epistemic inadequacy of hysteria intuitions is not due to the non-existence 
 Boonin 2008, 92-93.82
 Scanlon 1998, 274; 2013, 104; Hanna 2012.83
 Both traditionalists (Goldman 2007) and naturalists (Kornblith 2015, 154) about philosophical theorizing 84
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 37
of hysteria, so conceived. There really are a loosely associated cluster of mysterious 
symptoms that currently have no good medical explanation, and are reported to afflict 
females at a much higher rate than males. Maybe those symptoms are due to hysteria, 
so conceived. Probably, they aren't. Regardless, we still have sufficient reason to doubt 
that hysteria intuitions themselves are reliable evidence of hysteria. No matter how 
resilient or widely shared, and no matter how consciously well-intentioned and 
seemingly expert the diagnosis, any given hysteria intuition is likely to be the result of an 
unconscious gender bias that is insensitive to the relevant clinical facts. We just can't 
trust the intuition alone without first eliminating the effects of the bias.
Similarly, many of us intuit that a wrongdoer's responsibility alone offers a 
defeasible non-instrumental justification to censure them. That intuition provides 
excellent evidence that our core conception of blameworthiness is the 'basic desert' 
sense defined at the outset. However, as I argue in the next section, it's likely such an 
intuition is the result of an unconscious retributive bias I call 'anger affirmation' that is 
insensitive to the relevant moral facts. We just can't trust the intuition alone without first 
eliminating the effects of this bias, a task that I argue is quixotic.
2.1 The Genealogy of Blameworthiness
As a first step in identifying the likelihood of a bias, consider the nature of our 
retributive emotions. When we perceive agents to be responsible for wrongdoing, we 
quite naturally tend to feel what P. F. Strawson called 'reactive' forms of anger towards 
them; resentment, indignation, contempt, and the like. Empirical work confirms this. In a 
review of the psychological literature on anger, Shaun Nichols and Jesse Prinz point out 
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that various forms of immoral actions and character traits - particularly those that are 
perceived as "unjust" - elicit self-reports of anger, as well as all of the features of anger, 
including an increase in heart rate and skin temperature, and distinctive facial 
expressions such as a "furrowed brow, thin lips, raised eyelids, [and] square mouth."  85
Most importantly, our perception that someone is responsible for wrongdoing elicits a 
sine qua non of anger; the retributive desire to harm the wrongdoer.  86
We already know that there is a striking correlation between this natural 
retributive desire and our intuitions about blameworthiness. At least overt expressions of 
reactive anger nearly always come along with the intuition that the target of anger is 
blameworthy.  That correlation has led many to suspect that our anger is the source of 87
our blameworthiness intuitions.  It is difficult to substantiate such suspicions from the 88
armchair. As Alvin Goldman rightly remarks, "a phenomenological feature [all intuitions] 
share is the feeling that they come from 'I know not where'. Their origins are 
introspectively opaque."  Fortunately, there has been over half a century of research on 89
the phenomenon of 'self-affirmation' that lends credence to the view that our retributive 
desire is the source of our intuition that responsible wrongdoers are blameworthy. 
 Nichols and Prinz 2010, 124.85
 Vidmar 2001, 43; Darley and Pittman 2003, 333-334.86
 Honderich 1988, pp. 583-585; Feinberg 1970, 70-1; Scheffler 2003, pp. 69-92; Strawson, G. 2008, 90; 87
Pereboom 2007, 119 and 2014, 128-129 claim that reactive anger necessarily comes along with the belief 
that the target is blameworthy. Michael McKenna (2012, 66) argues, as do I, that there is no necessary 
connection between reactive anger and the belief that the target is blameworthy. My claim here is merely 
that reactive anger and the intuition that the target is blameworthy nearly always accompany one another. 
Granted, we tend to believe what we intuit. But that needn't be so. 
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The research begins with studies of the causal impact of certain sorts of 
decisions on attitudes. Take a study by James Fendrich, in which test subjects were 
asked about their attitudes towards African Americans, and also asked to decide 
whether they would agree to interact with African Americans in various scenarios (e.g. 
during lunch, as roommates, at an NAACP meeting, etc).  When subjects were asked 90
the attitude questions prior to the decision questions, the kinds of attitudes that the 
subjects reported weren't a good predictor of the kinds of decisions they made. There 
was consistency between attitudes and decisions only 37% of the time. When the 
subjects were asked the decision questions prior to the attitude questions, the kinds of 
decisions the subjects made were an excellent predictor of the attitudes they adopted. 
The consistency between attitudes and decisions shot up to 66%. The best explanation 
is that the subjects' decisions to act biased them in favor of attitudes that were 
consistent with those decisions. 
The phenomenon of subjects being biased towards certain attitudes because of 
their decisions, rather than the other way around, is well-confirmed. The phenomenon is 
most pronounced when a few further conditions are met. It turns out that the impact of 
decisions on attitudes rises as the decision seems to the agent to be both voluntary and 
difficult to retract.  Indeed, most researchers ensure that the subject voluntarily and 91
irrevocably decides to φ by simply inviting them to φ. Studies show that, once the 
subjects voluntarily φ, the impact of their decision on their attitudes is very high, often 
above 90%.
 Fendrich 1967.90
 Cooper 2007, 63.91
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What motivates the attitude change? The last few decades of studies on the 
phenomenon have shown that the impact of decisions on attitudes occurs because of 
the agent's (apparently) voluntary decision, or consequences of the decision,  being in 92
tension with that agent's overall assessment of themselves.  Claude Steele, the 93
pioneer of this 'self-affirmation' theory, explains that the phenomenon always occurs in 
studies in which subjects commit "such self-contradictory actions as writing public 
essays against their beliefs, expending effort on meaningless tasks, and delivering 
embarrassing speeches in front of prestigious audiences."  These actions are "self-94
contradictory" in that they indicate "that one is not adaptively or morally adequate...and, 
as a consequence [this] motivates one to reaffirm one’s adequacy."  Steele found in his 95
studies that 
Lacking any better means of [affirming a positive self-assessment], subjects 
typically attempt to justify [their actions] by changing their beliefs or attitudes to 
be more consistent with their actions. For example, they state that their beliefs 
were not really so different from the essay they wrote or that the meaningless 
task they worked so hard at was not really so meaningless.96
 Scher and Cooper 1989.92
 Steele and Liu 1983; Steele 1988. For an overview see Cooper 2007, 90-116.93
 Steele 1988, 269.94
 Steele 1988, 278.95
 Steele 1988, 269.96
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As Joshua Knobe and Brian Leiter report in their more recent review of the cognitive 
dissonance and self-affirmation literature, Steele's finding continues to be confirmed. In 
psychology, "the dominant view seems to be that people are motivated to believe that 
their behaviors are justified and that they therefore tend to adopt attitudes that justify 
[those] behaviors".97
It turns out, then, that we are biased, subconsciously, to assume that any 
voluntary decision that potentially threatens our positive self-assessment is justified. 
Return now to our retributive nature. Because our natural retributive desire is typically 
both easily fulfilled and stronger than conflicting desires, it provides a strong motivation 
to harm responsible wrongdoers that quite often results in retributive decisions and 
actions. We blame.  We punish. We lash out. We begin doing this at a very early age, 98
and continue to decide on the basis of our anger that we'll censure when the right 
circumstances present themselves. This prevalent motivation, which has throughout our 
lives routinely resulted in retributive decisions and behaviors, is one that we feel we 
make voluntarily. It's also one that threatens a positive self-assessment, as acting on it 
is in tension with the fundamental and well-entrenched moral belief that it is wrong to 
harm without justification. 
As the aforementioned studies show, we are unconsciously self-affirming in that 
any inconsistency between our voluntary decisions and our positive self-assessment 
prejudices us in favor of the conclusion that those decisions are justified. When met with 
our strong retributive motivations and the countless retributive decisions we have made, 
 Knobe and Leiter 2007, 102-103.97
 Quigley and Tedeschi 1996; Vidmar 2001, 43.98
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it's highly likely that this unconscious self-affirmative process prejudices us in favor of 
the conclusion that there is a justification for our retributive decisions and behaviors. As 
detailed in the Gene case, the 'mere fact' that an agent is responsible for wrongdoing is 
the only putative justification that can universally apply to decisions to harm responsible 
wrongdoers. Other moral and even prudential justifications are often lacking. So if 
there's a justification for censure, it would have to be 'just because' the wrongdoer is 
responsible for wrongdoing. It's likely this is why our conception of blameworthiness 
takes the basic desert form, and why B in particular seems true to us rather than some 
other kind of retributive justification. I call this effect of anger on the self-affirmation bias 
'anger-affirmation'.
2.2 Clarifying the anger-affirmation account 
Before discussing ways to test the hypothesis, a few clarifications are in order. 
First, cautious readers will rightly note that some blameworthiness intuitions occur in the 
absence of anger, or indeed any emotion at all. Such cases weaken the probability that 
occurrent anger-affirmation is the culprit of the intuition. However, the anger-affirmative 
process is likely shaping our concept of blameworthiness early on in our development, 
heavily reinforced by agreement with peers and apparent moral authorities. So, even if 
occurrent anger-affirmation can be ruled out as the source of a given blameworthiness 
intuition, it's predictable that those who have already developed and regularly deployed 
a basic-desert conception of blameworthiness will sometimes dispassionately intuit that 
a wrongdoer is blameworthy.  By adulthood, the assumption has been inculcated by 99
 See Jonathan Haidt's discussion of Domasio's somatic marker hypothesis (Haidt 2001, 825).99
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anger-affirmation. Hence the dispassionate intuition. Tellingly, it is exactly in these calm 
moments that our retributive intuitions weaken enough for us to recognize the 
suspiciousness of propositions like B. The problem of retribution arises when we calmly 
compare prohibitions against harm to our angry calls for punishment.100
Second, the account does not predict that everyone's blameworthiness intuitions 
will take the precise form that I defined at the outset. For example, most of us these 
days are only defeasibly motivated by our anger. So anger-affirmation makes it intuitive 
that the blameworthiness justification is defeasible, as defined above. But some tend 
instead to be sufficiently motivated by their anger. For them, anger-affirmation makes it 
intuitive that the blameworthiness justification is always sufficient.  For example, 101
Jeffrie Murphy argues that blameworthiness obligates us to censure. He also admits 
that he finds this intuitive because "of my own resentful and vindictive Irish nature...and 
my not always loving personality."  Conversely, some will be largely unmotivated by 102
their anger, or will simply be less angry individuals. For them, anger-affirmation makes it 
intuitive that blameworthiness only makes censuring 'less bad'.  Similarly, for most of 103
us, the kind of harm our anger always motivates us to seek is the wrongdoer's guilt. I've 
argued elsewhere that the predominant conception of blameworthiness conforms to that 
motivation. But there are certainly some whose anger motivates sadistic harms, or 
instead merely motivates expressions of exasperation. So some intuit that 
 Thanks to Michael McKenna for pressing me on this point.100
 See, for example, Mundle (1954, 217) and Moore (1993, 15). Some go so far as to say that the 101
justification comes in the form of an obligation (Murphy 1971 and 1973; McLeod 1999, 193).
 Murphy 2007, 17.102
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blameworthiness is a justification to inflict more severe forms of suffering, and some 
intuit that blameworthiness is merely a justification to 'vent' their anger.104
Lastly, my account only concerns intuitions, rather than beliefs or other kinds of 
attitudes. The studies cited above do not make this distinction. They test for 'attitudes', 
broadly defined. Intuitions and beliefs strongly correlate. But they can come apart. Take 
each of the propositions of the well-known non-identity problem. A choice is wrong only 
if it makes someone worse-off. Some choices that eventually result in future individuals 
living in severely restricted circumstances (e.g. the choice to deplete resources) make 
no one worse off. Nevertheless, such choices are wrong. One of these propositions 
must be false. But each proposition is likely to remain intuitive, even if we reject it. The 
phenomenon is typical in normative ethics. Sometimes moral propositions remain 
intuitive, despite their proven falsity.105
If the test subjects in the aforementioned studies were asked to distinguish what 
'seems' true to them from what they infer on the basis of reasoning, the correlation 
between decisions and intuitions would almost certainly be the same. It would probably 
increase. However, it's unclear that test subjects would also, after reporting the intuition, 
be quite as willing on reflection to believe what they intuit. I mention this in order to 
make clear that, while I take our blameworthiness intuitions at this stage of our moral 
development to be the inevitable result of an uncontrollable and unconscious anger-
affirmative process, I take beliefs to be consciously revisable. Even if we abandon belief 
in blameworthiness, as I will be advocating we do, it'll probably continue to seem to this 
 See the example of the Pirahã below.104
 Kagan 1989, 15.105
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generation that wrongdoers are blameworthy. Beliefs are revisable. Intuitions just 
happen.
2.3 Testing the anger-affirmation account
The anger-affirmative account predicts that those who hardly ever get angry will 
be far less likely to find B intuitive. This is a difficult prediction to test, considering that 
humans are wired for anger. However, there is at least one source of evidence. Daniel 
Everett spent nearly 20 years living with the Pirahã, a small and isolated amazonian 
tribe. Because living conditions were so harsh, and the members of the small tribe so 
interdependent, it was of paramount importance for members to keep each other 
healthy and flourishing. As a result, Everett writes "anger is the cardinal sin among the 
Pirahãs."  My account predicts that one of the effects of a non-angry disposition will be 106
a lack of blameworthiness intuitions among the Pirahã. It seems that's what we find. 
Everett relays the following remarkable story.
One day I decided to ask one of my main language teachers, Kaaboogí, if he 
would work with me. I walked to his house. Coming up the path, I noticed that 
Kaaboogí's brother Kaapási had been drinking cachaca. I heard Kaapási yell for 
Kaaboogí's little white dog to stop barking. A few steps later, only fifty feet from 
Kaapási's hut, I saw him raise his shotgun and shoot his brother's dog in the 
stomach. The dog yelped and jumped, bleeding profusely, its intestines hanging 
from the hole torn in its abdomen. It fell to the ground twitching and whimpering. 
 Everett 2008, 104.106
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Kaaboogí ran to it and picked it up. His eyes watered as the dog died in his arms. 
I feared that he would shoot one of Kaapási's dogs or attack Kaapási himself. 
The village stared at Kaapási and Kaaboogí-quiet except for the yelping of dogs. 
Kaaboogí just sat holding his dog, tears in his eyes. 
"Are you going to do anything to Kaapási?" I asked. 
"What do you mean?" said Kaaboogí, puzzled. 
"I mean, what are you going to do to him for shooting your dog?" 
"I will do nothing. I won't hurt my brother. He acted like a child. He did a bad 
thing. But he is drunk and his head is not working well. He should not have hurt 
my dog. It is like my child."107
Two features of the case are striking. The first is that, undoubtedly due to his upbringing 
in the Pirahã culture, Kaaboogí is not angry at his brother for this egregious wrongdoing. 
The second is that the idea that there is some reason to censure his brother is 
completely foreign to Kaaboogí. My claim is that the former fact explains the latter. 
When a person is consistently devoid of any anger to self-affirm, s/he won't find it 
intuitive that there is a reason to censure responsible wrongdoers 'just because' they 
are responsible for wrongdoing. Everett points out that the Pirahã occasionally get 
angry with one another, but almost exclusively in situations of infidelity between 
couples. Unsurprisingly, these are the only situations in which the Pirahã allow a kind of 
punishment.  Again, this is exactly what the anger-affirmative account predicts.108
 Everett 2008, 101.107
 The cheating partner must stay home all day and penitently allow the cuckolded partner to playfully 108
whack him in the head. Everett describes the process as "involv[ing] no shouting or overt anger. The 
giggling, smirking, and laughter are all necessary components of the process" (2008, 103-104).
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This is limited evidence. But a similar phenomenon occurs even amongst those 
of us who regularly feel angry and have strong blameworthiness intuitions. The anger-
affirmation account predicts that our blameworthiness intuitions will be difficult to sustain 
when the same self-affirmative bias that makes B intuitive to us is met with emotional 
motivations that run counter to a basic desert conception of blameworthiness. That's 
exactly what we find. Consider the much discussed case of Robert Harris. 
In 1978, twenty-five year-old Harris decided, rather capriciously, to murder two 
teenage boys. Mere minutes after murdering the two teens, Harris nonchalantly ate one 
of their hamburgers, and seemed to be "in an almost lighthearted mood. He smiled and 
told [his brother] Daniel that it would be amusing if the two of them were to pose as 
police officers and inform the parents that their sons were killed".  Most of us rather 109
automatically become angry at Harris for what he has done, and intuit that he is 
blameworthy for it. Now consider Harris's circumstances.
He was the most beautiful of all my mother’s children; he was an angel”, [his 
sister] said. “He would just break your heart. He wanted love so bad he would 
beg for any kind of physical contact. He’d come up to my mother and just try to 
rub his little hands on her leg or her arm. He just never got touched at all. She’d 
just push him away or kick him. One time she bloodied his nose when he was 
trying to get close to her"...Robert Harris's father was an alcoholic who was twice 
convicted of sexually molesting his daughters. He frequently beat his children ... 
and often caused serious injury. Their mother also became an alcoholic and was 
 Watson 1987, 269.109
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arrested several times, once for bank robbery...Harris had a learning disability 
and a speech problem, but there was no money for therapy...Harris was raped 
several times, his sister said, and he slashed his wrists twice in suicide 
attempts...Everyone in the family knew that he needed psychiatric help.110
I contend, along with Gary Watson, Derk Pereboom,  Shaun Nichols,  and others,  111 112 113
that the force of our anger at Harris diminishes substantially after considering these 
further details, and that our intuition that Harris is blameworthy substantially weakens, if 
not disappears altogether. 
What explains the substantial weakening of the intuition? Shaun Nichols argues, 
convincingly to my lights, that Harris's horrible circumstances evoke sympathy, an 
emotion that counteracts anger.  That diminishes our motivation to harm Harris, which 114
in turn removes any need to self-affirm in favor of blameworthiness. At this point, we 
might still be able to retain the intuition that Harris is blameworthy considering that 
anger-affirmation has inculcated an assumption of blameworthiness. But this is less 
likely because our sympathy now provides some motivation, however small, to help 
Harris against those who would attempt to harm him. To fail to help someone who 
apparently needs it is a potential threat to a positive self-assessment. So my account 
predicts that the blameworthiness intuition will be difficult to retain. Instead, if our 
 Watson 1987, 272-274.110
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sympathy is strong enough, it will seem that there's a justification to defend Harris. 
Jonathan Haidt cites studies in which sympathy indeed has this kind of effect on moral 
intuitions.  115
Derk Pereboom offers an alternative explanation of our intuitions in the Harris 
case. He argues that our blameworthiness intuitions diminish in the Harris case 
because, once the causal antecedents of Harris's character are made clear, we come to 
doubt that Harris has the sort of free will requisite for blameworthiness.  He argues 116
that our anger diminishes as a result of abandoning the blameworthiness intuition, 
rather than the other way around. 
I'm unconvinced. First, most people tend to believe that an agent's upbringing 
and social circumstances incline but do not necessitate an agent's immoral actions, and 
that agents like Harris therefore have enough free will to be responsible for their actions. 
Nothing in the preceding description of Harris's circumstances precludes that possibility. 
So although free will skeptics such as Pereboom and myself are quick to see Harris's 
circumstances as depriving him of free will, it's not at all clear that most people are 
coming to that conclusion. 
Second, it is likely that neither blameworthiness intuitions nor anger would 
substantially diminish if the causal antecedents of Harris's immoral actions were 
explained purely in terms that do not evoke sympathetic emotions, e.g., "Harris's 
acetylcholine receptors were impaired to do an increase of activity in the amygdala, 
which causally ensured his immoral actions." Indeed, such 'low affect' descriptions of 
 Haidt 2001, 819. 115
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causal antecedents have been found not to diminish blameworthiness intuitions about 
'high affect' cases like Harris's. Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe gave their test 
subjects a low affect description of a causally deterministic world. When test subjects 
were asked if people could be blameworthy in such a world, they answered in the 
negative. Tellingly, that did not weaken test subjects' blameworthiness attributions for a 
'high affect' case in which a man was described as burning his wife and children alive 
for no reason in that same causally deterministic world.117
 2.4 Objections to the anger-affirmation account
Intuitionists will object more generally to my account. According to intuitionists, it 
is an adequate understanding of the concepts involved in B that generates a direct 
'grasp' or 'apprehension' of its truth by way of intuition. Ross, for example, claims that a 
general blameworthiness principle (e.g. any responsible wrongdoer is blameworthy) is 
epistemically primitive in this way.  Robert Audi concurs.  Michael S. Moore claims 118 119
that it is particular blameworthiness judgments like the one we have to the case of Gene 
(e.g this responsible wrongdoer is blameworthy) that are epistemically primitive, best 
explained by the sort of general principle of blameworthiness to which Ross and Audi 
appeal.  120
It is highly contentious that any moral proposition is self-evident in this way. But I 
needn't reject the self-evidence of moral propositions wholesale. We understand the 
 Nichols and Knobe 2007.117
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concepts involved in B at least as well when we're feeling sympathetic as we do when 
we feel angry. But as the Harris case indicates, B is not intuitive when we feel 
sympathetic. We 'grasp' the truth of B in the way that intuitionists allege only if our 
intuitions aren't so easily and drastically influenced by affect. For example, our intuition 
that 'it's wrong to harm for no good reason' - a paradigm of an allegedly self-evident 
moral proposition - remains strong regardless of our affect. So it's not likely that our 
intuition that B is generated by our direct 'grasp' of its truth. Anger-affirmation is a better 
explanation.
2.5 The insensitivity of anger-affirmation
It's likely that anger-affirmation is the source of blameworthiness intuitions. 
Unfortunately, no part of the anger-affirmative process is sensitive to the relevant moral 
facts. Our self-affirmative nature biases us in favor of the conclusion that there is a 
justification for our decisions without regard to evidence. So if self-affirmation is the 
source of our conception of blameworthiness, as is likely, it is only because that 
conception provides us an ad-hoc justification for our retributive decisions. Moreover, 
the anger that triggers the self-affirmative process is itself neither elicited by the putative 
justification-conferring force of blameworthiness, nor aids us in being sensitive to such 
force. 
That our anger is unlikely to be elicited by blameworthiness is due to its primitive 
emotional underpinnings. Anger is an emotion that is just as likely triggered by a host of 
morally irrelevant considerations as it is by responsible wrongdoing. Road rage is an 
obvious example. So is anger at professional athletes for their failure to win. Consider 
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the variety of actions and character traits that test subjects in an early and fascinatingly 
thorough experiment reported elicit their anger:
- "finding books out of place"
- "unpleasant manners"
- "to have [the toe] stepped on"
- "narrow mindedness"
- "I jump at conclusions and hence am often angry without cause"
- "girls talking out loud and distracting me in study hours"
- "my health being below par"
- "being kept waiting, being hurried...density in others"
- "If I am hurrying in the street and others saunter, so that I cannot get by ...or 
when given a seat in church behind a large pillar"
- "A discordant note in music, especially if repeated"
- "Frivolity in others"
- "An over tidy relative always slicking up my things"
- "slovenly work, want of system, method and organization"
- "late risers in my own house, stupidity"121
These reports confirm what those of us who are being honest with ourselves already 
know from experience; morally irrelevant considerations just as often elicit our anger as 
apparently responsible wrongdoing. That being the case, the chances are high when 
 Hall 1899, 538-539. Also see Nichols and Prinz 2010, 128. 121
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we're angry that our anger is not elicited by blameworthiness. The only way to decrease 
that chance is to check whether an instance of anger is indeed elicited by 
blameworthiness. That is precisely how we attempt (often unsuccessfully) to restrict our 
anger to only target responsible wrongdoers. But even when we can confirm that our 
anger is targeting an agent who is actually responsible for wrongdoing, given that our 
anger is so often elicited by morally irrelevant considerations, the chances are high that 
the allegedly justification-conferring force of responsible wrongdoing cited in B is not 
among the elicitors of our anger. 
Some may concede that anger is not itself elicited by any blameworthiness 
justification, but instead can increase our awareness of it. Unfortunately, our retributive 
nature generally decreases our sensitivity to relevant considerations. In a recent study 
of the way in which unsatisfied anger makes us 'intuitive prosecutors', Julie Goldberg et 
al first review the literature on the cognitive effects of anger. According to their review, 
the research has confirmed that
there are numerous ways in which anger, once activated, degrades subsequent 
reasoning processes. Even when the object of subsequent judgments bears no 
relation to the source of one's anger, anger increases: (1) a desire to blame 
individuals, (2) tendencies to overlook mitigating details before attributing blame, 
(3) tendencies to perceive ambiguous behavior as hostile, (4) tendencies to 
discount the role of uncontrollable factors when attributing causality and (5) 
punitiveness in response to witnessing mistakes made by others.122
 Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999, 781-782.122
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Goldberg et al go on to find in their own study that, when the retributive desire to harm 
is not satisfied, anger "activate[s] an indiscriminate tendency to punish others in 
unrelated situations without regard for whether their actions were intentional or not."  123
This is indication that anger decreases our sensitivity to morally relevant considerations, 
and increases the likelihood of making false moral judgments, including false 
attributions of responsibility. So it's highly likely that any given instance of anger is not 
increasing sensitivity to any blameworthiness justification. 
2.6 Summary
To summarize, we're unconsciously self-affirmative, and naturally retributive. It's 
likely these features of our psychology are the reason we find a basic-desert conception 
of blameworthiness intuitive. If we have good evidence that these features of our 
psychology are not sensitive to the relevant moral facts, then we have a reason to doubt 
that any given intuition in favor of B is reliable. It's clear that these two features of our 
psychology are not sensitive to the relevant moral facts. Our self-affirmative nature 
biases us to adopt attitudes ad-hoc. And the anger at the core of our retributive nature is 
neither elicited by any justification-conferring force of blameworthiness, nor increases 
our sensitivity to such force. So we have a reason to doubt the reliability of any given 
intuition in favor of B. We just can't trust it until we can eliminate the effects of the bias. 
Unfortunately, it's unclear whether there's a way to eliminate the effects of the 
bias. We know from Steele's influential studies that a person is much less likely to 
 Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999, 783.123
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readjust their attitudes to accord with decisions that potentially threaten a positive self-
assessment if they are given an alternative means of retaining a positive self-
assessment. That provides us a promising way of eliminating the effects of any 
occurrent anger-affirmation. The trouble is that, as discussed above, the anger-
affirmative process inculcates a basic-desert conception of blameworthiness early on in 
our moral development. Once that conception predominates, we won't see retributive 
behavior towards responsible wrongdoers as a threat to a positive self-assessment. At 
that point, the default assumption is that we're defeasibly justified in our retributive 
behavior. So although providing an alternative means of retaining a positive self-
assessment eliminates the possibility of an occurrent anger-affirmative process, it 
doesn't eliminate the effects of anger-affirmation during one's moral development. 
In order to reliably eliminate the effects of the bias, we need to 'check' if B is likely 
true at all. That requires a source of support for B distinct from intuition. By analogy, a 
doctor might be able to eliminate the effects of any occurrent misogyny on his intuitions. 
But it's unclear how he could eliminate the effects of unconscious misogyny on the 
concepts and background assumptions that he developed during his clinical training 
without first finding an alternative and reliable source of support for the sort of diagnosis 
he has given. He needs to 'check' other evidence distinct from his intuition that his 
patient is hysterical to see if there is such a thing as hysteria. 
Our reason to doubt the intuition that B is, then, undefeated. It's uncontroversial 
that, if one has an undefeated reason to doubt an intuition in favor of a proposition, then 
that intuition does not all by itself adequately epistemically justify belief in that 
proposition. Therefore, 
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(ii) an intuition that B does not adequately epistemically justify the belief that B.
2.7 Objections to (ii)
Michael S. Moore argues that (ii) is false in cases in which it is oneself that one 
intuits is blameworthy. He argues that in such cases
there is a much lessened danger that our intuitions about desert will be tainted by 
the emotions of ressentiment. Rather, one emotion here predominates, and that 
is the emotion of guilt. A virtuous person would feel great guilt at violating 
another's rights by killing, raping, assaulting, etc. And when that emotion of guilt 
produces the judgment that one deserves to suffer because one has culpably 
done wrong, that judgment is not suspect because of its emotional origins in the 
way that the corresponding third person judgment might be.124
Moore's claim that first-person blameworthiness intuitions are unlikely to be produced by 
anger is insightful. However, guilt-produced blameworthiness intuitions aren't any more 
epistemically reliable than the blameworthiness intuitions produced by anger. We 
genuinely feel guilty for wrongdoing only when we allow the conclusion that we've done 
wrong to negatively impact our self-assessment. But the research shows that, once we 
assess ourselves negatively, we'll be more likely to adopt just about any attitude that is 
consistent with that low self-assessment. So when we feel guilty, we'll be more likely to 
 Moore 1993, 26.124
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consider ourselves blameworthy. But there's no reason to think that this 'guilt-affirmative' 
process is any more reliable than an anger-affirmative process (I return to the issue of 
guilt in section 5).
Some may argue that all moral intuitions fall prey to the sort of genealogical 
critique I offer here, in which case my position commits me to the radical conclusion that 
intuition can never provide adequate epistemic justification for a moral proposition.  125
That's not so. First, although there is good evidence that emotion is the source of most 
moral intuitions , there's no reason to think that all moral intuitions have emotional 126
origins. For example, Marc Hauser, Liane Young, and Fiery Cushman found that 
common intuitions to trolley cases persisted even in those who were severely 
emotionally impaired.  So we ought not concede to the Nietzschean conclusion that all 127
moral intuitions are "merely a sign language of the affects".  128
Second, not all emotional motivations conflict with a positive self-assessment. 
Positive emotions don't conflict with a positive self-assessment, for example. So the 
mere fact that an emotion plays a role in eliciting a moral intuition doesn't mean it's 
triggering the ad hoc self-affirmative bias at the heart of my critique. Last, and following 
from the previous point, researchers have found that positive emotions are not 
unreliable in the way that anger is.  So the mere fact that an emotion elicits an intuition 129
 Sinnott-Armstrong 2006.125
 Haidt 2001.126
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by way of the self-affirmative bias is not sufficient to undermine the justifying force of 
that intuition. 
3. Theories of blameworthiness.
Adequate epistemic justification often comes by way of a possible inference. The 
sort of inference of concern is one in which the conclusion is B and the set of premises 
from which B can be inferred consists of propositions non-question-beggingly distinct 
from B. The best inferential justification for B would be a plausible theory that entails it, 
or at least makes it more likely than not. However, there is no such theory. 
Recall that censures have both harmful and non-harmful features. Most theories 
claim that an agent's responsibility for wrongdoing provides a non-instrumental 
justification to target them with the non-harmful features of censures - moral disapproval 
and perhaps even private feelings of anger, resentment, or indignation. I'll grant that 
claim at the outset. My focus is instead on how the harm of censures is to be justified. 
There are two routes to justifying the harm of censures in a way consistent with 
blameworthiness. One is to establish that the harm of a censure is itself non-
instrumentally justified. Another is to establish that the harm of censuring responsible 
wrongdoers is necessary to target them with the non-harmful features of censures. A 
theory has what I will call a constitutive problem when it cannot establish the former 
claim. A theory has what I will call a contingency problem when it cannot establish the 
latter claim. It is my thesis in this section that no existing theory of blameworthiness has 
established either claim.
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3.1 Desert-based Strawsonian theories
Consider first a version of Peter Strawson's influential theory of moral 
responsibility. Strawson rightly points out that each moral agent has a level of concern 
for moral considerations. This level of concern constitutes each agent's 'quality of 
will'.  According to Strawson, agents who participate in normal adult relationships with 130
one another are sensitive to the quality of will evinced by each other's actions and 
characteristics. This sensitivity consists in a proneness to target an agent with harmful 
reactive attitudes (and other such censures) when that agent's action evinces a quality 
of will that is inexcusably deficient.  131
Strawson then offers two distinct lines of argument. First, he claims that these 
natural retributive tendencies are so deeply engrained that giving them up is not a viable 
option for us. Though our retributive impulses are sensitive to reasons to restrain 
ourselves in particular cases, the general practice is "part of the general framework of 
human life, [and] not something that can come up for review as particular cases can 
come up for review."  This is false. As Galen Strawson points out, humans can and 132
sometimes do give up their retributive practices on the basis of general concerns about 
free will, moral sensitivity, the self, etc.  In any case, this first line of argument does not 133
offer any support for B. That an agent can't avoid generally censuring responsible 
wrongdoers may offer an excuse for doing so, but certainly not a justification. 
 Strawson 1982. Also see McKenna 2012, 59; Arpaly 2006.130
 R. J. Wallace (1994, 76-77) argues that the sensitivity may sometimes consist only in the proneness to 131
believe it apt to target such agents with blame. Also see McKenna 2012, 25.
 Strawson 2008, 28.132
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Anticipating this response, Strawson's second line of argument is that, insofar as 
we have a choice, we can "rationally" assess whether or not to abandon our retributive 
practice "only in the light of an assessment of the gains and losses to human life, its 
enrichment or impoverishment."  Strawson is clear that he takes our retributive 134
practice to be essential to interpersonal relationships. Without it, we can at best relate to 
people as mere things to be managed or controlled. That being so, it is best to retain the 
practice (I examine a more nuanced version of this argument in section 4). 
On this argument, an agent's responsibility alone does not justify censuring 
her.  Rather, on one reading of Strawson, censures are to be justified by their 135
conduciveness to good interpersonal relations. That is a paradigmatically instrumental 
consideration distinct from blameworthiness. Strawson's proposal does not, then, 
support B. Recently, Michael McKenna, developing remarks by Jonathan Bennett, has 
tried to develop Strawson's second line of argumentation. He argues that blame is not 
merely conducive to, but also constitutive of, the non-instrumental goodness of good 
interpersonal relations. The argument begins with the claim that blaming is not merely 
an action, but is instead an interpersonal exchange. As Bennett puts it, blame is
an activity that superficially appears to consist in one person doing something to 
another - and indeed abortive or perverted forms of blame can be like this. On a 
deeper understanding, though, [it is] something that can only properly be done 
together.136
 Strawson 2008, 28.134
 Though we may have to assume it does on Strawson's theory, a point I discuss in section 4.135
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McKenna expands on this claim, arguing that blaming is a process "that begins at one 
end with a wrong done, that then...answers that wrong by way of some blaming 
practice, and that invites" an interpersonal exchange between the blamed and the 
blamer.  137
The proposal faces a constitutive problem because the claim being made is 
merely that the process of blame is constitutive of good interpersonal relations. That 
allows the possibility that the harm of the process is itself a mere means or unfortunate 
side-effect. In response to the constitutive problem, McKenna argues that there are 
three sources of non-instrumental goodness in the harmful features of this interpersonal 
process. First, a wrongdoer can be harmed by the blaming process only if s/he has a 
"commitment to membership within the moral community" in that s/he "cares about her 
moral relations with others".  Second, the blaming process is harmful only insomuch 138
as the blamer herself expresses her own such commitment to a moral community by 
"expressing morality's counsel."  Lastly, the harm of the blaming process is brought 139
about by repentance and reconciliation, which sustain the bonds of a moral community. 
McKenna contends that "there is value, non-instrumental value, in a wrongdoer's 
commitment to a moral community,...in a blamer's commitment to morality's counsel", 
and in the resolution and reconciliation "that sustain the bonds of moral community".140
 McKenna 2012, 169.137
 McKenna 2012, 166.138
 McKenna 2012, 168.139
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But how, exactly, are the harmful features of these alleged non-instrumental 
goods themselves non-instrumentally good? McKenna answers that the harms of blame 
partly constitute these alleged non-instrumental goods in the way that the percussion 
work of Philly Joe Jones constitutes John Coltrane's 1958 recording of "Blue Train". 
"Blue Train" is non-instrumentally good, says McKenna. Assuming that's right, the 
percussion that constitutes it is also non-instrumentally good.141
However, it is not Jones' drumming itself that is relevantly analogous here, but 
any harm Jones might have received from that drumming. Suppose that Jones suffered 
some harm during the multiple takes of vigorous drumming. (This is a plausible 
assumption. Drummers quite often develop carpel-tunnel syndrome and other such 
maladies). In order for McKenna's analogy to hold, the fact that Jones's drumming or 
the album on which it appears constitutes a non-instrumental good must also make it 
non-instrumentally good that Jones's drumming harmed him. That is not plausible. Any 
harm Jones suffered from his drumming could only be a means or unfortunate side-
effect.  The same goes for harmful responses to wrongdoing in general, censures in 142
specific. If they're somehow necessarily connected to a non-instrumentally good 
process or outcome, it's only as a means or a side-effect. 
Strawsonian proposals also face a contingency problem in that it is not clear why 
harm is necessary in every case to mete out the non-harmful features of censures. 
Harmful responses in general, censures in specific, quite often provoke emotions within 
the target that are consistently shown to encourage retaliation, cloud judgment, cause 
 McKenna 2012, 170.141
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misattributions of blameworthiness , and generally close the mind to relevant 143
considerations.  That's not always the best means to good interpersonal relations. It's 144
often an impediment. Moreover, non-harmful alternatives seem to abound. Consider 
expressions of sadness, frustration, disappointment, or even cool detachment, each of 
which can non-harmfully communicate all that's good about a censure, and propel a 
wrongdoer towards the moral reform and reconciliation that McKenna, Bennett, and 
Boxer emphasize.  Consider also the dispassionate communication of rationally 145
persuasive reasons for the wrongdoer to reform and reconcile. Surely these non-
harmful measures are sometimes just as conducive to good interpersonal relations, if 
not more so.
How might a Strawsonian respond? Recall that McKenna highlights three steps 
essential to good interpersonal relations after a wrongdoing: the responsible agent's 
concern for her moral relations with others, her moral community's expression of 
'morality's counsel', and repentance and reconciliation. McKenna and Bennett claim that 
each step is necessarily harmful. But that's not the case. The accomplishment of this 
last step - repentance and reconciliation - can feel good, especially when it is voluntary 
rather than coerced. And the first step - an agent's concern for her moral relations with 
others - can be accomplished by way of the wrongdoer's eagerness to rectify matters 
with her moral community, as well as her hope that she can become a better person. So 
there needn't be any harm at the first and third steps. 
 Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993; Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999; Nichols and Prinz 2010, 143
126.
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The second step is supposed to be harmful due to the expression of morality's 
counsel. If 'expressing morality's counsel' just means censuring, then the 
accomplishment of this step is indeed harmful. But then it is unclear, for reasons 
adduced above, why such a step is required for good interpersonal relations. Karin 
Boxer, responding to this kind of worry, argues that our justified negative attitudes 
towards wrongdoers rightly carry with them a commitment to retroactively opposing 
wrongdoing. According to Boxer, carrying out this commitment requires harming the 
responsible agent. That is one way that expressing morality's counsel might require 
harming the responsible agent.  146
However, one needn't harm in order to oppose a wrongdoing. One can 
retroactively oppose an agent's wrongdoing by, among other things, non-harmfully 
expressing one's condemnation for the wrongdoing, attempting to non-harmfully reform 
the agent and other wrongdoers, expressing sorrow and remorse for the wrongdoing, 
attempting to repair the wrong in whatever ways possible, and by way of non-violent, 
constructive protest against the wrong. The Civil Rights Movement was marked by 
peaceful and highly effective opposition to wrongdoing. So one needn't harm in order to 
oppose wrongdoing.
Strawsonians have not provided an explanation as to why the goodness of 
interpersonal relations always offers a justification to censure responsible wrongdoers, 
much less why such a justification would be non-instrumental. So these theories cannot 
show that an agent's responsibility for wrongdoing all by itself offers a non-instrumental 
justification to censure that agent. 
 Boxer 2013, 127-133.146
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3.2 Expressionist theories
'Expressionist' theories of punishment fair even worse in these regards. Such 
theories rely on the following argument. 
1) A wrongdoer's responsibility alone offers a defeasible non-instrumental 
justification to express condemnation in a way that is proportional to that agent's 
wrongdoing.
2) The only way to do that is to censure.
3) So, a wrongdoer's responsibility alone offers a defeasible non-instrumental 
justification to censure them.
Why (1)? Igor Primoratz, expanding on remarks by Joel Feinberg , claims that it's 147
because we are under obligations to "vindicate the laws [wrongdoers] broke, reaffirm 
the rights of their victims which they violated, and demonstrate...that their deeds were 
indeed crimes."  Just like the relation between blame and interpersonal relations in 148
Strawsonian theories, condemnation seems merely instrumental to achieving these 
goals. This is why, as H.L.A. Hart remarks, any expressionist theory will "tremble on the 
margins" of consequentialism.  But even if (1) offers a non-instrumental reason to 149
express the condemnatory features of censures, there is no support for (2). 
 Feinberg 1965.147
 Primoratz 1989, 203. Also see Feinberg 1965; Kleinig 1991.148
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Note that, if every responsible wrongdoer absconded to a deserted tropical 
locale, we would still have the ability to fully express our negative attitudes to each other 
in a way that vindicates laws, reaffirms rights, and demonstrates the wrongness of their 
actions. If anything, the absence of wrongdoers makes such expressions easier. So it's 
difficult to see how the accomplishment of the aforementioned goals requires censuring 
wrongdoers. Expressionists respond that the point is not merely to express our negative 
attitudes to each other, but also to guilty wrongdoers. However, as Joel Feinberg notes, 
punishment and other such censures seem to be merely one conventional way to 
express our negative attitudes to wrongdoers.  Thomas Scanlon presses the point 150
succinctly. "Insofar as expression is our aim, we could just as well 'say it with flowers' or, 
perhaps more appropriately, with weeds."  So expressionist theories face a 151
contingency problem. They don't show that censuring guilty agents is in any way 
necessary to express the non-harmful features of censures.
Primoratz responds by limiting the scope of (2) as applying only to those 
wrongdoers who are, "regrettably, although perhaps not surprisingly...oblivious to mere 
words [or weeds]. They do not care for the standards of society...They are lacking in 
respect for others...They are deficient in human sympathy... But they are endowed with 
as lively an appreciation of their own interest as is everyone else. So if society's 
condemnation of their misdeeds is really to reach them, if they are really to understand 
how wrong their actions are, it will have to be translated into the one language they are 
 Feinberg 1965.150
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sure to understand: the language of self-interest. This translation is accomplished by 
punishment".  152
As explained in section 1, blameworthiness is universal: it applies to any given 
responsible wrongdoer. Primoratz's limitation violates this constraint. In any case, 
Primoratz is highlighting not just the expression of negative attitudes to guilty 
wrongdoers, but its effective communication.  The communication of negative 153
attitudes to a wrongdoer is never necessary to vindicate laws, reaffirm rights, or 
demonstrate wrongdoing. Moreover, those lacking in sympathy and respect are exactly 
the sorts who will respond most negatively to harmful treatment. Their sympathy, 
respect for persons, and sensitivity to the wrongness of certain actions is likely to 
decrease rather than increase. So Primoratz's own explanation entails that premise (2) 
will not apply to those specific wrongdoers. But those are the only cases that he alleges 
(2) applies to. So Primoratz has not shown that the expressionist theory provides any 
reason to prefer that a response to wrongdoing comes in the form of a censure rather 
than some non-harmful alternative.
Jean Hampton argues for a version of the expressionist view that focuses on the 
relative moral status of victimizers and victims. On her view, wronging a person always 
involves implicitly declaring oneself, falsely, as having a higher moral status than that 
person. In that case, "the retributivist demands that the false claim be corrected. The 
wrongdoer must be humbled to show that he isn't the lord of the victim."  The only way 154
to do that, according to Hampton, is by way of punishment. "Retributive punishment is 
 Primoratz 1989, 199-200.152
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the defeat of the wrongdoer at the hand of the victim (either directly or indirectly through 
an agent of the victim, e.g. the state) that symbolizes the correct relative value of 
wrongdoer and victim. It is a symbol that is conceptually required to reaffirm a victim's 
equal worth in the face of a challenge to it...  155
Unfortunately, as David Dolinko points out, even if the falseness of a claim 
implicit in an instance of victimizing were itself what makes that victimization wrong, it 
wouldn't provide a justification to censure. "If implicit assertion of that false message 
were what made the act wrong, explicit assertion of the falsehood ought to be every bit 
as wrong (and deserve just as much punishment) as its implicit assertion through the 
criminal act." However, that's clearly false. "If someone publishes a book asserting 
that...its author is an Uebermensch greater in moral value than any other human being 
on the face of the earth, we do not regard it as obligatory...to clap the author in jail."  156
Moreover, a false claim of moral superiority is not what makes victimization wrong. A 
deluded cultist may believe in his religious fervor that asking his toddlers to join him in 
ritual suicide is a means of recognizing their high moral status. That the cultist's 
victimization of his children contains no false claim of moral superiority does not make 
that victimization any less wrong. 
One response available to Hampton is that the false claim of moral superiority is 
not one that is always endorsed by victimizers, but rather one that victimization 
necessarily evinces. This is the reading that Heather J. Gert, Linda Radzik, and Michael 
Hand offer in their excellent review of Hampton's work on retributivism. They read 
 Hampton 1991, 398-399.155
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Hampton as saying that, "When one person wrongs another...the offender does not 
merely express the claim that she is more valuable than the victim. She has actually 
dominated the victim, thereby providing substantive evidence for her claim to 
superiority."157
This line of response is not promising. First, very few victimizations indicate to 
anyone that the victimizer is somehow superior. We see victimizers as lowly characters, 
and their victimizing actions as confirming evidence of that low status. If they deserve a 
censure, they deserve it for victimizing, not misleading. Second, even if victimization did 
provide misleading evidence, the only reason to defeat that evidence would be 
instrumental. The victimizer would deserve a censure, not due to the wrongdoing itself, 
but rather as a means to counteract the misleading evidence that the wrongdoing 
allegedly provides. Lastly, in order to defeat misleading evidence of a victim's low moral 
worth, we would need to make explicit the morally salient attributes of the victim. 
Censuring the victimizer is not the best means to that end. Hampton herself, elaborating 
on remarks by Feinberg, acknowledges that in some cases a parade for the victim is 
better than a censure as a means of defeating the false evidence of low moral status.  158
It's rare anything so elaborate would be required. Often, just a bit of reflection provides 
sufficient evidence of moral worth. 
3.3 Fair play theories
 Gert, Radzik, and Hand 1994, 82.157
 Hampton 1992, 1697.158
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Consider next a 'Fair Play' theory of punishment, which George Sher claims can 
be amended to explain blameworthiness.  Herbert Morris, the progenitor of the view, 159
points out that a benefit offered by any just society is the benefit of noninterference by 
others in life and bodily security. I'll call this the safety benefit. According to Morris, a 
burden we voluntarily accept in order to receive this benefit is "the exercise of self-
restraint...over inclinations that would, if satisfied, directly interfere or create a 
substantial risk of interference with others in proscribed ways".  I'll call this the safety 160
burden. It follows that any person who freely and knowingly  eschews this self-161
restraint "renounces a burden which others have voluntarily assumed and thus gains an 
advantage which others, who have restrained themselves, do not possess".  That, 162
claims Morris, yields an unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. Criminals get 
safety benefits without safety burdens.
According to Morris, all else being equal, we ought to ensure an equitable 
distribution of safety benefits and burdens. So, all else being equal, we ought to rectify 
any unequal distribution caused by criminal wrongdoing. However, we ought to do so in 
whatever way violates the least rights. Morris argues that censuring criminals is the 
least violative way to return to an equitable distribution.  Hence, all else being equal, 163
we ought to censure criminals. More formally, 
 Sher 1989, 69-90.159
 Morris 1968, 477.160
 Morris makes the freedom condition clear. "A person has not derived an unfair advantage if he could 161
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The epistemic condition I offer him for the sake of charity.
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1) All else being equal, we ought to ensure an equitable distribution of safety 
benefits and burdens in the least violative way possible.
2) Those guilty of criminal wrongdoing inequitably benefit from their wrongdoing.
3) Censuring them is the least violative way to return to an equitable distribution.
4) So, all else being equal, we ought to censure criminals.
I do not interpret Morris himself as offering a theory of blameworthiness. Nor do I think 
any premise of the argument can be adapted for that purpose. Consider (1). Morris 
seems to think that we ought to equitably distribute safety benefits and burdens 
because it is in our self-interest to do so. That's a highly plausible explanation. It's also a 
paradigm of contractualist reasoning. But if (1) is indeed a contractualist principle, then 
the fair play theory is not a theory of the sort of desert-based blameworthiness at issue. 
No alternative explanation seems forthcoming.
Also, blameworthiness applies to all wrongdoing. So the argument cannot explain 
blameworthiness unless it goes beyond mere criminal wrongdoing.  However, (1) is 164
implausible if we take it to apply to all wrongdoing. We indeed ought to set up social 
institutions that protect us against criminal harms (murder, mugging, fraud, theft, and the 
like), and that actively force upon everyone the 'burden' of not carrying out those harms. 
When done right, police-work is essential. But neither individuals, nor social institutions, 
nor the moral community have a reason to provide protection from every kind of wrong, 
much less force upon every agent the 'burden' of never wronging others. Consider the 
 Sher 1987, 78.164
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wrong of privately disparaging a close friend, resenting a parent, or neglecting to feel 
the appropriate amount of love for one's child. No one has the moral standing to 
preemptively protect victims against these wrongs. No one has the moral standing to 
stop the wrongdoer in advance. Some morals oughtn't be policed.
As for (2), how is it, exactly, that wrongdoers benefit from wrongdoing? Morris 
cites 'giving in' to certain inclinations or impulses that others do not as a sort of benefit. 
Richard Burgh, in an otherwise insightful critique of the fair play theory, claims that this 
is indeed a benefit in that it affords the wrongdoer "a bit more freedom than those who 
undertook the [safety] burden."  George Sher agrees.  It is difficult to see how this 165 166
alleged freedom constitutes a benefit. Suppose that, during the course of otherwise 
great lives, brothers Jim and John each develop momentary inclinations to strike their 
frustratingly senile father. Jim tragically gives in to his inclination. John doesn't. Perhaps 
there is some understanding of 'freedom' in which Jim gained more freedom than John 
by giving in to his inclination. But given that acting on such an impulse can bring Jim 
only sorrow, there is no good explanation of why Jim 'benefits' from it. Indulging an 
impulse to do wrong sometimes affords us a benefit. It does not constitute one. 
George Sher claims that a wrongdoer benefits in that he gains "freedom from the 
demands of the prohibition he violates."  What does it mean to be free of the demands 167
of morality? Sher's remarks are brief. He claims that, "because others take that 
prohibition seriously, they lack a similar liberty" (emphasis mine).  This indicates that, 168
 Burgh 1982, 209. 165
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on Sher's view, to be free of a demand of morality is to not take that demand seriously. 
In a later work, Sher specifies that an agent takes a demand to not φ seriously if that 
demand qua demand demotivates her against φ-ing. So, those who don't take a 
demand seriously lack at least one demotivation to violate that demand. Lacking a 
demotivation against an action is a kind of freedom. Moreover, since moral prohibitions 
come in various degrees of strength, freedom from moral demotivation also comes in 
degrees.169
There would seem to be only two ways that this can benefit an agent. It can allow 
the agent to acquire a benefit in some specific instance, or more easily acquire benefits 
in general.  Lacking a demotivation to thieve, for example, offers a specific benefit 170
whenever there's an opportunity to snag a stack of cash. Those who don't worry 
themselves about morality in general may be benefitted in certain societies. As Sher 
says, "each increase in an agent's willingness to disregard the requirements of morality 
leaves him in a better position to accomplish the goals that partially determine his 
interests."  Unfortunately, lacking a demotivation against wrongdoing, in specific or in 171
general, is often not beneficial. Consider those thieves who wind up with marked bills, or 
those imaginary societies that tend to reward the virtuous more than the vicious. When 
wrongdoers are in these circumstances, they don't gain the benefit under consideration. 
Sher's version of the fair play theory entails that those wrongdoers cannot be 
blameworthy. But the theory is supposed to entail that such wrongdoers are 
blameworthy. 
 Sher 1997, 168 - 173.169
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As for (3), the problems identifying any additional benefit wrongdoers gain from 
doing wrong makes it difficult to assess how censuring removes that additional benefit. 
However, I'll set that issue aside and focus instead on the claim that censuring is the 
least violative way of rebalancing benefits and burdens. If censuring wrongdoers 
somehow removes a benefit, then praising or rewarding should offer a benefit. Praising 
or rewarding hardly ever violates anyone's rights, or leads to suboptimal outcomes. So 
it's hardly ever more violative to reward those who do right than to censure those who 
do wrong. Assuming (1) and (2) of the fair play argument, it follows that there will be 
some cases in which we ought to praise or reward those who abide by moral norms, 
rather than censure those who do not. That's a nice conclusion for those who favor 
positive reinforcement. It's not much help to those seeking a theory of blameworthiness.
4. An argument for retributive caution
So far, I have argued that
(i) An agent's alleged blameworthiness permits one to censure that agent only if 
one has adequate epistemic justification to believe s/he's blameworthy.
(ii) An intuition that an agent is blameworthy does not adequately epistemically 
justify that belief.
(iii) There is currently no plausible theory of blameworthiness.
We can sometimes gain epistemic justification by way of peer agreement or certain 
forms of testimony. However, such sources are highly dubious, to say the least, when 
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we have sufficient reason to conclude that our peers and testimony providers also lack 
a reliable intuition or argument in favor of their pronouncements. (ii) and (iii) provide that 
reason. So, 
(iv) If (ii) and (iii), no one has adequate epistemic justification to believe an agent 
is blameworthy.
It follows that
(v) An agent's alleged blameworthiness never permits censuring that agent.
As discussed at the outset, there is a widespread practice of treating responsible 
wrongdoers as if blameworthiness permits censuring them. According to (v), this 
retributive practice harms people on the basis of an alleged moral principle that we have 
sufficient reason to doubt. Most moral theories forbid us from adopting harmful practices 
that require acting on the basis of moral principles we have sufficient reason to doubt. 
On these 'single-tier' theories, (v) entails that we ought to practice retributive caution by 
refraining from censuring wrongdoers on the basis of alleged blameworthiness. 
However, 'two-tier' theories have the resources to allow, even demand, adopting 
practices that involve acting on moral principles we have sufficient reason to doubt. I'll 
discuss two notable two-tier justifications for blameworthiness - one that I think is 
available in Peter Strawson's work, and Manuel Vargas's Agency Cultivation Model - 
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before identifying and criticizing a premise required to defend any two-tier theory of 
blameworthiness.
4.1 Strawson (again)
In section 3, I discussed two lines of argument in Strawson. The first is naturalist, 
the second consequentialist. As I mentioned above, neither was meant to provide 
evidence that anyone actually is blameworthy as I have described that concept. 
However, Strawson's second line of argument can be (and I think is best) read as a two-
tier defense of blameworthiness. He is clear that we are prone to censure agents for 
freely, knowingly, and inexcusably manifesting a poor quality of will, and not for 
instrumental reasons. "The efficacy of these practices", he says, "is not a sufficient 
basis, it is not even the right sort of basis, for these practices as we understand 
them."  This indicates that Strawson takes our retributive practice to be roughly as I 172
have described it; we tend to censure responsible wrongdoers just because they are 
responsible for wrongdoing. 
However, recall that, according to Strawson, the question of whether or not to 
abandon our retributive practice can be assessed "only in the light of an assessment of 
the gains and losses to human life, its enrichment or impoverishment."  Puzzlingly, 173
that's an assessment of the 'efficacy' of the practice that he clearly thinks will come out 
in favor of retainment. Considering Strawson claims efficacy is not the right sort of basis 
for the practice, he might have meant this final line of defense to be two-tier. One way to 
 Strawson 2008, 21.172
 Strawson 2008, 28.173
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read him is that he's conceding that we tend to censure in response to responsible 
wrongdoing, and not in response to instrumental considerations. But when we ask 
whether or not responsible wrongdoing all by itself provides a justification for censuring, 
he's claiming that it doesn't particularly matter. The retributive practice is essential to 
interpersonal relationships. So it is best to retain it even if doing so involves 
systematically acting as if an epistemically unsupported justification obtains. 
4.2 Vargas's Agency Cultivation Model
Manuel Vargas reads Strawson in this way, and argues for a similar view. Like 
Strawson, Vargas points out that we tend to censure directly in response to responsible 
wrongdoing, and not in response to instrumental considerations. When we do so, we 
believe it is responsible wrongdoing itself that justifies the censure. But Vargas denies 
that responsible wrongdoing all by itself justifies censuring.  It follows that, on his view, 174
our retributive practice is likely to involve acting as if an epistemically unsupported 
justification obtains.  However, Vargas argues that our retributive practice on the 175
whole fosters moral agency, and we're justified in retaining it in virtue of that fact, even if 
it involves responding to each individual case as if there is a blameworthiness-like 
justification for doing so.  We should revise our beliefs as much as possible, of course. 176
But ultimately all that matters, Vargas argues, "is that the system as a whole produces 
 Vargas 2013, 249-261. Moreover, he's skeptical that agents are responsible in the sense likely to be 174
presupposed by our retributive practice (2013, 21-72).
 Vargas 2013, 97. 175
 Vargas 2013, 172; 2015, 2666-2671.176
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agents that, over time and in a wide range of contexts, are suitably responsive to moral 
considerations."177
4.3 Bad effects
I offer such a quick gloss of these theories only because my concerns are rather 
general. Two-tier theories of blameworthiness all share the following feature. They 
concede that our retributive practice could be epistemically faulty in that it involves 
responding to an apparent justification that we have sufficient reason to doubt. They 
then argue for retainment in any case by claiming that our retributive practice conduces 
to some crucial human good (e.g. interpersonal relationships, agency cultivation) better 
than alternatives.178
One strategy against this claim involves skepticism about the crucial goods at 
issue. Stephen Morris, for example, argues that the goodness of moral agency 
cultivation has not been established.  I'm resistant to that argumentative strategy. 179
Another strategy is to deny that the retributive practice best conduces to the target 
goods.  This strategy is more promising. Although there are clearly cases in which 180
censuring is conducive to some crucial human good like interpersonal relationships or 
agency cultivation, it's unclear that our retributive practice is the most effective means to 
this end. I consider the widespread belief that it is to be wishful thinking.  181
 Vargas 2013, 176.177
 Nichols (2007) is also sympathetic to this sort of view.178
 Morris 2015.179
 Again, see Morris 2015.180
 Thanks to Derk Pereboom for introducing me to this idea.181
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Unfortunately, I don't have the resources to argue that our retributive practice is not the 
most conducive to the aforementioned goods in the aggregate. No one does. It's an 
empirical question with a paucity of data. My strategy against the two-tier view is to 
argue that, even if retainment maximizes the aforementioned goods, that still doesn't 
outweigh the damaging effects of retainment. Consider just two of these effects.
One damaging effect of retaining our retributive practice is that it involves 
routinely acting as if an epistemically unsupported justification obtains.  This involves 182
systematic and widespread irrationality, and may cause psychological damage to those 
aware of it. Vargas claims it is possible, through conceptual revision, to revise basic 
desert out of our first-order blameworthiness judgments so that those judgments are 
consistent with instrumental second-order justifications.  However, as much of the 183
discussion so far has made clear, the 'basic-ness' of our blameworthiness judgments is 
incredibly resilient. That being the case, the skeptical challenge pushes us towards an 
error theory about blameworthiness, not revisionism. Furthermore, revising to believe 
that we are justified in censuring only by virtue of instrumental justifications would leave 
us feeling alienated from the first-order non-instrumental conviction on which we act.  184
Another damaging effect of retainment is its collateral damage. On the two-tier 
view, censuring responsible wrongdoers is justified by the overall efficacy of the 
 Pereboom 2013, 129-130.182
 On his view, although the retainment of our retributive practice does require judging that 'something' 183
about responsible wrongdoing defeasibly justifies censure, these judgments are 'cognitively thin' in that 
"what that something comes to is...not anything about which we have formed thoughts or strong 
convictions. Indeed, from the standpoint of our ordinary discourse and practical life, what is important is 
confidence that we are correct and justified in our first-order judgments. The justifiers and their precise 
nature are ordinarily of secondary and considerably less importance". Hence the ability to revise first-
order judgments to fit with second-order instrumental justifications (2015, 253). 
 Doris 2015. 184
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practice, and not by the efficacy of censuring in each particular case.  So there will be 185
many instances in which our retributive practice advises censuring people even though 
that censure won't foster agency, improve relationships, or produce any other moral 
good. On the two-tier view, we still have reason to censure these individuals. They are 
to be ground up in the gears of the two-tier machinery.186
With these damaging effects in mind, it becomes clear why the two-tier 
justification will dissolve if there's a less damaging alternative practice that is even close 
to being as effective. By analogy, consider the largely abandoned stop-and-frisk policy 
in NYC. That policy systematically treated innocents who fit certain profiles as if they 
were suspected criminals. Advocates of the policy often claim, falsely, that it was better 
at decreasing crime than alternatives. These advocates fail to consider that, even if the 
policy were better than alternatives at decreasing crime, that would not alone justify it. 
The large number of innocents swept up by stop-and-frisk were collateral damage 
whose demographic profiles were never sufficient to warrant suspicion of guilt in the first 
place. A policy that did not treat innocents in this way would be morally preferable even 
if it were, say, 80% as effective at crime prevention. 
Similarly, our retributive practice cannot merely be just a little better than the 
other available methods at maintaining interpersonal relations, fostering moral agency, 
or achieving other such goods. For if that were so, we would be paying a premium in the 
harms of irrationality and collateral damage to achieve marginal increases in the target 
goods. A system that is beneficial overall will strike a better balance between gains in 
 Vargas 2013, 172.185
 McGeer 2015, 2639-2640.186
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the target values and losses of others. So, our current retributive practice is justified by 
its effectiveness in bringing about the aforementioned goods only if there is not a less 
damaging alternative practice that is almost as effective. 
Our retributive practice does not meet this standard. To see why, consider a kind 
of objection that is widely thought to push rule consequentialism towards act 
consequentialism. If agency cultivation, securing good interpersonal relations, or some 
other such good is our aim, why not just do our best to censure responsible wrongdoers 
when and only when it conduces to their agency cultivation, good interpersonal relations 
with them, etc? As Victoria McGeer points out, two-tier theories like Vargas's 'collapse' 
into single-tiered theories because it is far better for us to respond directly to the 
justifications for censure that actually obtain, rather than taking the tortuous route 
through epistemically unjustified beliefs about blameworthiness.  After all, the direct 187
route would presumably be roughly as effective as our current practice, but without 
irrationality or alienation, and with far less collateral damage. 
Vargas responds that, if an agent is blameworthy when and only when blame 
conduces to their agency cultivation (or conduces to good interpersonal relations with 
them, etc), then the dead, the dying, the distant, and the blame-resistant aren't ever 
blameworthy. But facts about such agents' blameworthiness "present themselves as 
settled independently of whether the considered agents are sensitizable in that 
particular instance. Yet McGeer’s account seems to require that we conclude that this 
swath of ordinary practices is fundamentally flawed."  That's a severely counter-188
 McGeer 2015.187
 Vargas 2015, 2673.188
 82
intuitive implication that requires "radical revision" to our moral thought and practice. 
"The two-tiered picture of blaming norms", on the other hand, requires far less revision 
because it "provides a way of capturing the spirit of the idea that 'praise and blame are 
justified not in terms of their putative effects (whether good or bad), but simply because 
they are the appropriate or merited response to what the person has done'."189
Radical revision to ordinary moral thought is indeed required to adopt a single-
tiered theory. However, the fact that a moral theory conflicts with ordinary moral thought 
is a demerit of that theory only if there is some reason to think that ordinary moral 
thought is correct. A claim at the core of Vargas's view is that our ordinary moral thought 
about blameworthiness is not correct. Surely, then, the fact that responding directly to 
the bona fide moral reasons that Vargas identifies requires radical revision to 
epistemically unjustified moral beliefs does not weigh in favor of retaining those beliefs. 
Adopting less biased policing policies, for example, requires radical revision to many 
people's ordinary (authoritarian) moral thought. That alleged 'cost' of revision doesn't 
come close to outweighing the damages of retaining such a practice. We ought not 
stop-and-frisk, despite unjustified beliefs to the contrary. Why think that matters are any 
different in the case of retributive beliefs? 
Perhaps what Vargas has in mind here is not just the counter-intuitiveness of 
responding directly to instrumental reasons for censure, but also the difficulty of it. He 
claims his two-tier agency cultivation model is "buttressed against such a collapse [into 
a single-tiered theory] by the realities of our psychologies, including the length of time it 
takes to develop and refine moral attitudes, the flexibility of our attitudes, the cognitive 
 Vargas 2015, 2675.189
 83
burden involved in assessing responsibility, and the overarching need to have a stable 
and efficacious system of influence. Collectively, these considerations...weigh against 
something like act or token specific norms of responsibility."  190
Vargas's remarks indicate that he takes it to be too psychologically difficult for 
human agents to efficiently and systematically censure on the basis of instrumental 
justifications on a case-to-case basis. This is speculative. As I argue elsewhere , it is 191
psychologically possible, even easy in some kinds of cases, to censure solely on the 
basis of such justifications. We often censure young children, for example, when we feel 
it will best morally educate them. We censure immoral but nevertheless undeserving 
agents in order to overcome or take a stand against the immoral systems of which they 
are a part. Perhaps we can, with slow and steady practice over several generations, 
replace our retributive practices with the forward-looking approach that we apply in 
these sorts of cases. There is not yet sufficient reason to dismiss this possibility, 
especially considering the costs of retainment.
Since an agent's alleged blameworthiness does not permit censuring that agent, 
and there is not sufficient reason to act as if it does, we ought to practice retributive 
caution by refraining from censuring agents on the basis of blameworthiness.
5. Censures, blame, and guiltworthiness
My argument has focused only on the limited class of blaming responses I call 
censures. This leaves room for the following objection. At the outset, I identified blame 
 Vargas 2013, 181.190
 See "Skepticism and the Rationality of Anger".191
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as anger by virtue of moral disapproval. Well, we are clearly epistemically justified in 
morally disapproving of those who are responsible for wrongdoing. And it is at the 
cornerstone of my account that we are prone to become angry at, and hence blame, 
these individuals. On my view, blame doesn't need to be expressed in a way that is 
harmful, or even expressed at all. So, even if I'm right that we ought to be skeptical that 
harmful expressions of blame (i.e. censures) are deserved, my account allows that 
blame itself is deserved by these wrongdoers. Isn't this harmless blameworthiness a 
sort that is allowed by my account?
Perhaps not. Gary Watson remarks, plausibly, that "one's blaming attitudes are 
unfair if it would be unfair...to subject others to the adverse treatment to which one's 
attitudes dispose one".  If he's right, the impermissibility of censuring on the basis of 192
blameworthiness entails the impermissibility of blaming on the basis of 
blameworthiness. However, I feel no need to push this point because I find the idea of 
harmless blameworthiness implausible. As I argue elsewhere,  debates about what is 193
deserved by wrongdoers have for too long suffered from an unproductive obsession 
with blaming attitudes and emotions, when what is clearly at stake is the harmful effects 
of acting on them. Positions that prohibit desert of the latter and allow desert of the 
former makes this all the more clear. Such a position entails that people are justified in 
fuming to themselves over the transgressions of others, but not justified in doing much 
of anything about it. This action is, as the old saying goes, like drinking poison and 
expecting another to sicken. It is not our attitudes and emotions that responsible 
 Watson 1996, 239.192
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wrongdoers intuitively deserve, but rather some of the effects that typically result from 
acting on these attitudes and emotions. 
However, consideration of this point leads us to a kind of harmful response that I 
think escapes my argument for retributive caution. One of the typical and intended 
harms of overtly blaming an individual is the eliciting of moral guilt in that individual. This 
emotion is not, as much of the current literature suggests, a form of blame. Blame 
consists of some form of anger by virtue of moral disapproval. Moral guilt (henceforth 
simply 'guilt') consists instead of sorrow by virtue of moral disapproval of oneself. The 
difference is important. Anger aims to hurt. Sorrow does not. It just hurts. Anger clouds 
thoughtful contemplation. Sorrow does not (as socially isolated academics are acutely 
aware). It is often the case that we judge that we deserve to feel this non-hostile 
emotion for our wrongdoings. I do not think that intuitions to this conclusion are much 
more trustworthy than blameworthiness intuitions. But the following inference is readily 
available to each of us and is, I think, often employed.
It's partly constitutive of being a morally good person to feel guilt for one's 
responsible wrongdoing. I have a non-instrumental justification to be a good person. 
Therefore, I have a non-instrumental justification to feel guilty for my responsible 
wrongdoing. The argument is typically run from this first-person point of view. But it 
applies generally. If the desert of guilt for responsible wrongdoing is justifiably applied to 
oneself, it's justifiably applied to others as well.  Each of us has a non-instrumental 194
justification to be a good person, and hence a non-instrumental justification to feel guilty 
for our responsible wrongdoings. 
 Moore 1993, 27.194
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As far as I can tell, the apparent plausibility of the argument does not result from 
an epistemically unreliable process. Nor does the argument fall prey to the criticisms I 
leveled throughout section 3. So although we are not epistemically justified in 
concluding that anyone is blameworthy, we may be epistemically justified in concluding 
responsible wrongdoers guiltworthy. This conclusion leaves room for censures to be 
defeasibly justified whenever they are the best means to elicit deserved guilt. That 
instrumental reason for censure, together with the others mentioned throughout this 
essay, show that retributive caution does not commit us to retributive prohibition. 
Retributivists might find this concession patronizing. They are welcome to censure me, 
provided they can identify an instrumental reason to do so.  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Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness
A common way to explain the 'liability' sense of moral responsibility for an agent's 
immoral action or characteristic (henceforth 'transgression')  is by the kind of negative 195
response that the agent deserves for it. The predominant view amongst those who 
explain moral responsibility in this way is that blame is always the kind of response at 
issue.  Stronger responses - punishment, public censure, and the like - may also be 196
deserved, but not always, and only if blame is deserved.  I call this the blame-focused 197
view of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue for an alternative. Aside from a few 
exceptions , moral guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as 198
merely an effect of being blamed , a form of blame , or as a reliable indicator of 199 200
moral responsibility , but not itself the kind of response that explains moral 201
responsibility for transgressions. Getting behind the eyes of immoral agents reveals 
otherwise. Moral responsibility for transgression is explained by the way in which the 
transgressor deserves to feel, and not by the interpersonal responses that typically elicit 
those feelings. Moral responsibility is intrapersonal. Guilt, not blame, is the paradigm. 
 Below, I more carefully consider moral responsibility's relation to obligations.195
 Feinberg 1970, 55-94; Gibbard 1990, 42; Wallace 1994, 76-77; Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 5-8; 196
Strawson, G. 2002, 452; Bennett 2002; Clarke 2005, 21; Fischer 2006, 63; Darwall 2006 and 2009; 
Shoemaker 2007 and 2011; Waller 2011, 2-5; McKenna 2012, 150; Boxer 2013; Scanlon 2013, 101- 102; 
Pereboom 2014, 2.
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 Bennett 2002, 152-153; McKenna 2012, 161-171.199
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Blame and other such interpersonal responses are like a police composite, accurately 
portraying a common face  of moral responsibility without identifying its DNA.202
My plan is as follows. In section 1, I discuss the nature of blame, moral guilt, and 
distinguish moral responsibility-based justifications to respond to transgressors from 
other justifications to regard or respond. I conclude the section by arguing that an agent 
deserves to feel moral guilt if she deserves blame. In section 2, I argue that the 
converse does not hold. Some transgressors do not deserve blame, and yet still 
deserve to feel guilt for their transgressions. Denying that those transgressors are 
morally responsible is implausible. So it is guilt rather than blame that is always the kind 
of response that morally responsible transgressors deserve. I call this the guilt-focused 
view of moral responsibility. I argue that this alternative view conforms to general 
features of desert that the blame-focused view does not, offers a compelling way to 
reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows that those outside of 
the moral community can still be morally responsible for their transgressions. I conclude 
in section 3 by considering objections.
1. Disapproval and blame.
Gary Watson argues that there is a sort of 'aretaic' blame that consists merely in 
dispassionate moral attitudes towards an agent.  The attitudes necessary and 203
 The metaphor originates with Watson's influential 1996 paper "The Two Faces of Responsibility".202
 Watson 1996.203
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sufficient for this sort of blame are contested. But it is clear that it consists in some 
number of the following.204
(i): the belief that the agent is or has acted in a way that is morally bad.
(ii): the belief that negatively appraising the agent for this transgression is apt.
(iii): an endorsement of the moral reasons against the agent's transgression.
(iv): desiring that the agent not have transgressed.
(v): holding the desire cited in (iv) because of (i)-(iii).
There is a noteworthy dispute concerning the use of the term 'blame' here. Michael 
McKenna has us suppose that a person who holds attitudes (i) - (v) has no negative 
emotions or ill feelings towards their target and "could not imagine regarding or 
responding to [the target] any differently than she would her sweet little grandmother...
[believing] that there's no better remedy than just hoping [the target] will do better next 
time".  It seems to me that such an individual is not blaming per se. Rather, I think that 205
the holding of these attitudes are better described as a sort of moral disapproval that is 
a precursor to blame. That is how will refer to them for the remainder of this work. I take 
it that in paradigm cases to genuinely blame an agent for an immoral act consists in
 For example, Arpaly (2006, 9-39), Smith (2007, 476), and Scanlon (2008, 122-214) argue that (i) 204
through (iii) are necessary and sufficient. George Sher argues for a view of blame that only requires (i) 
and (iv) (2006, 93-114). Michael McKenna argues that all of these conditions are required (2012, 21-29).
 McKenna 2012, 24. Also see Rosen 2015, 67.205
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Blame: some form of anger (such as resentment or indignation) towards an agent 
in virtue of morally disapproving of that agent.206
One might feel other negative emotions by virtue of moral disapproval. Some, such as 
frustration and irritation, will in a variety of contexts be relevantly blame-like, perhaps 
counting as a 'mild' form of blame. I am happy to also include them in the category. I 
take other emotions, such as disgust and hatred, to be in most contexts too unlike 
blame to fall in the category.
1.2 Two kinds of moral responsibility
For the purposes of this work, this particular dispute over the nature of blame is 
merely terminological. Although I reject that the collection of attitudes that I call moral 
disapproval constitutes a kind of blame, I take them to be pertinent to moral 
responsibility in exactly the ways that Watson and others claim. To morally disapprove 
of an agent is not merely to attribute to them some kind of causal responsibility, for 
example when we say 'James is responsible for the fire because he accidentally dug 
into a hidden gas line.' To morally disapprove of an agent for a transgression is to take 
that agent to be in a crucial sense morally responsible for that transgression due to 
immoral ends that s/he has adopted. Specifically, 
 Strawson 1982; Wallace 1994, 76-77; Watson 1996, 238; Bennett 2002 and 2008; Smith 2007, 477; 206
McKenna 2012, 21-29; Boxer 2013; Rosen 2015. Gibbard (1992) argues non-cognitive anger is sufficient 
for blame. 
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An agent is morally responsible in an attributability sense for a transgression just 
in case it is apt to morally disapprove of that agent for the transgression.207
Moreover, I agree with Watson and numerous others that an agent's attributability does 
not entail that the targeted agent is liable to a response such as blame or punishment. 
Unlike blame and punishment, moral disapproval is not a way of responding to or 
treating agents. It rarely, if ever, affects targeted agents in any way, and certainly never 
harms  them in ways that are typically prohibited. This is why, as George Sher points 208
out, moral disapproval is made apt merely by those norms "that require that we believe 
propositions that are true and that we accept moral principles that are justified."  For 209
example, suppose that, 
Janus's attributability: After just a few drinks, your good friend Janus relays a 
deeply embarrassing secret of yours to some mutual friends. You're mortified. 
Your friends will never see you the same way. The next morning, Janus admits 
that he likes to gossip, and had a small urge to do so that night that is 
characteristic of an immoral value that he holds. But he claims that his acting on 
this urge was an unexpected and unintended result of the mixture of his newly 
 Zimmerman 1988, 152; Watson 1996; Arpaly 2006, 9-39; Sher 2006, 130; Shoemaker 2011; Nelkin 207
2011, 34-35.
 Throughout, I assume that an agent is 'harmed' by a response when and only when that response 208
decreases the agent's well-being, or prohibits that agent from an increase in well-being that s/he would 
have otherwise obtained. Those who reject the assumption are welcome to consider my use of 'harm' as 
a mere expedient for the more cumbersome disjunction in the analysans. 
 Sher 2006, 130. See also Zimmerman 1988, 152; Watson 1996; Arpaly 2006, 9-39; Shoemaker 2011; 209
Nelkin 2011, 34-35
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prescribed medication with his mild alcohol consumption. He would certainly 
have resisted his motivation otherwise. 
Janus is responsible for this betrayal in more than just a causal sense. He's gossipy. 
That's partly why he betrayed you. So it is apt to morally disapprove of him. The aptness 
of this moral disapproval also justifies a few sorts of responses. First, you're justified in 
altering any relationship practice which rests on prior beliefs that Janus's attributability 
defeats. For example, your friendship with Janus was probably based, like many close 
friendships, on a high level of trust of which you now have justification to believe him 
less capable. You should adjust your relationship accordingly.  Second, Janus is 210
'answerable' for his betrayal in that you're justified to demand that, insofar as he is able, 
he explain his reasons for it, and that he justify or excuse it if he can.  211
It is understandable that you would also privately feel blaming emotions towards 
Janus, and be prepared to target him with harmful blaming responses (detailed below), 
should he fail to provide a viable justification or excuse for his behavior. I take this 
private form of blame towards attributable agents to be morally permissible, since it 
doesn't affect anyone other than the blamer. It is worth noting, however, that it is 
extremely difficult to keep blame private. It typically either manifests in some harmful 
action, or dissipates. In this case there is apparently no positive reason for the former. 
According to Janus, his betrayal was in large part a result of forces beyond his 
control. He simply could not have foreseen that his medication would loosen his lips in 
 Scanlon 2008, 128-31; Shoemaker 2011.210
 David Shoemaker (2011 and 2015) argues that answerability is a form of responsibility distinct from 211
attributability and liability. Angela Smith (2012) disagrees. My arguments are consistent with either 
conclusion.
 93
the way that it did (there was no warning on the label, his prior prescription didn't have 
this effect, etc). If that's true, it constitutes a reasonable excuse for his behavior. So 
although it is apt to morally disapprove of Janus, to adjust your relationship practices, 
demand him to answer for himself, and permissible to privately feel benign blaming 
emotions towards him, he is not liable to any response that will further harm him, 
including being targeted by blame, or to agents being disposed to target him with blame. 
He is not, as Watson puts it, 'accountable' for his actions.212
This is what distinguishes liability from attributability. An agent can be morally 
responsible for doing wrong in an attributability sense even if s/he isn't liable to any 
responses that harm in ways beyond those brought about by mere relationship 
adjustment or demands for justification. But an agent is morally responsible for doing 
wrong in a liability sense only if s/he is liable to such a response for it.
1.3 Desert and liability
There are various moral considerations that might render a transgressor liable to 
harmful responses such as blame and punishment. That the agent 'deserves' such 
responses is the consideration most often implicated by ascriptions of moral 
responsibility. When an agent deserves some potentially harmful response, s/he 
deserves it just because s/he transgressed in the way s/he did, and not for any further 
 Watson 1996. Also see Shoemaker 2015, 113. I prefer to follow Karin Boxer (2013, 3) in using H.L.A 212
Hart's term 'liability' because 'accountability' suggests an interpersonal nature, which I deny. See 
especially section 2.2 below.
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reasons, such as those generated by consequentialist or contractualist theories.  For 213
example, suppose that 
Janus's liability: you discover Janus's betrayal was not an unforeseeable 
accident. He's not on any medication. The alcohol didn't impair his judgment. 
Though he likes you, and thinks of you as a friend, he's been jealous of your 
charm and charisma for quite some time. So it turns out that he freely and 
knowingly divulged your secret in an attempt to bolster his own social standing at 
your expense. And then he lied about it.
Janus deserves some potentially harmful response for this transgression, blame being 
an obvious choice. Such a response may bring about better states of affairs. It may be 
that Janus tacitly agreed, or would agree, to abide by rules which, if broken, make him 
liable to such responses. Such a response may even be inevitable, given your anger at 
Janus. But these reasons to potentially harm Janus do not seem to capture the basis of 
his desert. Janus deserves some potentially harmful response regardless of any 
(hypothetical or actual) agreement, or the value of the states of affairs that result. He 
deserves it just because he freely and knowingly divulged your secret for nefarious 
reasons.
This is not to say that anyone ought to harmfully respond to Janus, all things 
considered. If for example a peaceful response to Janus guarantees a far better state of 
affairs (Janus's reform, your relationships repaired, your friends putting the secret out of 
 This 'basic' desert formulation is Derk Pereboom's (2014, 2). Also see Scanlon 2013, 101- 102; 213
Feinberg 1970, 55-94; Clarke 2005, 21; Strawson, G. 2002, 452; Waller 2011, 2-5; McKenna 2012, 150. 
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their minds, etc), then although Janus deserves a potentially harmful response, it may 
be that no one ought to respond to him that way, all things considered. This is because, 
when an agent deserves some response, s/he is only defeasibly liable to the response 
in one of the following ways : 214
Goodness: there is some non-instrumental good in the agent receiving the 
response.  215
Reason: there is a defeasible non-instrumental reason to respond to the agent in 
that way.216
I haven't the space to adjudicate which interpretation is correct. I'll just assume that, for 
any agent and allegedly deserved response, showing that both the goodness and 
reason interpretation apply is sufficient to show that the agent deserves the response. 
I'll assume that showing neither interpretation applies is sufficient to show that the agent 
does not deserve it.
Some may object that there are alternative forms of liability for wrongdoing that 
do not involve desert, as defined.  I address alternative forms of liability in the final 217
section. But I should note that my focus in this paper is on the sizable number of 
 Kleinig 1971, 76; Hanna 2013.214
 Ross 1930, 134-138; Miller 1999, 136; Sher 1987, 194-198; Hurka 2001, 8-12; Moriarty 2003, 520; 215
Bennett 2002, 147; Kagan 2003, 93; McKenna 2012, 172; Pereboom 2014.
 Feinberg 1970, 60; Zimmerman 1988, 162; Schmitdz 2002, 774. Some (Mundle 1954, 217 and Moore 216
1993, 15) claim that the reason is always sufficient. Others (Murphy 1971 and 1973; McLeod 1999, 193) 
argue that the reason comes in the form of an obligation. 
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philosophers who agree with me that desert, so defined, is the justification at stake in 
cases of liability for wrongdoing. My concern is to instead challenge the sort of response 
that is alleged to always be at issue. Specifically, I'm taking aim at those who agree with 
my examination thus far, and endorse
The blame-focused view: An agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for 
doing wrong just in case s/he deserves to be blamed for it.
This includes many of those working in the free will debate.  Those who reject desert 218
as the justification at issue can take the ensuing arguments to be aimed at a more 
cautious conclusion; if desert, so defined, is at issue in cases of liability for wrongdoing, 
then it is the desert of intrapersonal responses like guilt rather than interpersonal 
responses like blame that explains the wrongdoer's liability. As mentioned in the 
introduction, I first plan to argue for this conclusion by establishing that an agent 
deserves guilt whenever s/he deserves a harmful interpersonal response such as 
blame. A better understanding of blaming dispositions propels us towards this 
conclusion.
1.5 The harms of deserved blame
As Christopher Bennett, Michael McKenna, and Karin Boxer have recently 
pointed out, blame is constituted by three sorts of dispositions, each of which tends to 
harm the blamed. First, anger disposes blamers to purposely alienate the blamed from 
 See especially Fisher 2006, 62; McKenna 2012, 150; Pereboom 2014, 2.218
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the moral community. As Bennett puts it, when you blame an individual "the first thing 
you are disposed to do is to stop speaking to them, and to stop helping them. You stop 
offering them the basic goodwill that human beings might normally expect of one 
another."  Michael McKenna points out that such alienation is a deprivation of what 219
Feinberg calls 'welfare interests'. Specifically, it deprives the blamed of "the capacity to 
engage normally in social intercourse and enjoy and maintain friendships."  Typically, 220
this is harmful to the blamed agent.
Second, blaming anger disposes one to seek repentance from the blamed.  221
Bennett and Boxer point out that blamers desire that repentance come by way of some 
personal sacrifice.  I suspect that this desire is aimed more generally at making the 222
blamed suffer, a desire that many take to be sine qua non of anger.  Strawsonians 223
such as McKenna, Boxer, and Bennett,  on the other hand, take this desire to be 224
constructive, aimed at motivating the blamed to repay the victim, and more importantly 
to "resuscitate the credibility of" his social commitments, and in general "recover his 
place in the moral community".  Perhaps there are ways of accomplishing these goals 225
 Bennett 2002, 149-152.219
 Feinberg 1984, 37; McKenna 2012, 136.220
 Bennett 2002, 151; McKenna 2012, 138-141; Boxer 2013, 125.221
 Bennett 2002, 159; Boxer 2013, 127-133.222
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 Bennett 2002, 160-161.225
 98
without the blamed agent suffering in any way. But that seems difficult. As McKenna 
acknowledges, seeking repentance involves interfering in the blamed agent's life, which 
is likely to cause substantial emotional disruption.226
It is intuitive that a blameworthy transgressor like Janus is liable to some degree 
of the alienation and repentance that blame tends to bring about. But alienation is 
instrumental to, and repentance arguably requires, what I take to be the more 
fundamental harm that blame is intended to elicit. Most agree that blame is a form of 
'guilting' in that blamers intend their blame to result in the blamed feeling guilty for 
transgressing.  This intentional guilting is not without a moral purpose. Those working 227
on moral responsibility urge that a blameworthy transgressor gets all that s/he deserves 
only if s/he feels guilty for the transgression. Consider the following variation of a 
thought experiment by Randolph Clarke. 
Janus's guiltworthiness: You overtly blame Janus for his transgression. In doing 
so, you alienate him. You communicate to him that you desire, even expect, his 
repentance. He tells you, sincerely, that he already shares your moral 
disapproval, and has already begun reforming himself. Over the next days and 
weeks, he shows this to be true, all the while trying to make amends, telling you 
that he deeply values and respects you as a person, and that he wishes he had 
 McKenna 2012, 138-139.226
 Gibbard 1990; Bennett 2002, 152-153; Darwall 2006; Smith 2007, 477; Shoemaker 2007, 91; 227
McKenna 2012, 139-140; Boxer 2013, 125.
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acted otherwise. He also apologizes profusely. However, he candidly admits 
during his apology, "I haven't felt even a little guilty for divulging your secret."  228
This emotional failure is jolting. Janus clearly understands that he's wronged you, 
shares your disapproval, and is responding to every legitimate moral demand. But his 
candid admission that he feels no guilt whatsoever for wronging you generates the 
strong intuition that Janus has failed to receive all that he deserves for his 
transgression. It is not the lack of guilt per se that explains the intuition. For it would 
persist even if we stipulated that Janus felt guilty for his transgression for purely non-
moral reasons; for example because in transgressing he was imprudent, irrational, or 
careless in execution. The sort of guilt that explains why Janus does not get all that he 
deserves is moral in nature.  By this, I mean229
Moral guilt: sorrow in virtue of morally disapproving of oneself.
Moral guilt (henceforth simply 'guilt') is the potential harm of blame that Janus must 
receive in order to get all that he deserves.230
1.6 Blameworthiness implies guiltworthiness.
 Clarke 2013, 156.228
 I take it that an emotion is 'moral' whenever it is by virtue of a belief that there has been a moral 229
transgression of some kind, a belief implicated by moral disapproval (Wallace 1994, 33-38).
 Bennett 2002, 151; Darwall 2006, 71, 168; Shoemaker 2007; McKenna 2012, 138-141; Boxer 2013, 230
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I think this is because a blameworthy agent like Janus deserves to feel guilt for 
the transgression.  More generally, blameworthiness implies guiltworthiness. Several 231
considerations support this thesis. First, it is intuitive in two distinct ways. From the 
perspective of an accuser, it is intuitive that there is some non-instrumental good in 
Janus feeling the guilt that he lacks, and that he has a non-instrumental reason to see 
to it that he feels guilt. The non-instrumental goodness of his guilt, and the defeasible 
reason for him to bring it about, seem to obtain just because he freely and knowingly 
transgressed. This other-focused intuition is evidence that blameworthiness implies 
guiltworthiness.
We can also judge Janus from a first-personal perspective, as if in his shoes. 
This is rarely a perspective that is adopted when considering a transgressor's deserts. 
But as Michael S. Moore has pointed out, when we put ourselves in a transgressor's 
position, we realize that we ourselves would feel guilt.  I take it that we would almost 232
certainly see our guilt as having some non-instrumental goodness, and ourselves as 
having a reason to bring it about. Moore points out that, all else being equal, a person's 
judgement that s/he would deserve some response in a transgressor's position is good 
evidence that the transgressor deserves that response.  This self-focused intuition is 233
further evidence that Janus deserves to feel guilt for his transgression, and that in 
general blameworthiness implies guiltworthiness.
 Clarke 2013; Rosen 2015, 82-83.231
 Moore 1993, 26.232
 Moore 1993, 27.233
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This claim is not merely intuitive. It is also the best explanation for the compelling 
claim that Janus must feel guilt in order to get all that he deserves. One might try to 
explain why Janus must feel guilt in order to get all that he deserves by claiming that
G: any given blameworthy transgressor must feel guilt in order to get all that s/he 
deserves, even though s/he does not deserve the guilt itself.234
G does not account for our intuitions that guilt is deserved. But more worryingly, given 
that a primary purpose of blame is to elicit guilt, G implies the following: just because an 
agent transgresses, there is some non-instrumental good, or a defeasible reason, to 
blame her in order to elicit her guilt, even though there is no non-instrumental good, and 
no defeasible reason to see to it, that the transgressor feels this guilt. That is not an 
outright contradiction. But it is not prima facie plausible when compared to the thesis 
that blameworthiness implies guiltworthiness. So the onus is on the defender of G to 
offer a compelling argument in its favor.
One way to argue for G is to argue that a blameworthy transgressor must feel 
guilt for some reason that is not desert-based. For example, some might argue that 
moral guilt is made apt by mere attributability norms. However, I take it that guilt 
necessarily pains the agent who feels it, and is therefore harmful, all else being equal. 
Those norms "that require that we believe propositions that are true and that we accept 
moral principles that are justified" can't alone offer a reason or make it good to feel pain. 
A normative justification like desert is clearly at play. 
 Boxer 2013, 10, 62-63, 127-133.234
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Granted, it is difficult (though I do not think impossible) to morally disapprove of 
oneself - specifically to desire for the right moral reasons that one hadn't acted wrongly - 
without feeling the pain of guilt. But this feeling isn't merely a regrettable concomitant of 
apt disapproval. For if it were, we should have no moral qualms with the use of some 
emotional analgesic to relieve it. I doubt this use would be seen as morally appropriate. 
A blameworthy wrongdoer who tries to rid themselves of the pain of guilt is not ridding 
themselves of a feeling morally equivalent to a headache. They're failing to emotionally 
respond as they ought.
Some might argue instead that guilt is merely required for a wrongdoer to 
recognize that what s/he did is morally bad or wrong, and that this recognition is in turn 
required for a blameworthy agent to get all that s/he deserves, even though s/he doesn't 
deserve the guilt itself.  In my view, feeling guilt is not required for recognition of 235
wrongdoing. For example, I believe (due to the work of Alaistar Norcross) that 
supporting the factory farm industry through consumer purchases is wrong. But my 
occasional enjoyment of factory farmed meat preempts any guilt that I might otherwise 
feel when recognizing this fact. Moral emotions are too influenced by our morally 
imperfect values to align with our recognition of wrongdoing. Sometimes we recognize 
that an action is wrong, but guiltlessly do it anyway.236
Rather, feeling guilt is part of what it is for a wrongdoer to genuinely care about 
the moral norm that s/he's transgressed. Janus simply doesn't care enough about his 
betrayal. I don't care enough about my wrongful meat consumption. Hence the lack of 
 This is one way to interpret Darwall 2006, 71, 112, 168; 2009, 144. Also See Pereboom 2017.235
 Clarke 2016, 126-127.236
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guilt. It is this fact that I think helps explain why blameworthiness implies 
guiltworthiness. A morally decent person is one whose concern about moral norms 
brings about the feeling of guilt when s/he's freely, knowingly, and inexcusably done 
wrong. Each of us has a non-instrumental reason, and it is non-instrumentally good, to 
be a morally decent person. So each of us has a non-instrumental reason, and it is non-
instrumentally good, to feel guilty when we've freely, knowingly, and inexcusably done 
wrong. To blame someone is to attempt to get them to respond to this justification. G is, 
then, implausible. Blameworthiness implies guiltworthiness.
1.7 Guilt vs blame
Some might think that guilt is just a species of blame.  If that is right, then the 237
thesis that blameworthiness implies guiltworthiness could be seen as rather trivial; 
showing nothing more than that transgressors who deserve blame from others also 
deserve blame from themselves. There is no denying that some instances of guilt are 
colloquially classified as a kind of 'self-blame'. We often tell those who are unjustifiably 
sorrowful in virtue of their moral disapproval to 'stop blaming themselves.' However, 
even if guilt is a species of self-blame, the conclusion that blameworthiness implies 
guiltworthiness is, as we will see throughout the next section, far from trivial. It is the first 
step in an argument leading us to the conclusion that it is always a self-directed emotion 
(whether we call it 'guilt' or 'self-blame') rather than an other-directed emotion that 
explains moral responsibility for transgressions. 
 This is another way to interpret Darwall 2006, 168; 2009, 144. Also see Morris 1988; 66-67; Wallace 237
1994, 66-67; Skorupski 1999, 142; McKenna 2012, 72-74.
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Still, it is worth briefly noting why it is a mistake to classify guilt as a kind of blame 
in anything more than a colloquial sense. Although there are cases in which we 'blame' 
ourselves, I take paradigm examples of self-blame to lack feelings of sorrow. Self-blame 
is instead constituted by hostility, frustration, and even self-loathing. As discussed 
above, these angry feelings dispose us to harm in various ways. One of them is to 
alienate the target of the emotion. We cannot literally alienate ourselves from 
ourselves.  But we can, and I think often do when self-blaming, see our transgressions 238
as manifested in a version of ourselves that we do not fully identify with. To self-blame is 
to distance ourselves from that morally imperfect manifestation, in a way kicking 
ourselves for failing to express what we take to be our true moral character. 
Such an attitude might be a good form of moral self-regulation. And it's a way of 
expressing a commitment to live up to a moral ideal. But it's rarely true or epistemically 
justified in regards to transgressions for which we are morally responsible. Moral 
deficiencies endure. It takes time and effort to change them. When we're being honest 
with ourselves, we rightly see those transgressions we are morally responsible for as 
indicating who we are as persons. To avoid the aforementioned alienation and instead 
honestly identify ourselves as immoral, here and now, elicits forms of sorrow; remorse, 
disappointment, sadness, and the like. Such an emotion nearly always obtains in the 
absence of any angry feelings or dispositions, or even the belief that anger towards 
oneself is deserved.  Guilt doesn't aim to hurt. It just hurts. I think that's enough to 239
warrant a distinction in kind between guilt and self-blame.
 Thanks to Michael McKenna for making this point, and for helpful discussion on this issue.238
 Waller 1990, 165-166; Pereboom 2014, 186-187.239
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2 Guiltworthiness doesn't imply blameworthiness.
Blameworthiness implies guiltworthiness. So guilt is a genuinely deserved 
response in all of those cases in which blame is deserved. This shows that it is at least 
a candidate for explaining the liability sense of moral responsibility for transgressions in 
all of the cases in which blame is alleged to explain moral responsibility.  In this 240
section, I offer a few kinds of cases supporting the conclusion that morally responsible 
transgressors can lack the desert of blame. However, in each case, the morally 
responsible agent deserves guilt. So blameworthiness for transgressions is more fragile 
than moral responsibility for transgressions, while guiltworthiness is not. So the guilt-
focused view is a viable alternative to the blame-focused view, one that I also argue 
offers solutions to puzzling features about moral responsibility. 
2.1 The moral community
According to many advocates of the blame-focused view, it is some fact about 
the value of moral-interpersonal relations between members of the moral community 
that explains any given agent's blameworthiness for a transgression. As a test case for 
this claim, Michael McKenna has us suppose that
There is a world where a solitary person, call him Robinson, mercilessly beats his 
dog. There is no moral community, no practices of holding morally responsible 
built up out of the broader array of adult interpersonal relations Strawson wrote 
 I take it that this is one reason why Gibbard (1990, 42) claims that it is both blameworthiness and 240
guiltworthiness that explains moral responsibility.
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about, no conventions for blaming, nor for offering excuses or justifications, and 
so on. No...moral responsibility practices. There is just brute nature all around, 
this one person, Robinson, and his cruelty to his pet....Robinson can apply moral 
predicates, and so can understand that his beating Rover is cruel. Perhaps he 
thinks it is morally bad and believes what he is doing is morally wrong. 
Nevertheless, [he] has no concept of an interpersonal moral responsibility 
exchange...no idea what it would mean to be blamed, to be held to account for 
his actions, for him to offer apology to others for his conduct...241
Here we're imagining an agent who's circumstances make it virtually impossible for him 
to recognize or care about anyone's moral authority. As David Shoemaker remarks of a 
similar case, Robinson seems to be the sort of agent who "accepts that he has reason 
to refrain from [doing wrong but] denies that that reason has its source in anyone's 
authority as a member of the moral community to demand it."  Robinson's nature 242
precludes his ability to "take himself to be responsible to us."  So, conclude McKenna 243
and Shoemaker, individuals like Robinson are not blameworthy.  There is neither non-244
instrumental goodness in, nor a non-instrumental reason for, blaming Robinson.
I concur. As Stephen Darwall points out, blameworthiness is essentially 
interpersonal. It is a form of moral address the purpose of which is the communication 
of second-personal reasons. In general, these are reasons that an agent has due to 
 McKenna 2012, 107-109.241
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"some valid claim or demand of some [particular individual or group of individuals] 
having practical authority with respect to the agent and with which the agent is thereby 
accountable for complying."  The specific second-personal reason relevant here is the 245
basic demand: a demand that members of the moral community maintain and evince a 
certain quality of will towards fellow community members. Darwall and others argue that 
an agent deserves blame only if the agent can understand and apply this basic demand. 
Robinson can act in accordance with the basic demand, but cannot understand and 
apply it precisely because his capacity to see others as moral authorities is altogether 
absent.  So Robinson is not blameworthy. I take it that the same goes for any 246
interpersonal response alleged to be deserved by a wrongdoer. In blaming, guilting, 
punishing, etc, we're trying to communicate the way in which the agent is accountable 
for complying. These messages are alien to Robinson. So he does not deserve any 
interpersonal response.
If the blame-focused view is correct, this fact entails that Robinson is not morally 
responsible for beating his dog. Indeed, McKenna, Darwall, Shoemaker and others 
argue that agents who are insensitive to the basic demand also can't be liable for their 
wrongdoing.  This conclusion is puzzling. Although Robinson does not understand the 247
interpersonal features of moral reasons and moral responsibility practices, he clearly 
recognizes the impersonal form of such prohibitions such as the prohibition against 
 Darwall 2009, 143.245
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causing pain for no good reason.  As McKenna makes sure to point out, Robinson 248
"can apply moral predicates, and so can understand that his beating Rover is cruel. 
Perhaps he thinks it is morally bad and believes what he is doing is morally wrong." 
Robinson freely beats his poor dog anyway. 
Robinson's morally impoverished upbringing might make it the case that he is 
now wholly incapable of feeling guilt or any other negative self directed emotion. If so, 
then I agree that he is not morally responsible for it in a liability sense. After all, in that 
case there would be no harmful response that would be intelligible to Robinson as 
anything other than retaliation. There would be no way for him to care about morality in 
anything more than the cold and detached ways of a severe sociopath. 
However, it is difficult to conceive of Robinson having even a minimal 
understanding of obligations without the capacity to feel guilt.  It's far more 249
conceivable, and in any case we can stipulate, that Robinson indeed has the capacity to 
feel guilt for beating his dog. Assuming that's right, it's intuitive that Robinson's moral 
sensitivity is enough to make the feeling of guilt a deserved response. How much guilt 
Robinson deserves might be mitigated by his impoverished moral understanding. But to 
say that he's not liable to a harmful response - full stop - is too much of a stretch. 
Interpersonal incompetence precludes the desert of interpersonal responses, not 
liability.
One objection to this conclusion is that Robinson did not do wrong because φ-ing 
is wrong only if agents who freely, knowingly, and inexcusably φ are blameworthy for φ-
 Shoemaker 2007, 90.248
 Though for a critique see Harman 2009.249
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ing.  I don't wish to reject the view that the desert of some form of potentially harmful 250
response for φ-ing is necessary for the wrongness of φ-ing. But I fail to see why blame 
is the only response that qualifies. Surely guilt is also among these potentially harmful 
responses. Consider Mill's claim that "we do not call anything wrong unless we mean to 
imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, 
by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own 
conscience."  One reading of the passage is that guiltworthiness for φ-ing is the only 251
desert necessary for the wrongness of φ-ing. Kurt Baier endorses a kind of Millian view, 
arguing that an action is wrong if and only if it "licenses interference" when 
committed.  By "interference", Baier has in mind "pressures which are in themselves 252
obnoxious...methods such as handcuffing, jailing, fining, and possibly simply 
'condemning'."  I see no reason why one's own guilt could not also qualify as 253
'obnoxious' in Baier's sense. 
Another objection to the conclusion that Robinson is blameless but morally 
responsible relies on the following two premises: (1) Any wrong action is made wrong by 
second-personal reasons against it.  (2) An agent knowingly does wrong only if s/he 254
understands what it is that makes the action wrong. It follows from (1) and (2) that an 
agent knowingly does wrong only if s/he understands second-personal reasons. So, 
because Robinson doesn't understand second-personal reasons, he simply can't 
 Gibbard 1990, 42; Skorupski 1999, 142.250
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knowingly do wrong. But it's a given that an agent is morally responsible for doing wrong 
only if s/he knowingly does wrong. So Robinson can't be morally responsible for doing 
wrong.
 The epistemic restriction in (2) is too stringent, especially under the assumption 
that (1) is true. Just as a person can know that their gambling is irrational, even if s/he's 
incapable of understanding the fundamental features of irrationality, a person can know 
that s/he's doing wrong even if s/he's incapable of understanding the fundamental 
features of morality. For example, no one has a convincing explanation for why it is 
wrong to bring about lives barely worth living that would not have existed otherwise. But 
that doesn't excuse those who do. There's just something wrong about it. That's plain 
enough.
Advocates of the blame-focused view may concede that guiltworthiness explains 
the moral responsibility of those wrongdoers, like Robinson, who exist outside of the 
moral community. But they may argue that blameworthiness at least explains the moral 
responsibility of those wrongdoers who are less interpersonally incompetent. 
Responsibility for our actions, they may argue, is essentially interpersonal for members 
of the moral community. There are several considerations that militate against this 
claim.
2.2 The suberogatory
Suppose that
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Lisa is exiting a public place. A stranger behind her has his hands full. But Lisa's 
mood is a bit sour. So she flippantly decides not to open the door for him, even 
though she knows that this guarantees him a small amount of struggle. 
Most of us intuit that Lisa is morally responsible for her action in more than a mere 
attributability sense. After all, to fail to prevent another person a bit of struggle without a 
good reason is not just poor etiquette. It is morally bad, evincing a lack of good will on 
Lisa's part. Lisa knows this. And she freely did it anyway. That is grounds for more than 
mere moral disapproval. It is also grounds for guilt. 
Suppose, for example, that Lisa knows that she will feel a small amount of guilt if 
she looks back to see the man struggle with the door, and won't feel guilt otherwise. Her 
not looking back seems morally deficient. It seems better, and she seems to have more 
reason, to choose the former option. And wouldn't you, in the same scenario, judge 
there to be a reason, and judge it to be non-instrumentally good, to elicit within yourself 
a small amount of guilt for your action? I suspect an affirmative answer runs deep for 
many of us. That's indication that Lisa deserves guilt for her action.
Suppose further that Lisa's mother witnessed the scene while waiting in the car. 
She justifiably suspects that bringing Lisa's attention to the man's struggle will make 
Lisa feel guilty for not helping the man. She does so, saying flatly "look at that poor man 
Lisa. He needed help." She may even ask, in a non-hostile tone, "why didn't you help 
him?" Such non-hostile 'guilting' behavior is quite common. But there are general moral 
prohibitions against bringing about easily avoidable harms for no good reason. So Lisa's 
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mother needs a justification for guilting Lisa in this way. All else being equal, the fact 
that Lisa deserves to feel guilty seems an excellent justification. 
However, it strikes me as counterintuitive that Lisa deserves to be blamed in 
such a case. Suppose that Lisa's mother not only attempts to bring about Lisa's guilt, 
but does so in a blaming manner by attempting to alienate her and seek her 
repentance. She may seek repentance by, for example, communicating to Lisa in an 
angry tone that she wants Lisa to go apologize to the man. And she may alienate Lisa 
by remaining disapprovingly silent throughout some portion of the car ride home. Any 
degree of these blaming behaviors seems excessive. Although the man probably 
thought Lisa's action to be bad, it is unlikely that he 'held it against her' in a way that 
would make an apology anything more to him than a further inconvenience. Anger at 
Lisa solely because of her action is extreme. Lisa's action is morally bad. But it's not 
that morally bad. Lisa is guiltworthy but not blameworthy. 
That Lisa is not blameworthy is also entailed by a commonly-held restriction on 
blameworthiness. Although Lisa's action is morally bad, it is also arguably morally 
permissible, best described as a suberogation.  Many argue, correctly I think, that 255
blameworthiness requires wrongdoing:
BRW: an agent deserves blame for φ-ing only if it is wrong that s/he φ's all-
things-considered.  256
 Driver 1992 and Macnamara 2012. 255
 Widerker 1991, 223; Wallace 1994, 12, 135; Copp 1997, 445; Pereboom 2009, 170; Nelkin 2011, 256
100-107; Boxer 2013, 64. I intend φ-ing to include refraining.
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One reason to think that BRW is true is the close relation between obligations and 
demands. Derk Pereboom, citing Dana Nelkin, contends that "'ought' propositions that 
specify what an agent [is morally obligated] to do are essentially action-directed, so that 
if 'S ought not do A' is true, then as a matter of the meaning of 'ought' propositions, or of 
the essential nature of obligation, S is thereby directed to refraining from A" by way of a 
demand.  257
This being so, I take it that the fairness of demands are linked to moral 
obligations in the following way. It is fair to an agent to demand her to not φ only if it is 
wrong that s/he φ's all-things-considered.  To demand that an agent not φ is to 258
request that the agent not φ, and to sincerely indicate that one will repudiate her for 
noncompliance with this request. That is why to repudiate an individual for acting 
permissibly is also unfair to her. It is akin to saying 'I do not accept the acceptable'. The 
locution is not contradictory. But it does not fit comfortably in the mouth. Blaming 
behaviors - specifically alienation and the seeking of repentance - are widely 
understood as unequivocally symbolizing repudiation.  They are ways of indicating, at 259
a minimum, that the blamer does not accept some action or characteristic. This is one 
reason that BRW is appealing. Blaming an agent for doing nothing wrong is, at least 
 Pereboom 2014, 139. See Nelkin 2011, 108-116.257
 Note that this principle does not entail, nor do I mean to suggest, that it is never fair to others or even 258
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under current conventions, to repudiate an acceptable action. That is unfair. And that 
unfairness is sufficient to undermine any allegedly deserved blame. 
However, BRW leaves it open to us that Lisa is guiltworthy for her suberogation. 
This is as it should be. If φ-ing is morally permissible but still morally bad, then although 
it is unfair to an agent to demand that she refrain from φ-ing, it may still be fair to the 
agent to strongly recommend that she not φ.  Such a recommendation against φ-ing 260
neither indicates nor requires the fairness of repudiation. Guilt and non-emotional forms 
of guilting are typically neither interpreted nor intended to be forms of repudiation. So for 
an agent to feel or be asked to feel guilt when she freely and knowingly suberogates is 
not always unfair to that agent. Moreover, the norms governing negative responses to 
oneself are not constrained by what others can legitimately expect or demand. Those 
norms are intrapersonal. Lisa is guiltworthy for her suberogation, but also blameless for 
it.
The view that those who suberogate (suberogators?) can be guiltworthy but not 
blameworthy offers a solution to a puzzling feature of moral responsibility. Consider the 
following three propositions.
(a) φ-ing is suberogatory.
(b) A is morally responsible in a liability sense for φ-ing.
(c) A is not blameworthy for φ-ing.
 Pereboom 2014, 140-141.260
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Cases abound in which each of these propositions seem true.  If the blame-focused 261
view is right, then an agent who is not blameworthy simply cannot be morally 
responsible. So if the blame-focused view is right, (b) and (c) cannot simultaneously be 
true. This poses the following problem. For cases like Lisa's, those who endorse the 
blame-focused view must either deny (b) in an attempt to affirm (c), or deny (c) in 
attempt to affirm (b). Denying either is, as I have been urging, independently 
implausible. But as I pointed out above, BRW and (a) entail that the suberogator can't 
be blameworthy. So those who deny (c) must also commit themselves to further 
implausibilities. They must also deny BRW,  or deny (a).  The latter denial is not 262 263
plausible, at least in cases like Lisa's. And as I argue in the appendix to this paper, 
arguments against BRW are unsound. 
The guilt-focused view allows us to avoid such inconsistencies. If the guilt-
focused view is right, an agent can be morally responsible even if s/he isn't 
blameworthy. So the guilt-focused view allows the consistency of (b) and (c). Moreover, 
since BRW does not preclude guiltworthiness for suberogations, the guilt-focused view 
also allows the consistency of (a) and BRW. So the guilt-focused view allows us to 
consistently affirm (a), (b), (c), and BRW. The availability of such a simple and intuitive 
way to retain the consistency of independently plausible claims is an attractive feature 
of the view. It is also a reason to accept it.
2.3 The instrumental character of blame
 For similar cases see Driver 1992 and Macnamara 2012.261
 Driver 1992; Macnamara 2012, 145; McKenna 2012, 182-187. 262
 Nelkin 2012, 104-107.263
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Unlike Robinson, Lisa is perfectly morally and interpersonally competent. But like 
Robinson, she is not blameworthy, despite being morally responsible for her 
transgression. So advocates of the blame-focused view cannot claim that 
blameworthiness always explains the moral responsibility of fully competent 
transgressors. 
Advocates of the blame-focused view may point to the fact that a feature these 
cases share is that neither transgressor can be legitimately targeted with the demands 
that come along with blame. Advocates may then claim that guiltworthiness explains the 
moral responsibility of such transgressors, but that blameworthiness explains the moral 
responsibility of anyone who is legitimately targeted with demands; that is, wrongdoers 
who are members of the moral community. Those (like Lisa) who merely suberogate or 
(like Robinson) do not understand second-personal reasons are in a sense only 'partly' 
responsible for their wrongdoing by way of their guiltworthiness. Because they don't 
have to answer to anyone, and hence aren't blameworthy, they aren't 'fully' morally 
responsible. This response is challenged by two features of allegedly deserved blame, 
both of which conflict with our intuitions about the nature of deserved objects.
If the blame-focused view is right, a blameworthy individual deserves others to 
target her with blame. This is puzzling. In so many cases, an agent's receipt of her 
desert affects her necessarily, others only contingently. We routinely say, for example, 
that hard workers deserve the fruits of their labor, that the most qualified deserves to get 
the job, and that the fastest runner deserves to win the race. Most pertinently, consider 
desert for morally good actions. Suppose Sadam anonymously donates his kidney in an 
attempt to save a child's life. The child survives. This causes Sadam joy. Intuitively, 
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Sadam deserves his joy. No positive interpersonal response, for example praise, is 
necessary for him to receive this desert. More generally, objects of desert needn't affect 
anyone but the deserving agent. Each agent's desert is theirs and theirs alone. 
Blame necessarily affects the blamer but, as in the Robinson case, and the 
example below, only contingently affects the target. So the blame-focused view posits 
an object of desert that is fundamentally different from the objects of desert cited above. 
It is one that affects the blamed contingently, blamers necessarily. This implication is 
especially troubling because blaming emotions - anger, irritation, frustration, and the like 
- tend to affect blamers harmfully. They can distort our beliefs, become dangerously 
misplaced, escalate into altercations, strongly incline us to act irrationally, or expose us 
to frustration and disappointment when the target of blame doesn't conform to 
expectations.  Being angry, irritated, or frustrated also tends to feel bad.264
This is why blame has always struck me as instrumental to desert, and never 
deserved per se. It is something that desert justifies only when blame achieves its 
primary aims. Guilt is a primary aim of blame. It affects the guilty necessarily. And the 
non-deserving needn't be affected at all in order for a wrongdoer to feel guilt, much less 
that they suffer any harm. The guilt-focused view certainly leaves it as a possibility that 
blame is sometimes deserved. But it avoids the above difficulty by allowing that blame is 
something desert justifies only when it is a means to some amount of deserved guilt. 
For example, return to the case of Janus. Why didn't he feel guilty for wronging you? 
Suppose you discover that
 For a nice overview of some of these effects, see Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999, 781-783.264
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Janus's blamelessness: Janus was raised in a hostile household with parents 
and siblings who were constantly looking to target one another with anger. 
Because they were generally cruel, becoming emotional in response to their 
hostility would only attract relentless teasing and bullying. Janus became 
severely traumatized by this at a young age. He survived by instinctually shutting 
his emotions down in response to even the mildest indication of anger. This 
trauma never left him. As a result, any indication of anger makes Janus 
emotionally numb. He can't help it. It's just the way he's been conditioned. 
However, Janus is perfectly capable of feeling guilty for wronging you. In fact, he 
would have already felt immensely guilty if, instead of blaming him, you had 
turned the other cheek and calmly described to him, in a non-blaming manner, 
your moral disapproval, and the embarrassment and hurt you felt when he 
wronged you. 
Janus is unusual. But he's by no means an unknown type. Some people are too 
traumatized by circumstances beyond their control to respond normally to blame. Some 
become defensive and hostile. Others, like Janus, just shut down. The only emotional 
effect blame has on him is to inhibit guilt that alternative responses would have elicited. 
Granted, blaming him expresses legitimate moral demands. But these moral demands 
can just as easily be communicated through a variety of non-hostile responses. Given 
his emotional difficulties, Janus is more receptive to moral demands conveyed in a non-
blaming manner. Moreover, recall that one of the details of the case is that Janus 
morally disapproved of himself and began responding to the demands you eventually 
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made of him (to reform, apologize, repent, etc) without anyone needing to first 
communicate those demands to him. Moral demands are like that. They 'demand' by 
way of normative, not verbal, force. That being so, I find it strange to think that there is 
any non-instrumental goodness in, or non-instrumental reason for, blaming Janus just 
because he did wrong. That's because blame doesn't serve it's primary purpose in 
regards to desert. Specifically, blame won't bring about the guilt that Janus clearly 
deserves.
If that's right - Janus doesn't deserve to be blamed - then the blame-focused view 
entails that Janus is not morally responsible (in a liability sense) for wronging you. But 
it's our strong intuition that Janus is morally responsible for wronging you. That's the 
answer that the guilt-focused view predicts. Janus is morally responsible for wronging 
you because he deserves to feel moral guilt for doing so. This case shows that the 
explanation of moral responsibility rests behind the eyes of the transgressive agent. 
Janus deserves to feel guilty. That offers you an instrumental reason to respond to him 
in whatever way happens to elicit this deserved guilt, which in this case is (oddly but by 
no means unimaginably) by turning the other cheek. 
Blaming Janus can still be justified by other considerations. Blaming him may 
deter others. Perhaps retaining a proneness to blame in reaction to wrongdoing is, even 
when that blame is undeserved, part and parcel of maintaining good interpersonal 
relationships amongst most members of the moral community.  You may also 265
justifiably be angry that Janus has done wrong in the way that we are justifiably angry 
that there is injustice in the world. That may give you a justification to voice your anger 
 This is one way to read Strawson 1982. 265
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to him, in a way blaming his action rather than him.  You may even have a right to 266
blame him, given agreed-upon social norms.
These justifications to blame are consistent with the conclusion that Janus 
himself does not deserve to be blamed, and furthermore that allegedly deserved blame 
is merely a means to elicit deserved guilt. I suspect that the prevalence of the blame-
focused view is due in part to a conflation of these subtly distinct justifications to 
blame.  Our (often overwhelming) reasons to express blame to an agent lead us to 267
believe that it is our blame that the agent deserves. But an agent's desert is theirs and 
theirs alone. That the guilt a transgressive agent deserves is often the result of meting 
out independently justified blame is a contingent fact. 
3 Summary and some objections
The aforementioned cases show that moral responsibility is resilient. Blame-
insensitive agents like Janus can be morally responsible. So can suberogators and 
those who don't understand second-personal reasons. Blameworthiness is too fragile to 
account for moral responsibility in these cases. Guiltworthiness is not. It can account for 
moral responsibility in these cases, as well as in all those cases in which morally 
responsible agents are allegedly blameworthy. So we should abandon the blame-
focused view and instead endorse
 Gideon Rosen claims that wrongdoers like Janus are indeed blameworthy. Suggestively, the only 266
support he offers is that the "act remains resentment-worthy" (2015, 69). That conclusion is consistent 
with the conclusion that Janus himself is not blameworthy.
 It is also due, as I explain in "The Case for Retributive Caution", to our retributive and unconsciously 267
self-affirming nature.
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The guilt-focused view: An agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a 
transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. 
There are a few remaining ways that an advocate of the blame-focused view might 
resist. One is to argue that, although the characters cited above do not deserve to be 
targeted by blame, they deserve you to privately feel blame towards them. As I pointed 
out, private blame towards attributable agents is morally permissible, given that it only 
affects the blamer. It is also understandable that you'd feel angry in some of these 
cases (perhaps all of them if you're a particularly irritable sort). But privately blaming is, 
as the old saying goes, like drinking poison and expecting another to sicken. The 
silliness of such an act impugns the plausibility of the position recommending it. In 
privately blaming, you're just hurting yourself. Janus, Lisa, Robinson, etc don't deserve 
a response that only hurts you. If an agent does not deserve to be targeted with blame, 
then s/he doesn't deserve to be privately blamed either.268
Another argument for the blame-focused view in light of the preceding criticisms 
is to broaden it to include desert of other negative interpersonal responses. Blame, the 
blame-focused advocate might claim, is merely the paradigmatic interpersonal response 
that is deserved for wrongdoing. It is not the only kind of negative interpersonal 
response that can be deserved. In Janus's case, blame is not deserved, but an 
alternative interpersonal response - turning the other cheek - is deserved. And while this 
interpersonal response is unlike blame in that it does not alienate, it is quite like blame 
in that it is supposed to communicate legitimate moral demands, and elicit guilt and 
 Watson 1996, 239.268
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repentance. Similarly, although Lisa does not deserve to be blamed, she deserves her 
mother's cool questioning.
This amendment does not generate the right answer in the Robinson case. There 
is no interpersonal response that plausibly explains Robinson's moral responsibility. But 
there is a deeper problem. We are attempting to discover commonalities between all 
deserved responses for immoral acts. On this proposal, one commonality is the 
interpersonal nature of these responses. Another, as I hope I've established, is the guilt 
that the interpersonal response must bring about. But now the proposal seems to be 
that: An agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case 
s/he deserves both guilt, and whatever interpersonal response happens to elicit this 
guilt. The interpersonal feature of the response looks unimportant. Guilt is doing all the 
work. 
What of blameworthiness? I have used the Janus and Robinson cases to urge 
that blame and other such interpersonal responses are never deserved per se. Rather, 
they are justified by an agent's desert only as a means to elicit the response that the 
agent deserves. The guilt-focused view is by design consistent with this sweeping 
conclusion. But it is also consistent with the possibility that blame and other such 
interpersonal responses can be deserved. I have only argued that, because not all 
morally responsible wrongdoers deserve interpersonal responses, interpersonal 
responses do not themselves explain moral responsibility. Whether these responses 
can ever be deserved I leave in this paper as an open question.269
 Though I argue in "The Case for Retributive Caution" that, in fact, we ought to be skeptical that blame 269
and other such censures are ever deserved.
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Some may fret over the fact that the guilt-focused view requires the 
abandonment of a Strawsonian explanation of moral responsibility. Strawsonians allege 
that (i) it is some fact about the value of moral-interpersonal relations of the moral 
community that explains any given agent's blameworthiness for a transgression, and 
that (ii) blameworthiness explains moral responsibility for a transgression. Strawsonians 
have adeptly argued for (i). But the jump from (i) to (ii) is rarely justified. I have relied on 
Strawsonian insights about the strictness of certain interpersonal norms to argue that 
agents like Lisa and Robinson are not blameworthy for their transgressions. If I am right 
that it is these agents' guiltworthiness that explains their moral responsibility, and it is 
also true that the value of moral-interpersonal relations cannot account for their 
guiltworthiness, then the jump from (i) to (ii) is indeed unwarranted. Strawsonians 
cannot in that case account for moral responsibility.
However, Strawsonians still have an important theory even if it turns out that they 
cannot explain moral responsibility for transgressions. We need a theory that tells us 
how to respond to any given morally responsible transgressor. Strawsonians have 
offered influential arguments that we sometimes have strong reasons to proportionately 
blame or even punish  any given morally responsible transgressor. (To that list I urge 270
Strawsonians to also add strong reasons to 'guilt' guiltworthy agents in a non-blaming, 
non-punitive manner.) And they have adeptly identified the norms governing these 
reasons. These reasons and the norms governing them obtain even though 
Strawsonians cannot explain moral responsibility.  So though it turns out that 271
 Feinberg 1965; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991.270
 McKenna 2013, 154-161; Pereboom 2014, 137-138.271
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Strawsonians can't explain moral responsibility, they still have a compelling theory that 
tells us something at least as important, if not more so; how to respond to the morally 
responsible. Perhaps that is no consolation.
Some may object that my arguments do not count in favor of the guilt-focused 
view so much as they count against the claim that moral responsibility as liability is 
explained by desert. They may object as follows. We ought not begin with the 
assumption that moral responsibility for transgressions is explained by desert, and then 
attempt to discover the response that desert for transgressions always justifies. Rather, 
we ought to begin with the assumption that moral responsibility for transgressions is 
explained by defeasibly justified blame, and then attempt to discover the defeasible 
justification at issue. The arguments in favor of the guilt-focused view show that desert 
for transgressions does not always offer a defeasible justification to blame. So desert 
can't be the justification at issue.
On this view, if one of the numerous non-desert-based justifications to blame an 
agent obtains, the agent is blameworthy. For me to deny blameworthiness only because 
of the absence of a desert-based justification splits hairs too finely. This objection fails 
for two reasons. First, one desideratum of any good theory of moral responsibility is an 
explanation of why moral responsibility for transgressions quite often offers a defeasible 
justification for blaming the transgressor. The objection clearly satisfies this 
desideratum. But another desideratum is an explanation for why our attributions of 
moral responsibility are typically couched in desert language, and bring along with them 
strong intuitions about desert. We should strive for a view that satisfies both desiderata. 
The guilt-focused view does just this. It takes our intuitions and linguistic practices to be 
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correct; we say and judge that the morally responsible deserve because the morally 
responsible deserve. Moreover, the guilt-focused view allows that moral responsibility 
for transgressions quite often (perhaps nearly always) offers a defeasible justification for 
blaming the transgressor. To retain the assumption that moral responsibility for 
transgressions always offers a defeasible justification to blame comes at the expense of 
the correctness of our judgments and linguistic practices concerning desert. That is too 
high a cost.
Second, there is a kind of case that militates against a more inclusive conception 
of blameworthiness as explaining moral responsibility. 
Stanley: Stanley and Meredith have been married for fifty-seven years. Their love 
for each other is unconditional. So after Meredith's nearly immobilizing stroke, 
Stanley dutifully looks after her every need. Still, the task is onerous for Stanley. 
He's elderly. He and Meredith have no children, relatives, or friends to help him. 
So Stanley often gets impatient. During one of his more impatient moments, 
Stanley doesn't bother to buckle Meredith in to the passenger seat of their car. 
He knows the danger this poses to Meredith, especially considering that his car 
has been acting funny lately. He understands all of the reasons why failing to 
prevent this danger is wrong. But he's in too much of a hurry to care. Moreover, 
his patience has been worn so thin lately that he has come to desire, albeit 
weakly, that Meredith die so as to relieve him of his immense burden. During their 
commute, the brakes give out, and Stanley's desire is unfortunately fulfilled. 
Meredith dies instantly during the crash. Stanley's guilt over wronging Meredith is 
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so immense and relentless that he is unable to sleep, unable to eat, unable to 
function, unable to carry on a day without tears. He wishes for all the world that 
he had done otherwise, and would eagerly trade places with Meredith if he could. 
This guilt renders him incapable of any other emotions, and remains with him for 
the short remainder of his life.272
For Robinson, blame is unintelligible. For Janus, blame is ineffective. For Stanley, it is 
extraneous in that it can't bring about any effect that has not already occurred. 
Specifically, blaming Stanley can't communicate any moral demand that he isn't already 
satisfying. Nor can it inflict any more of the typical harms of blame upon him. He already 
feels as guilty as it is possible to feel. It seems to me that, though it is apt to morally 
disapprove of Stanley, there is no justification to blame him. On even a more inclusive 
blame-focused view, that renders Stanley not morally responsible for his wrongdoing. 
However, Stanley is clearly morally responsible for his wrongdoing. Stanley deserves 
some amount of the guilt that he feels. And it is this guiltworthiness that explains his 
moral responsibility for freely, knowingly, and inexcusably doing wrong. Sometimes 
moral responsibility hides behind a blameless face. 
 Thanks to Michelle Kosch for encouraging me to include this kind of case.272
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Retributive Skepticism and the Rationality of Anger
When we believe that an agent has acted immorally, we naturally tend to react 
with anger.  We are, of course, sensitive to the fact that angry reactions are almost 273
always harmful to the target,  and therefore require justification. Commonly, the 274
justification offered is retributive. The immoral agent is alleged to deserve it, where by 
this it is meant that there is a non-instrumental justification to target the agent with anger 
just because she acted immorally in the way that she did.  However, this putative 275
justification is often lacking. Some are undeserving of anger because they were 
coerced, compelled, or morally unaware.  Others are simply too psychologically 276
abnormal to be eligible for desert at all. Moreover, there are excellent reasons to doubt 
that anyone can deserve to be targeted with expressions of anger or other harmful 
treatment. After all, the epistemic origins of desert attributions are notoriously 
suspicious.  And it is unclear that beings like ourselves have the kind of free will  and 277 278
moral sensitivity  requisite for desert. On the basis of these worries, many of us are 279
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becoming increasingly doubtful about desert as a justification for anger. What 
implications, if any, do retributive doubts have for the rationality of our anger?
That depends. There are many who claim that it is incredibly difficult, perhaps 
impossible, for an agent to target an individual with anger without also believing that the 
individual deserves it.  I call this view retributivism about anger or simply anger-280
retributivism. If this view is correct, then any agent who targets an individual with anger 
while skeptical about that individual's desert will be doxastically irrational in that she 
holds a belief that she believes to be false.  This is troubling. For a skeptic who wishes 281
to avoid irrationality would then face a dilemma: either relinquish doubt or eschew 
anger. Some argue that the first option is best in light of anger's desirable 
consequences.  Unfortunately, this will often leave us forming beliefs in the teeth of 282
contrary evidence. That being the case, others advise eschewing anger, opting instead 
for "feeling disappointed, hurt or shocked about what the offender has done, moral 
concern for him, and moral sadness and sorrow".  But this option requires a rather 283
drastic emotional change, one that many consider to be undesirable or even 
impossible.  What's a skeptic to do?284
In this paper, I argue that, although anger-retributivists have rightly identified the 
retributive nature of paradigm forms of anger such as resentment and indignation, they 
are mistaken that anger in general has any unbreakable connection to retributive 
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beliefs. I first more carefully explain the anger-retributivist thesis, as well as the 
phenomena offered to support it. I then defend an alternative account that explains 
these phenomena just as well, but lacks the troubling implication. I call it the practical 
view of anger. Roughly, this is the view that a moral agent can target an individual with 
anger if she believes she is sufficiently justified in doing so, and values acting on that 
justification more than she disvalues harming the targeted individual. Due to the 
contingent details of our moral development, desert is the justification most often 
assumed to obtain, as well as one we highly value acting on. Hence the typical 
connection between anger and retributive beliefs. However, I argue that there are non-
desert based justifications and values that can work just as well. I cite as paradigms two 
kinds of cases: cases of moral reform in which we value the betterment of the immoral 
agent and moral community more than we disvalue the temporary harm that anger 
causes, and cases of moral protest in which we react angrily to an immoral but 
nevertheless undeserving actor in order to overcome or take a stand against the 
immoral system of which they are a part. Given our values, lacking the belief that such 
individuals deserve to be targeted by anger might decrease the severity of our anger, 
but it surely cannot extinguish it. I conclude by discussing the upshot for retributive 
skepticism.
1 Desert-based and desert-free anger
First, some distinctions. I'll classify a belief as 'involved' with an emotion 
whenever it is a constituent, a cause, or a concomitant of that emotion.  Some think 285
 Prinz 2004, 3-20. 285
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that anger needn't be involved with any belief at all.  I'm sympathetic to the view. But 286
I'll be setting it aside, as I'll only be dealing with a kind of anger known as 'reactive 
anger'.  This kind of anger (henceforth simply 'anger') is necessarily involved with the 287
belief that the targeted agent has acted immorally. As stated at the outset, a popular 
justification for targeting an agent with anger is that she deserves it. Call anger that is 
involved with the belief that the target of anger deserves to be targeted by anger desert-
based anger. Call anger that lacks involvement with such a belief desert-free anger. 
I grant for the sake of argument that paradigm forms of anger such as 
resentment and indignation are desert-based. According to Joel Feinberg, these forms 
of anger "are not mere 'reactions to' but 'requitals for'. [They] have ostensible desert 
logically built in to them", and are not targeted at agents "'in the public interest' or 'for 
utilitarian reasons'."  Derk Pereboom concurs, claiming that resentment and 288
indignation are kinds of "anger targeted at an agent because of what he’s done or failed 
to do," and necessarily come along with "a belief that the agent deserves to be the 
target of that very anger just because of what he has done or failed to do. An attitude 
does not count as resentment or indignation if it lacks these features".  289
Some accept that anger can be desert-free, and claim that it is only certain forms 
of anger that are desert-based. Michael McKenna, for example, claims that it is only 
"reactive anger of a distinctive sort, specifically, resentment, indignation, disapprobation, 
 Gibbard 1992.286
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and guilt, that carries with it a basic-desert belief."  For others, there are no viable 290
alternatives to desert-based anger. For example, Galen Strawson argues that all 
instances of anger are "demonstrably inappropriate given their essential dependence on 
a belief in [desert] that is demonstrably false".  Saul Smilansky claims that retributive 291
skepticism "does not leave sufficient moral and psychological 'space' for...defensible 
reactive attitudes".  Samuel Scheffler claims that "the reactive attitudes entail...the 292
thesis that those very attitudes are merited or deserved as responses to the individual 
who is their target".  Ted Honderich claims that there is a non-cognitive but 293
nevertheless unavoidable connection between anger and retributive beliefs; due to 
human psychology, it is just a "brute fact" that retributive beliefs are concomitants of 
anger.  294
One way to interpret these remarks is that desert-free anger is impossible 
simpliciter. But that's clearly too strong. You're walking along the sidewalk in heavy rain. 
It's been a long and frustrating day. A driver hits a nearby puddle trying to park, 
drenching you with foul water. You immediately have an increase in heart rate and skin 
temperature, distinctive facial expressions, and hostile action tendencies towards the 
driver , all of which are involved with your belief that the driver has acted immorally. 295
 McKenna 2012, 66.290
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Those conditions are sufficient for anger. But in that first moment, it's unlikely you have 
yet formed any beliefs about the deservingness of the target. That is because the anger 
is still "narrow-profile". Narrow-profile anger occurs instantaneously with the belief that 
one is being wronged.  It is a kind of anger that is not exposed to the whole of an 296
emoter's cognitive system. We share narrow-profile anger with some of those who are 
cognitively impaired and children too young to be plausibly attributed with beliefs about 
desert. 
Most of us become more reflective after the initial surge of anger though. That is 
because, for normal adults, narrow-profile anger soon becomes wide-profile in that it is 
exposed to a broader range of the emoter's attitudes, and is amenable to rational 
assessment.  Once an emotion is wide-profile, a person can appraise it as irrational, 297
imprudent, or unjustified. Alternatively, one can appraise it as rational, prudent, or 
justified. It is at this appraisal stage that a belief about desert may become involved with 
one's anger.
Still, even at the wide-profile stage, it is implausible that a retributive belief is 
always involved with anger that does not result in action. Suppose after the initial surge 
of anger you discover that the driver was too distracted by his noisy family to have seen 
the puddle. The driver was in the wrong, but unknowingly. Consequently, you come to 
doubt that the driver deserves to be targeted with anger. That being the case, you're 
unlikely to act in a way that is hostile towards the driver. More specifically, your hostile 
action tendencies are in this case insufficient for action in the absence of a retributive 
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belief. But those action tendencies remain nonetheless, as well as the 
phenomenological and physiological features of anger, and the belief that the driver has 
acted immorally. You're silently angry. Your silent anger is desert-free. The above 
remarks by Strawson, Pereboom, and others are, then, more plausible when applied 
only to wide-profile anger at an individual that results in a hostile action towards that 
individual, or (as I'll stipulate is equivalent) results in targeting the individual with an 
expression of anger.
Some of the above remarks indicate that desert-free wide-profile anger is 
impossible to act on. That's also too strong. If desert-free wide-profile anger is in some 
way problematic, it is surely not because there is no possible world in which an agent 
can act on it. A more plausible thesis is that such anger is too difficult for normal adults 
to act on to be at all practical. Consider higher-order thoughts. We sometimes think 
about our thoughts. And occasionally these second-order thoughts are the object of 
some further third-order thought. A 20th-order thought is possible, but not the sort of 
thing that humans can do without a great deal of difficulty. Facts about human 
psychology render them psychologically impractical. 
In response to these considerations, Derk Pereboom concedes that narrow-
profile anger "has no cognitive content or presupposition or associated belief that 
involves the notion of desert".  He is also uncommitted about the possibility of children 298
and cognitively unsophisticated adults expressing desert-free anger. But he contends 
that, at the very least, "when a mature, normal human being makes some agent the 
 Pereboom 2014, 147.298
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target of an overt expression of her genuine [wide-profile anger ], it’s at least close to 299
psychologically impossible that she doesn’t also believe that the agent basically 
deserves [it]".  In light of these suggested amendments, I take the most plausible 300
interpretation of the above remarks to be what I call retributivism about anger or
Anger-retributivism: it is not psychologically practical for a normal adult to target 
an individual with an expression of desert-free anger that is wide-profile. 
This thesis still entails the troubling conclusion that normal adults will be doxastically 
irrational to doubt that an individual deserves to be targeted with anger while 
simultaneously targeting that individual with an expression of anger that is wide-profile. 
For if anger-retributivism is true, that very anger comes along with the belief that the 
target does deserve to be targeted with anger. This inconsistency between doubt and 
belief indeed generates a strong reason for the skeptic to either relinquish doubt or 
eschew anger.
2 Explaining the Harris Case
The primary support offered for anger-retributivism concerns the phenomenon of 
anger diminishment after the retraction of retributive beliefs. Consider the much-
discussed case of Robert Harris. In 1978, twenty-five year-old Robert Harris decided, 
rather capriciously, to murder two teenage boys. Mere minutes after murdering the two 
 In conversation.299
 Pereboom 2014, 129.300
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teens, Robert Harris nonchalantly ate one of their hamburgers, and seemed to be "in an 
almost lighthearted mood. He smiled and told [his brother] Daniel that it would be 
amusing if the two of them were to pose as police officers and inform the parents that 
their sons were killed".  Those of us who are morally attuned become angry at Harris 301
for what he has done, and believe that he deserves (at the very least) to be targeted by 
an expression of anger for it. Now consider Robert Harris's circumstances. 
He was the most beautiful of all my mother’s children; he was an angel”, [his 
sister] said. “He would just break your heart. He wanted love so bad he would 
beg for any kind of physical contact. He’d come up to my mother and just try to 
rub his little hands on her leg or her arm. He just never got touched at all. She’d 
just push him away or kick him. One time she bloodied his nose when he was 
trying to get close to her"...Robert Harris's father was an alcoholic who was twice 
convicted of sexually molesting his daughters. He frequently beat his children ... 
and often caused serious injury. Their mother also became an alcoholic and was 
arrested several times, once for bank robbery...Harris had a learning disability 
and a speech problem, but there was no money for therapy...Harris was raped 
several times, his sister said, and he slashed his wrists twice in suicide 
attempts...Everyone in the family knew that he needed psychiatric help.302
 Watson 1987, 269.301
 Watson 1987, 272-274.302
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As Watson, Pereboom,  Nichols,  and others  point out, the force of our anger 303 304 305
diminishes after considering these further details. What explains the dissipation of the 
emotion? Pereboom claims that after learning of the causal antecedents of Harris's 
immoral action, we abandon the belief that Harris deserves to be targeted by an 
expression of anger for what he has done. He claims that "the best explanation for [the 
dissipation of anger] is that your retributive attitude presupposed the belief that the killer 
deserved, in the basic sense, to be the object of this attitude, and because you no 
longer have this belief, the attitude is deprived of the presupposition that sustained it".  306
However, the absence of a retributive belief is not the best explanation for the 
dissipation of anger. Reconsider the silent anger case cited above. You refrain from 
acting with hostility towards the driver because you abandon your belief that the driver 
deserves to be targeted with anger. It's plausible that you can, and probably would, 
remain silently angry nonetheless. Harris's actions were far worse than the driver's. But 
we don't remain silently angry. We lose anger altogether. The absence of a retributive 
belief cannot explain this difference between the cases.
Shaun Nichols argues that the vivid details of Harris's horrific childhood evokes 
sympathy, and that it is difficult to remain angry at Harris when one feels sympathy for 
him.  So even if it is granted that we come to abandon our belief that Robert Harris 307
deserves to be the target of anger, we do not have to appeal to the doubt in order to 
 Pereboom 2007, 202.303
 Nichols 2007, 411.304
 Kane 1996, 84; Honderich 1988, 434-435.305
 Pereboom 2007, 202. Also see Kane 1996, 84.306
 Nichols 2007, 413-6. Also see Arpaly 2006, 31.307
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explain the dissipation of the emotion; our conflicting emotion of sympathy is alone 
sufficient. 
The anger-retributivist might respond that the conflicting emotion alleged to 
diffuse anger is not unlikely to be generated by a re-appraisal of the case, where this 
reappraisal at least partially consists in one's abandonment of the belief that Harris 
deserves to be the object of anger. Watson points out in his discussion that we 
empathize with Harris by coming to see him as morally unlucky, and sympathize with 
him by coming to see him as a victim.  Nichols concurs with the latter point.  308 309
However, both Watson and Nichols go on to claim, correctly I think, that these 
reappraisals are each sufficient on their own to generate the countervailing emotion. 
One needn't first abandon one's retributive belief on the basis of one's appraisal of 
Harris-as-victim or Harris-as-morally-unlucky in order for sympathy to diminish one's 
anger. And it's not as if seeing a person as victim or seeing a person as morally unlucky 
necessarily precludes the belief that she deserves to be the target of anger. Nichols' 
explanation is the best explanation.
3. Motivating an alternative account
A common motivation for claiming that a belief is involved with an emotion is that 
it is required in order to explain the apparent inappropriateness of instances of that 
emotion. For example, one reason to think that fear is an emotion that is inappropriate 
when one is clearly not in danger is that fear is involved with the belief that one is in 
 Watson 1987, 275-276.308
 Nichols 2007, 415.309
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danger. Therefore, when one is clearly not in danger, and one is nevertheless afraid, 
one's fear is inappropriate, given that it is involved with a belief that is epistemically 
unjustified.  At first glance it would seem that the anger-retributivist is likely to have 310
more traction with this sort of claim. As Galen Strawson points out, "it seems that they 
[the reactive emotions] stand in a sufficiently close relation to [retributive] beliefs...to 
depend for their correctness or appropriateness on the correctness of those beliefs".  311
Targeting the undeserving with anger is typically inappropriate. However, there 
are cases in which targeting the undeserving with anger is not inappropriate. I explore 
such cases in detail below. For the moment, I wish to focus on the vast majority of 
cases in which anger at the undeserving is inappropriate, as I think those cases tell us 
something important about anger's relation to retributive beliefs. I take it to be quite 
difficult for any human who assesses themselves as a moral individual to commit an act 
that they know requires justification without also intuiting that they are justified in doing 
so. This thesis carries armchair plausibility as well as a good deal of empirical support. 
Decades of cognitive dissonance studies have found that those who assess themselves 
as moral individuals are so averse to acting in a way that conflicts with this assessment 
that ad-hoc justifications for their behavior will seem to them to obtain, often at the 
expense of deeply-held beliefs.  Given that most of us are moral beings who 312
understand that acting on our anger requires justification, any expression of wide-profile 
anger challenges our view of ourselves as moral individuals in the absence of an 
 See Kendal Walton's discussion of 'quasi-fear' (January 1978, 5-27).310
 Strawson, G. 2008, 92-100. Also see Strawson, G. 1986, 80; Murphy 1988; Scheffler 1992, 313-316 311
and 2003, 71.
 See especially the review by Joshua Knobe and Brian Leiter (2007).312
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intuition that the expression of anger is justified. So, an expression of anger will typically 
be involved with an intuition that expressing anger is justified. We tend to believe what 
we intuit. So, an expression of anger will typically be involved with the belief that 
expressing anger is justified
In most cases in which we are angry, there is no non-desert based justification to 
target a wrongdoer with anger. That she deserves to be targeted 'just because' she did 
wrong is often the only putative justification available. This explains why anger not only 
seems to be, but often is inappropriate when a desert-based justification is clearly 
lacking; our anger is involved with the belief that the anger is justified, and in most 
cases we believe, correctly, that there are no desert-free justifications available. Hence 
the inappropriateness of the anger when we believe that a desert-based option is also 
unavailable. We've simply run out of justifications.
My claim, then, is that it is psychologically difficult, perhaps impossible, for a 
normal adult who assesses herself as moral to target an individual with an expression of 
wide-profile anger without also believing that she is justified in doing so. This explains 
why anger at the undeserving is often inappropriate. What about cases in which an 
emoter rightly believes that they have some desert-free justification available? Here I 
wish to concede that the belief that one has a desert-free justification to express anger 
is unlikely to offer sufficient motivational force against desert-based values. Most of us 
disvalue harming an agent if we believe that she does not deserve it. One reason for 
our natural reluctance to accept consequentialist theories of punishment is precisely 
because this disvalue tends to generate an emotional aversion to the conclusion that it 
is sometimes obligatory to harm those apparently undeserving of it. This is especially 
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true when the consequences of the harm are only marginally better than they would 
have been in its absence. Without values of sufficient strength, our emotional aversion 
to treating persons as mere means will often keep many of us from actually targeting 
the non-deserving with anger even when we are clearly justified in doing so. That is why 
I endorse what I call the practical view of anger, or
Practicalism: it is psychologically practical for a normal adult to target an 
individual with an expression of wide-profile anger if (i) she believes she is 
sufficiently justified in doing so, and (ii) values acting on that justification more 
than she disvalues harming the targeted individual.
3.1 Protest anger
Take an interaction Frederick Douglass describes in his autobiography. He writes 
of the aftermath of his first fight against a brutally oppressive slave-master who 
attempted to whip him for no good reason. It was a fight that lasted "nearly two hours," 
and carried with it the risk of death for Douglass. 
The whole six months afterwards, that I spent with Mr. Covey, he never laid the 
weight of his finger upon me in anger...This battle with Mr. Covey was the 
turning-point in my career as a slave. It rekindled the few expiring embers of 
freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood. It recalled the 
departed self-confidence, and inspired me again with a determination to be free. 
The gratification afforded by the triumph was a full compensation for whatever 
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else might follow, even death itself. He only can understand the deep satisfaction 
which I experienced, who has himself repelled by force the bloody arm of slavery. 
I felt as I never felt before. It was a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of 
slavery, to the heaven of freedom. My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice 
departed, bold defiance took its place; and I now resolved that, however long I 
might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave 
in fact. I did not hesitate to let it be known of me, that the white man who 
expected to succeed in whipping, must also succeed in killing me. From this time 
I was never again what might be called fairly whipped, though I remained a slave 
four years afterwards. I had several fights, but was never whipped.313
Douglass speaks of deservingness occasionally in his autobiography. And it is unlikely 
that he lacked the belief that Covey deserved to be targeted by anger. But notice that 
Douglass never explicitly attributes his oppressor with deserving anything at all, much 
less as deserving to be targeted by anger or any other detrimental treatment. Rather, 
Douglass vividly recounts only the terribleness of Covey's oppression, and the good 
consequences that came about from angrily fighting against him in response to that 
oppression. His justification at the time of the fight was that Covey "had used me like a 
brute for six months, and that I was determined to be used so no longer" . The former 314
conjunct indicates the immoral action to which Douglass is responding. The latter 
contains a response that is instrumental to stopping any further moral transgressions. 
 Douglass 2009, 78. For a discussion of the merits of Douglass's anger, see Bell 2009.313
 Douglass 2009, 77.314
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Though it's Covey in specific that Douglass is reacting to, it's fighting off "the bloody arm 
of slavery" and a determination to not be used "like a brute" that is his justification for 
the reaction. Douglass's overt expression of anger was not mere narrow-profile anger. It 
was sustained. It survived rational reflection. It was wide-profile anger. 
I take it that someone in a position like Douglass's could target a person like 
Covey with an overt expression of this anger while also lacking the belief that the target 
deserves to be the target of the anger. After all, the valuable consequences of this overt 
expression for Douglass were obvious and overwhelming. And even if someone in 
Douglass's position, perhaps Douglass himself, would have come to lack the belief that 
his oppressor deserved any sort of harmful treatment, it is almost certain to be the case 
that he would find it difficult, perhaps psychologically impossible given his situation, to 
value Covey's well-being enough for this disbelief to be motivationally salient. For a 
person in Douglass's position, the instrumental value of making a vicious oppressor like 
Covey worse-off far outweighs the value of Covey's well-being. This weighting of values 
surely has strong motivational force. 
With this in mind, it seems psychologically practical, even easy, for a person in 
such a situation to coherently reason that, "I'm angry at Covey for his lifetime of 
viciousness towards me and numerous others. Given the conditioning of his upbringing 
and social environment, I don't believe that Covey himself deserves to be targeted by 
this anger. But I don't care much about Covey's well-being, or of his lack of 
deservingness. Nor should I. Instead, I deeply value the end of Covey's oppression. And 
I am certainly justified in making Covey worse-off by acting on my anger as a means to 
these far better ends." Again, I'm not claiming Douglass himself had these beliefs, or 
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reasoned or emoted in this way, but merely that these circumstances could easily elicit 
such reasoning and emoting.
An anger-retributivist might allege that someone in Douglass's position would 
have the relevant retributive belief, but simply fail to realize it. I don't find this response 
compelling. Although there are cases in which beliefs are not introspectively available, it 
is implausible that a retributive belief would elude an emoter in such a case. After all, if 
such an emoter held a belief that she believed to be false, she would surely feel some 
psychological tension. But it is intuitive that a retributive skeptic in Douglass's position 
would feel no psychological tension targeting a vicious oppressor like Covey with an 
expression of desert-free anger. So there is not good evidence that the emoter holds a 
retributive belief. In the absence of such evidence, it would be uncharitable to attribute 
such a belief to the emoter, as doing so would amount to attributing a seemingly rational 
person with irrationality. 
The kind of scenario envisaged here is not rare. Many wrongdoers, regardless of 
circumstances undermining their desert, are part of oppressive systems too terrible to 
elicit any sympathy. They are part of social systems that wantonly harm by way of 
fatuous prejudice, ruthless psychological abuse, or violent oppression. They are racists, 
bigots, domestic abusers, bullies, and despots. The systems of which such individuals 
participate, and the individuals themselves, don't always respond to sorrow or pleas for 
mercy. Sometimes, anger is a much more effective tool.  315
3.2 Reformative anger
 Bell 2009; Nichols 2007.315
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Consider next anger that is reformative. There are many cases in which we 
believe that, despite some amount of immediate harm, an agent will be made much 
better-off overall by being targeted by an overt expression of anger. Consider the 
following case. 
Because of the turmoil of a recent divorce, Jim's teenage daughter Sandra 
begins stealing from the corner store. This angers Jim. Jim has refrained from 
overtly expressing his anger because he rightly believes that doing so will hurt 
Sandra's feelings, and that Sandra, being compelled to steal by the turmoil at 
home, does not deserve any adverse treatment. Instead, he disciplines her as 
best he can in other ways, expressing sorrow and remorse all the while. But she 
is not particularly receptive. She continues to steal. Jim comes to believe that 
hurting Sandra's feelings by way of an overt expression of his anger will compel 
her to refrain from theft, and that this will make her much better off in the long 
run. Jim believes this justifies expressing his anger and, being a loving parent, 
values his daughter's being made better-off overall far more than he disvalues 
the small amount of her displeasure that is a means to that end. 
My intuition is that Jim can express desert-free anger. There is a concern that this kind 
of anger is merely 'feigned'. But there are crucial physiological and psychological 
differences between feigned anger and reformative anger. A paradigm example of 
feigned anger is the outburst of a professional stage actor. A stage actor's feigned anger 
may be behaviorally identical to genuine anger. And yet an actor's adrenaline, heart 
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rate, and skin-conductance are unlikely to increase, and there won't be any motivation 
to harm the target of the performance. An actor would be shocked if her outburst were 
to actually hurt her fellow performer. In contrast, every time Jim catches Sandra 
stealing, he develops the physiological and psychological symptoms that feigned anger 
lacks. He's not acting like he's angry. He's actually angry. This happens to parents all 
the time when their children act wrongly. Jim may not enjoy that Sandra is hurt by his 
expression of anger, but he expects that it will, and would be shocked if it didn't. 
I grant that, phenomenologically, there is likely to be a difference between anger 
aimed at an agent for reformative purposes, and anger aimed at an agent as retribution. 
Specifically, I think the expression of retributive anger tends to feel good, while anger 
expressed solely for reformative purposes probably does not. This is because only the 
latter is aimed at helping the target, and as such is involved with personal values that 
speak against the momentary harms that are inflicted. Jim, for example, is acting on his 
anger as a last resort for precisely this reason. Although this is an interesting difference 
between reformative anger and retributive anger, it is not one that is relevant to the 
debate.
It's an open question as to just how often anger would be helpful in this way. 
Christopher Bennett, Michael McKenna, and Karin Boxer have all recently argued that 
the harm of being targeted with anger tends to bring about much better circumstances 
overall for the immoral agent, as well as the members of her moral community. It can 
bring about a sort of healing process between the immoral agent and her victim 
involving remorse, apology, and ultimately reconciliation.  I am highly skeptical that 316
 Bennett 2002; 2008; McKenna 2012; Boxer 2013.316
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anger is typically more conducive to such effects than non-hostile alternatives. However, 
given that it is common amongst many cultures to seek apology and reconciliation by 
way of overt expressions of anger, and that most immoral agents are reverent to these 
cultural norms, it seems plausible (though this is a speculation that can only be 
corroborated by empirical research) that in a small but substantial number of cases an 
expression of anger will result in more good than any non-hostile alternative.
4. Conclusion
The anger-retributivist may not share my intuitions, and may object that all these 
examples do is pit practicalist intuitions against theirs. However, I take it as a source of 
agreement that we ought to strive for parsimony in theorizing about psychological 
states. Practicalism attributes fewer beliefs to emoters than anger-retributivism, but 
attempts to explain the phenomena under investigation just as well. It is the simpler 
view. In an intuition standoff, parsimony puts the onus on anger-retributivists to provide 
something aside from their particular intuitions to defend their more complex view. My 
hope is that I have argued persuasively in section 2 against the support that has been 
offered by anger-retributivists thus far. If so, the ball is now in their court.
The results of anger are typically bad. Among other things, it can distort our 
beliefs. It can damage personal relationships. It can lead to childish and destructive 
behavior. So it is often the case that anger lacks any desert-free justification. Retributive 
skepticism undermines the only remaining putative justification. That being so, 
abstaining from anger will often be the best course of action. However, not all 
expressions of anger lack justification in the absence of desert. We value acting on 
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some of those justifications - for example those in the interest of moral protest and 
reformation - far more than we disvalue the harm caused to the target of anger. Such 
anger is not only justified. It is practical and rational. In these cases, desert-free anger is 
for the retributive skeptic like lactose-free milk is for the allergic; perhaps it's not as 
tasty, but it serves just as well. 
 148
Appendix: In Defense of BRW
As stated above, I think it's plausible that
BRW: an agent deserves to be blamed for φ-ing only if it is wrong that s/he φ's 
all-things-considered.317
Two different kinds of arguments have been offered against BRW. The first relies on the 
'subjective view' of blameworthiness. The second relies on a conclusion alleged to be 
supported by Frankfurt cases. I explain and argue against each in turn.
1. The subjective view of blameworthiness
Consider the following case, offered by Ishtayique Haji.
Cure: Suppose doctor Deadly is responsible for the treatment of some patient, 
Bennie. Suppose all the available evidence indicates that Bennie is suffering 
from a dangerous disease that we will call 'Malady.' Suppose Malady can easily 
be cured by administering one dose of medicine A, but exacerbated to the point 
where it proves fatal if a patient suffering from it is given a single dose of 
medicine B. Suppose wicked Deadly gives Bennie medicine B with the express 
intention of killing Bennie. But luckily, suppose the diagnosis is incorrect. Bennie 
is in fact suffering from Malaise, a disease that gives rise to symptoms almost 
 Widerker 1991, 223; Wallace 1994, 12, 135; Copp 1997, 445; Pereboom 2009, 170; Nelkin 2011, 317
100-107; Boxer 2013, 64. I intend φ-ing to include refraining.
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indistinguishable from the ones to which Malady gives rise. Suppose, finally, that 
a dose of B given to a patient suffering from Malaise safely cures Bennie, but a 
dose of A given to a patient stricken with Malaise instantly kills him.  318
As Haji points out, Deadly's administering the cure is not impermissible. On the contrary, 
it is obligatory; Deadly ought to administer the cure, all things considered. Nevertheless, 
Haji claims that Deadly deserves to be blamed for administering the cure.  According 319
to Haji, echoing a view by Zimmerman, the case supports the 'subjective' view of 
blameworthiness that desert of blame for an action does not require that an agent 
transgresses a moral obligation, but only requires that she "performs the action in light 
of the belief that she is doing wrong."  Hence, BRW is false.320
I find this troubling. First, the subjective view entails false conclusions to other 
cases. A parent in the deep south may firmly believe, justifiably, given her upbringing 
and social circumstances, that she is obligated to brutally whip her son for his 
homosexual tendencies. Despite this firmly held belief, she may, due to purely 
 Haji 1998, 51. Also see his 2002, 172, as well as Zimmerman 1997, 236; Scanlon 2008, 124-125.318
 Haji 1998, 51.319
 Haji 1998, 52. Also see Zimmerman 1988, 40-40. In the work in which he presents the above case, 320
Haji endorses only the desert of the sort of aretaic blame - what I call 'moral disapproval' - I discussed at 
the outset. He says that "the blame in consideration is manifestly inward and not overt. It is the sort of 
blame registered when we say things like 'she is deserving of blame for pilfering the pie'; or 'she is to 
blame for letting the candle go out.' The fact that a person can be deserving of moral blame even in the 
absence of anyone else's being aware that she is so deserving underscores the inward nature of such 
blame" (Haji 1998, 9). However, in a more recent work, Haji speculates that "perhaps the praise and 
blame in question comprise overt praise and blame respectively. Such praise or blame consists in 
reaction to, or treatment of, a person on account of some deed performed by that person, the reaction 
being positive (like a pat on the back) in the case of praise, and negative (like a scowl or a reprimand) in 
the case of blame." He is then explicit that overt blame for an act does not imply that the deserving agent 
ought not to have performed it (Haji 2002, 40). Zimmerman certainly seems to have such blame in mind 
when he discusses liability for acts that are not wrong (1988, 180).
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prudential considerations (such as squeamishness) not whip her son. Just as in Cure, 
the subjective view of blameworthiness implies that, since this parent acts in light of the 
belief that she is doing wrong, she deserves blame for not whipping her son.  This is 321
an incredibly counterintuitive conclusion considering that this parent is morally forbidden 
from whipping her son. The correct conclusion is that this parent does not deserve 
blame for not whipping her son. BRW entails this conclusion. 
Second, the subjective view of blameworthiness leads to an unfair sort of double-
standard. Doctor Deadly 'ought' to have administered medicine B, all things considered. 
It was easy for Deadly to administer B, he had no moral reservations about doing so, 
and demanding him to do so would not have harmed him in any way. This being the 
case, it seems at least in principle fair to Deadly to demand him to administer B. If we 
accept Haji's conclusion that Doctor Deadly is worthy of blame for administering B, then 
it would seem that Doctor Deadly deserves to be blamed for an action that it was fair to 
demand that he do. But that is unfair. To demand Deadly to administer the cure 
indicates that the demander will not accept noncompliance with the demand. But to then 
blame Deadly for complying with that demand is to do just the opposite; it is to not 
accept compliance with the demand. That is needlessly unfair. Deadly would seem to be 
damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.
For these reasons and others, I have a strong intuition that Deadly does not 
deserve blame for administering the cure.  As David Copp argues, if a person like 322
Deadly deserves blame, it is instead for being "willing to do something that he believed 
 Haji 1998, 321
 One of the alternative desert bases sometimes cited in cases such as this is that Deadly deserves 322
blame for trying to kill Bennie. Justine Capes (2012) has persuasively argued against that proposal.
 151
to be wrong".  Dana Nelkin and Gideon Rosen further specify that a person like 323
Deadly will be blameworthy when it is a terrible character trait or intention - for example 
maliciousness - that motivates his willingness to do something that he believes to be 
wrong.  Indeed, in discussion of a similar case, Justin Capes argues that an agent is 324
blameworthy for committing a morally permissible action if she does it out of ill will, and 
"despite believing that it was wrong".  It is quite plausible on nearly any moral theory 325
that being willing to maliciously do something one believes to be wrong is itself 
wrong.  That's the best explanation for blameworthiness in the sorts of cases that 326
those endorsing the subjective view appeal to. But that explanation doesn't support the 
subjective view. So the subjective view of blameworthiness is unmotivated.
2. An appeal to Frankfurt cases against BRW
Haji offers a different sort of argument to the conclusion that blame can be 
deserved for bad actions and characteristics that are not wrong. It is as follows. An 
agent can transgress a moral obligation to not φ only if the agent ought not φ, all things 
considered. Following Kant's 'ought-implies-can' dictum , Haji argues, along with many 327
others, that it is wrong for an agent to φ only if that agent can avoid φ-ing. But the 
characters in Frankfurt cases (to be discussed in detail below) could not avoid their 
deliberations, decisions, or actions. So characters in Frankfurt cases can't have done 
 Copp 1997, 449.323
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wrong by deliberating, deciding, or acting as they did. However, it is widely agreed that 
the characters in Frankfurt cases can nevertheless deserve blame for deciding or acting 
as they did. So it follows that an agent can deserve blame for his action or characteristic 
even if that action or characteristic is not wrong.  More formally,328
(1) It is wrong for an agent to φ only if that agent can avoid φ-ing.
(2) Agents in Frankfurt cases cannot avoid φ-ing.
(3) So (from 1 and 2), it is not wrong for agents in Frankfurt cases to φ.
(4) Nevertheless, agents in Frankfurt cases can deserve to be blamed for φ-ing.
(5) So (from 3 and 4) agents can deserve to be blamed for φ-ing even if it is not 
wrong for them to φ.
Hence, BRW is false. The argument is valid. But in the remainder of this section I argue 
that a careful investigation of Frankfurt cases shows that (4) is false. Two specifications 
are in order. 
First, agents can be derivatively blameworthy for actions for which they had no 
alternative. A paradigm case concerns intoxication. Suppose one of Jones's patients 
has a heart attack. Jones is called in from a dinner party. If sober, Jones could easily 
fulfill his duty to save the patient's life. Unfortunately, Jones has been drinking. Because 
of his intoxication, he can't save his patient's life. Does Jones deserve to be blamed for 
failing to save his patient's life? That depends. At the time Jones decided to drink, he 
either had sufficient reason to believe his patient might need his help, or he didn't. If he 
 Haji 1998, 53-59.328
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did, then he knowingly decided to deprive himself of the ability to save a patient that 
might need his help. In that case, it's intuitive that he deserves to be blamed for that 
decision. If Jones did not have sufficient reason to believe his patient might need him, 
then Jones does not deserve to be blamed for taking a drink. It seems Jones 
derivatively deserves blame for failing to save his patient's life only insofar as he non-
derivatively deserves blame for this prior decision. Henceforth, the non-derivative desert 
of blame is what I will mean by 'blameworthiness'.
Second, the sense of 'can' that is relevant in this kind of argument was long 
thought to be nothing more than alternative possibilities simpliciter. That is why Harry 
Frankfurt originally argued against the 'principle of alternative possibilities'. A long 
debate about the issue revealed that the relevant sort of principle is more specifically 
the principle of robust alternatives
PRA: A is blameworthy for φ-ing only if she had a robust alternative to φ-ing. 
Derk Pereboom offers the following formulation of a robust alternative:
Robust alternative: For an agent to have a robust alternative to an immoral action 
A, that is, an alternative relevant per se to explaining why s/he is blameworthy for 
performing A, it must be that
(i) s/he instead could have voluntarily acted or refrained from acting as a result 
of which s/he would be blameless, and
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(ii) for at least one such exempting acting or refraining, s/he was cognitively 
sensitive to the fact that s/he could so voluntarily act or refrain, and to the fact 
that if s/he voluntarily so acted or refrained s/he would then be, or would likely 
be, blameless.329
2.1 Pereboom's Frankfurt case
Several decades ago, Harry Frankfurt offered an intriguing style of thought 
experiment alleged to be a counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities.  330
Derk Pereboom has ingeniously adapted Frankfurt's original thought experiment to both 
apply to PRA, and be insulated from many influential critiques. Suppose that
Grey: Adam is perched near the window of an abandoned warehouse, his rifle 
aimed at Bennie, the benevolent leader of a neighboring country. He's 
deliberating about whether or not to assassinate Bennie. His motivations to 
assassinate Bennie are strong. They're so strong that he will refrain from 
deciding to assassinate only if he becomes more attentive to a particular moral 
reason against assassination. Specifically, Adam will not decide to assassinate 
Bennie only if he becomes more attentive to the suffering the assassination will 
cause. Though Adam's attentiveness to this moral reason is necessary, it is not 
sufficient for him to refrain from deciding to assassinate Bennie. After all, he 
could still freely decide to assassinate Bennie, even while attending to this moral 
 Pereboom 2014, 13. Pereboom considers decisions as kinds of actions, as do I.329
 Frankfurt 1969.330
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reason. Unbeknownst to Adam, a CIA operative, 'Grey' has been ordered to 
ensure that Adam's assassination succeed. Grey has the ability, by way of 
neurological manipulation, to control Adam's decisions. She intends that Adam 
decide to assassinate Bennie, and will cause Adam to do so if she sees that 
Adam becomes attentive to the moral reason against assassination. But as it 
turns out, Adam never attends to this moral reason. So Grey never has to 
intervene. Subsequently, Adam decides to act exactly as Grey had planned.  331
Adam has the alternative available to him of becoming attentive to the moral reason 
against transgressing. But Pereboom argues that this alternative is not robust. Adam 
neither believes, nor has reason to believe, that becoming more attentive to the moral 
reason will trigger an intervention that will cause him to decide as he does. On the 
contrary, he deliberates and decides to act on the false assumption that he could refrain 
from deciding as he does. So the presence of Grey deprives Adam of any robust 
alternatives to his decision.  But many nevertheless intuit that agents such as Adam 332
still non-derivatively deserve to be blamed for their decisions. Hence, PRA is false.
2.2 Ginet's critique
I remain unconvinced by such examples. Adam must decide by a certain time, 
say t3, or he will miss his opportunity to assassinate Bennie. So if Adam is going to 
 Pereboom's original example involves tax evasion. However, considering the obviously immoral 331
practices that tax dollars are used to support - drone strikes, for example - it is highly controversial that it 
is immoral to evade taxes. I appeal instead to an uncontroversially immoral action - assassinating a 
benevolent leader for no good reason. This 'Grey' case is in all other respects identical to the 'tax evasion' 
case presented in Pereboom 2014, 15. Also see Pereboom 2012. 
 Pereboom 2014, 15-16.332
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refrain from deciding, he must become attentive to the moral reason at the time t2 just 
prior to t3. So by t3, Adam has already either become attentive to the moral reason, or 
decided. If Adam has already become attentive, then Grey will have intervened by 
causing Adam to decide. In that case, Adam is not blameworthy for deciding as he does 
because his decision will have been caused by Grey. But if Adam has already 
voluntarily decided prior to t3, without any intervention, then it is clear that he is already 
blameworthy for deciding at the precise time that he does. 
Carl Ginet argues, correctly I think, that this judgment does not conflict with 
PRA.  At the precise time that Adam decides - let us suppose it is t1 - Adam could 333
have instead been attending to the moral reason. This available alternative is robust at 
t1. For by voluntarily attending to the moral reason at t1 Adam would have been 
refraining from deciding to do wrong. And Adam is surely cognitively sensitive to the fact 
that, if he refrains from deciding to do wrong at a certain time, he will not be 
blameworthy for deciding to do wrong at that precise time. So PRA is consistent with the 
intuition that Adam is blameworthy for deciding at the exact moment that he does.
On the other hand, many lack the intuition that Adam is blameworthy for deciding 
by t3. As Ginet points out, Adam is clearly blameless for the fact that, if he "had not 
[decided] earlier, he would have [decided] by t3."  That is instead a fact attributable to 334
Grey. "But that fact is equivalent to the fact that [Adam decided] by t3."  Hence, Adam 335
is not blameworthy "for the obtaining of the temporally less specific state of affairs of his 
 Ginet 1996 and 2002.333
 Ginet 2002, 308.334
 Ginet 2002, 308.335
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[deciding] by t3".  Apparent intuitions to the contrary rest on a failure to carefully 336
distinguish between being blameworthy for deciding at t1 and being blameworthy for 
deciding by t3. This failure is to be expected considering that Adam would have been 
just as blameworthy, and for the same reasons, for the latter as he would the former, 
had Grey not been present.  Hence, PRA is not challenged by Frankfurt style 337
examples.
2.3 Pereboom's response
Pereboom offers the following response. Ginet's timing criticism rests on the 
claim that any initial intuition that PRA is false is elicited by a failure to carefully 
distinguish Adam's deciding at t1 and deciding by t3. According to Ginet, we fail to make 
this distinction because Adam would have been just as blameworthy, and for the same 
reasons, for the latter as he would the former, had a Frankfurt intervener not been in 
place. But consider the following case.
Bomb: Adam knows he has the opportunity to set a bomb to explode exactly at 
t4, killing Bennie instantaneously. Suppose that factors beyond Adam's control 
causally determine him to decide to set this bomb, but leave it up to him at which 
instant during a short interval, beginning at t0 up to and including t3, he makes 
the decision. More precisely, factors beyond his causal reach causally determine 
him to have a desire to kill Bennie so powerful that he will inevitably make this 
 Ginet 1996, 407.336
 Ginet 1996, 406-407.337
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decision at some time in this interval. Adam first has this desire just before t0. It 
would persist to t3 were he not to decide before then, and would not alter in 
strength during the interval. This last instant, t3, is the deadline because Adam 
believes, correctly, that the bomb is rigged not to explode if he decides any later. 
Due to Adam's being cognitively sensitive to the strength of his desire, from the 
time just before t0 he believes with certainty that he will decide by t3. The bomb 
will explode at t4 no matter which of these instants he makes the decision. Adam 
understands that at which of these instants he decides makes no difference 
morally, and as a result he is indifferent among them.338
Suppose Adam decides to set the bomb at t1. According to Pereboom, all 
incompatibilists are committed to the conclusion that Adam is blameless for deciding at 
this time. Because leeway incompatibilists like Ginet rely on PRA to show why 
determinism renders agents blameless, the reason that Ginet must cite for the 
conclusion that Adam is blameless for deciding at t1 is that Adam lacks a robust 
alternative. However, Adam does not lack a robust alternative to deciding at t1. Rather, 
Adam has no alternative to deciding at t3, if he hasn't done so earlier. So "the only 
plausible candidate for explaining Adam's blamelessness is the unavailability of an 
alternative to making the decision by t3, and thus on the leeway incompatibilist view, 
this unavailability would have to be sufficient for Adam's not being blameworthy at t1."339
 Pereboom offers this case in correspondence as a cleaner version of his original 'Adam' case (2012 338
and 2014, 24-25).
 Pereboom 2014, 25.339
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Adam is not deprived of a robust alternative to deciding prior to t3. He is only 
deprived of a robust alternative to deciding by t3. So the leeway incompatibilist must 
also conclude that this lack renders Adam blameless at t1. Hence, in Grey, Ginet cannot 
consistently claim that Adam would have been just as blameworthy for deciding at t1, 
and for the same reasons, as he would be for deciding by t3, had a Frankfurt intervener 
not been in place. Still, the Grey case generates the "strong intuition that [Adam] is 
blameworthy at t1, for which the leeway incompatibilist now has no explanation."340
2.4 Against Pereboom's response
All leeway incompatibilists will agree that, in Bomb, Adam is not morally 
responsible for deciding by t3 because 
R: Adam has no alternative to deciding at t3, if he hasn't done so earlier.
However, leeway incompatibilists are not committed to the conclusion that R is the 
explanation of Adam's blamelessness for deciding to kill Bennie at t1. There's a vast 
difference between committing to φ, and deciding when to φ. Adam certainly commits to 
killing Bennie. But given the details of the case, that is a commitment he made at t0. 
Consider a case Pereboom offers as analogous to Adam's situation.
Suppose my kids are very hungry, it's now t0, I need to leave at t3, and I am 
committed with certainty to feeding them before I leave. Suppose I can refrain 
 Pereboom 2014, 26.340
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from feeding them at t1. It's highly credibly that this is only because I know that I 
can feed them a little later, and not because I can refrain from feeding them at all 
by t3.341
The reason Pereboom can't refrain from feeding his kids by t3 is because, given the 
strength of his attitudes and desires, and his sensitivity to them, he's already committed 
to feeding them by t3. For Pereboom, the question is no longer 'if' he will feed his kids. It 
is merely a question of 'when.' More generally, if an agent believes with good reason 
that her motivations for φ-ing will remain fixed in strength, and that those motivations 
guarantee that s/he will φ regardless of any further deliberation or efforts of her agency, 
then the agent has already committed to φ-ing. 
An agent can be blameworthy for an immoral commitment if s/he formed it freely, 
but can't be if s/he didn't. To see why, reconsider Bomb. According to the setup of 
Bomb, Adam strongly desires to kill Bennie. He knows at t0 that, because his current 
motivations for killing Bennie will remain fixed in strength, he will kill Bennie by t3 
regardless of any further deliberation or efforts of agency. For Adam, it is no longer a 
question of 'if' he will kill Bennie. It is merely a question of 'when'. So at t0, Adam is 
already committed to killing Bennie. Suppose Adam had a robust alternative to forming 
this commitment prior to t0. For example, suppose prior to t0 he knew he could stop his 
desire to kill from becoming so strong by focusing on a moral reason against killing, but 
freely did not do so because of his own nefarious goals. In that case, it's intuitive that 
Adam can be blameworthy for forming the immoral commitment at t0. However, in 
 Pereboom 2014, 25.341
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Bomb, Adam has no alternative at t0 to forming the commitment to kill Bennie. So, given 
leeway sensibilities, Adam is blameless for committing at t0 to kill Bennie. 
Granted, Adam must now decide when to kill Bennie, or more precisely, when to 
act on his commitment to kill Bennie. But as Pereboom points out, because the bomb 
will explode exactly at t4 no matter which time Adam chooses, it makes no moral 
difference when Adam decides to act on his immoral commitment to kill Bennie. So the 
fact that Adam decides to act on his immoral commitment at t1 makes Adam no more or 
less blameworthy than if he had decided to act at some other time in the sequence. 
Adam is unavoidably committed to killing Bennie. That fact, and not R, renders him 
blameless. The strict deadline in R is, in fact, entirely irrelevant. Suppose that
Coma: Adam is a hospital worker where Bennie will be in an induced coma for at 
least a year. Adam has a strong desire to kill Bennie starting at t0. Adam knows 
he's going to have sporadic opportunities to pull the plug on Bennie over the next 
year. He also knows that his strong desire to kill Bennie won't alter in strength. 
Adam has no desire to restrain himself indefinitely. That being the case, he 
knows he'll kill Bennie at some time in the near future regardless of any further 
deliberation or efforts of his agency. 
On my view, Adam has already committed in Coma to killing Bennie at some time in the 
near future, even though he hasn't decided precisely when to act on this commitment, 
and there's no strict deadline for doing so. If Adam had some robust alternative to 
forming this commitment at t0, then it's intuitive that he can be blameworthy for forming 
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it. But if Adam has no robust alternative for forming this commitment at t0, it's intuitive 
that he's not blameworthy for it, despite there being no strict deadline. That's the 
conclusion entailed by PRA.
This 'unavoidable commitment' explanation is consistent with Ginet's timing 
criticism. Again, Ginet's explanation is that, in the Grey case, Adam decides at t1 to 
assassinate Bennie with a robust alternative available. Intuitively, he's blameworthy for 
that decision. But it is not intuitive that Adam is blameworthy for deciding by t3 to 
assassinate Bennie since that is a fact attributable to Grey. Notice that this explanation 
remains viable even if we stipulate that Adam forms a commitment to kill Bennie at t1, 
but takes a moment to better aim his gun and consequently does not act on his immoral 
commitment until after the t2 deadline. Intuitively, he's still blameworthy. The reason is 
that, on this variation of the case, the basis of blameworthiness - his commitment to kill - 
has already occurred in the absence of any intervention, and in the presence of a robust 
alternative. When he decides to act on the commitment needn't matter.
In response to this criticism, Pereboom offers a reformulation of the Bomb 
case.  Suppose that Adam falsely believes that his desire doesn't guarantee that he 342
kill Bennie by t3. As Pereboom points out, because Adam is ignorant of the fact that his 
desire does guarantee he kill Bennie by t3, my view does not entail that Adam has 
committed to killing Bennie yet. Nor is that a plausible conclusion. Adam is uncommitted 
if he doesn't believe that his current motivations guarantee him to kill Bennie by t3. As 
long as Adam remains unsure, he can remain uncommitted up until the t3 deadline. 
Pereboom contends that, because of R, leeway incompatibilists will nevertheless intuit 
 In correspondence. 342
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that Adam is blameless for deciding at t1 to kill Bennie even though Adam has a robust 
alternative to this decision at t1.
It's unlikely that intuitions will play in Pereboom's favor. After all, Adam knows that 
his desire doesn't guarantee him to decide at t1 to kill Bennie. And Adam falsely 
believes that he can decide not to kill Bennie at any future time. So Adam could have 
decided at t1 to not kill Bennie.  That alternative is robust. Adam makes his immoral 343
decision anyway. So it's intuitive that he's blameworthy for deciding at t1 to kill Bennie. 
But it's not intuitive that he's blameworthy for deciding by t3 to kill Bennie, as he has no 
robust alternative to that decision. 
In sum, Pereboom's response to Ginet's criticism of Fankfurt cases faces a 
dilemma. Either Adam believes he's guaranteed to kill Bennie, or he doesn't. If he does, 
then it's intuitive that he's blameless. But as I've shown, Adam's true belief, together 
with his other psychological states, entails that he has already committed at t0 to killing 
Bennie. Since Adam has no alternative to that commitment, PRA predicts that he's 
blameless for forming it. When he decides to act on that commitment is irrelevant. So a 
'does believe' variation of the Bomb case is not a counterexample to PRA. If Adam does 
not believe that he's guaranteed to kill Bennie, then Pereboom is correct that Adam has 
a robust alternative to his deciding at t1 to kill Bennie. However, this 'doesn't believe' 
variation of the Bomb case no longer elicits the intuition that Adam is blameless for 
deciding when he does. Nor does PRA entail that conclusion. Either way, Ginet's timing 
criticism in defense of PRA is vindicated against Pereboom's response. An agent 
 Though, as Pereboom points out, Adam has no alternative to eventually deciding to kill Bennie.343
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cannot, then, be blameworthy for any φ-ing for which s/he had no alternative. So 
premise (4) of Haji's argument is false. BRW stands. 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